Explorations in political economy of reforms by Rohac, Dalibor
This electronic thesis or dissertation has been 











The copyright of this thesis rests with the author and no quotation from it or information derived from it 
may be published without proper acknowledgement. 
 
Take down policy 
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing 
details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim. 
END USER LICENCE AGREEMENT                                                                         
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 
International licence. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 
You are free to: 
 Share: to copy, distribute and transmit the work  
 
Under the following conditions: 
 Attribution: You must attribute the work in the manner specified by the author (but not in any 
way that suggests that they endorse you or your use of the work).  
 Non Commercial: You may not use this work for commercial purposes. 
 No Derivative Works - You may not alter, transform, or build upon this work. 
 
Any of these conditions can be waived if you receive permission from the author. Your fair dealings and 












Download date: 06. Nov. 2017
This electronic theses or dissertation has been 









The copyright of this thesis rests with the author and no quotation from it or information 
derived from it may be published without proper acknowledgement. 
 
Take down policy 
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk 
providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim. 
END USER LICENSE AGREEMENT                                                                         
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 
Unported License. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/  
You are free to: 
 Share: to copy, distribute and transmit the work  
 
Under the following conditions: 
 Attribution: You must attribute the work in the manner specified by the author (but not in 
any way that suggests that they endorse you or your use of the work).  
 Non Commercial: You may not use this work for commercial purposes. 
 No Derivative Works - You may not alter, transform, or build upon this work. 
 
Any of these conditions can be waived if you receive permission from the author. Your fair dealings 










Title:Explorations in political economy of reforms
Author:Dalibor Rohac

















Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) in Political Economy 
June 2014 
- 2 - 
 
Abstract 
This thesis studies the role of incentives and beliefs in changes in economic policies and 
institutions, particularly during economic transitions. We motivate our work by 
providing a review of the literature on post-communist economic transitions in the 
introductory chapter. In Chapter 2, we outline the methodological strategies used in the 
thesis. In the subsequent chapters, this broad research agenda is translated into three 
self-contained research projects, which study different attributes of cognitive and 
incentive problems arising in processes of institutional change.  
Chapter 3 uses the idea of policy credibility to explain the persistence of food and 
energy subsidies in Egypt and provides a discussion of how appropriate reform design 
can help overcome the lack of credibility. Chapter 4 outlines a rational choice-based 
explanation for the rise of political Islam in the Middle East. The explanation revolves 
around the claim that religious political groups are able to address the problem of 
credible commitment, ubiquitous in new and emerging democracies. Chapter 5 studies 
the role of cognitive constraints in shaping transitional outcomes, with a focus on post-
communist Czechoslovakia. Besides presenting evidence for systematic differences in 
beliefs between the Czechs and the Slovaks, it argues that measurable differences in 
market attitudes affected policy choices in both countries and led to different 
transitional outcomes. Chapter 6 concludes. 
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1 Towards a New Political Economy of Reforms1 
1.1 Introduction 
Economists often provide input into decisions about public policy. That is not 
surprising. By the standards of social sciences, economics has a uniquely sophisticated 
methodology and a rigorous set of tools of theoretical and empirical analysis. The 
appeal of economics lies also in its substantive subject matter, which includes the 
questions of wealth, unemployment, and economic growth – all of them of interest to 
the public and to policymakers.  
However, it is not obvious that economists are singularly well equipped to understand 
the processes of policy change or to provide advice to policymakers. The aim of this 
thesis is to help outline a research agenda for economists and social scientists who wish 
to gain a better grasp of the processes of policy change. It will highlight the importance 
of two sets of factors, both of them largely omitted from traditional methods of policy 
analysis used by economists. The first set of factors is related to the incentive problems 
involved in changing policies and institutions. We will call these incentive-related 
constraints on policy making. Policy changes that are in the public interest, however 
defined, may not occur if policymakers are self-seekers, and if sufficient mechanisms 
aligning their self-interest with the public interest are not in place. Incentive problems in 
politics can take many different forms and may affect the voters, policymakers, or 
bureaucrats charged with implementing a policy change. In practical terms, these steer 
policymakers and economic agents towards actions that are not in the public interest, 
broadly understood, and encompass rent-seeking, patronage, corruption, or reneging on 
electoral promises. This thesis will focus on a particular category of incentive problems, 
namely problems of credibility. Policies can be understood as contracts between the 
                                                    
1 This chapter draws heavily from material published in Economic Affairs as Roháč (2013b) and Roháč 
(2013d). 
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population and policymakers. Like private contracts, they are based on promises that 
can be broken. The question of how the risk of reneging on promises affects the set of 
possible policy outcomes and the characteristics of the political arena will constitute one 
set of questions that this thesis will purport to address. 
The second set of factors explored in this thesis concerns the beliefs and mental models 
used by policymakers and the public which constrain policy making. We will call these 
cognitive constraints to policy making. Such constraints include factors such as 
ideology and beliefs, as well as various ways in which agents in the real world appear to 
depart from standard economic assumptions of cognitive rationality. One hypothesis, 
explored in Chapter 5 of this thesis, is that measurable differences in policy preferences 
can affect policy choices as well as the economic, social, and political outcomes of 
policies and formal institutions.  
This introductory essay discusses the mechanisms through which cognitive and 
incentive-related constraints affect policy making and how they can help explain the 
variation in policies and institutional arrangements adopted during economic transitions. 
In addition to discussing the mechanisms through which incentives and beliefs matter, 
this chapter illustrates the relevance of cognitive and incentive-related constraints by 
providing a discussion of the existing literature on post-communist economic 
transitions. According to our interpretation, the more successful transition strategies 
were the ones that were more robust with regard to incentive-related constraints and to 
cognitive constraints. Reform successes thus focused policymakers’ attention on 
variables that they could control and provided a simple laundry list of policies that were 
necessary – though not sufficient – for the success of transitions, and enabled 
policymakers circumvent the problem of credible commitment, ubiquitous in 
transitional environments. 
- 10 - 
The three core chapters in this thesis provide case studies of policy making in 
transitional environments, which illustrate the relevance of an approach that revolves 
around incentive problems and beliefs as critical factors shaping policy changes and 
reforms. Chapter 3 focuses on the problem of subsidy reform in Egypt, where wasteful 
subsidies to consumer goods ranging from diesel oil to tea have withstood attempts at 
reform. The interpretation offered revolves around the problem of credibility and the 
inability of policymakers to commit to a reform path that would not be reversible. 
Chapter 4 also focuses on the countries of Middle East and North Africa and provides 
an exposition of the effects credibility problems may have in shaping political 
environments in new and emerging democracies. Specifically, the paper shows how a 
lack of credibility in making electoral promises, pervasive among most political 
organisations in the region, has given a distinct electoral advantage to Islamic parties 
which possess brand names and reputation that can be used towards making believable 
promises about policies. Finally, Chapter 5 focuses on the role of cognitive factors in 
shaping policy outcomes. Drawing on survey data from post-communist 
Czechoslovakia, the paper provides evidence suggesting that differences in beliefs about 
markets and economic policy between the Czechs and the Slovaks could have accounted 
for the different transitional trajectories of the two countries.  
Our approach, combining an emphasis on incentive-related and cognitive problems, is 
not entirely original. Some scholars, most notably Eggertson (2005), Leighton and 
López (2013) or Rodrik (2014), have tried to integrate political economy and models of 
belief formation in order to explain institutional change. Similarly, Ostrom’s (1993) 
distinction between epistemic choice and public choice can be seen as an attempt to 
formulate a research agenda focused on the evolution of institutions and policies. 
Caplan (2007) links the departures from assumptions of cognitive rationality with 
incentive problems existing in politics in order to explain the persistence of bad 
- 11 - 
policies. Similarly, Kuran (1995) explores the implications for the political process of 
the divergence between privately held beliefs and those displayed publicly. In recent 
years, a research agenda has emerged in political economy around the idea of robustness 
of institutions and policies. Robustness is understood as the susceptibility of institutions 
and policies to produce desirable social and economic outcomes even under less-than-
ideal assumptions about the knowledge and benevolence of individuals and 
policymakers (Leeson and Subrick 2006, Pennington 2011). This collection of essays 
seeks to make a contribution to that line of enquiry, with a focus on questions of 
transitions, reforms, and policy change. 
The study of incentive problems in politics has a long history in political economy and 
neighbouring disciplines. Accounts based on poorly or well-aligned incentives in the 
political arena are at the heart of many explanations of modern economic growth, most 
prominently by Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) or North, Wallis and Weingast (2009). 
The roots of the study of incentive problems in politics can be found in the classical 
contributions of Buchanan and Tullock (1962), Tullock (1967) and Buchanan (1967), 
which have given rise to several streams of literature, both theoretical and empirical, 
and varying in their degree of technical sophistication.2  
Credible commitment is a recurrent issue in this area of literature. Originally developed 
to explain the behaviour of central bankers,3 the idea that private agents might not 
believe the announcements made by policymakers about the future trajectory of policy 
has permeated the study of various aspects of policy making, ranging from regulation 
and taxation to electoral behaviour.4 Martinelli (1993) uses the framework of credibility 
constraints and other public choice problems affecting the political process to explain 
                                                    
2 Good, though somewhat dated, overviews of the different approaches and topics are provided by 
Mueller (2003) or Persson and Tabellini (2002). 
3 Kydland and Prescott (1977), Rogoff (1985). 
4 See, e.g., Keefer and Knack (2007), Keefer and Vlaicu (2008), Coyne and Boettke (2009), Talercio 
(2004),Campos and Esfahani (2000), Frye (2004), and Boettke (1995). 
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the dynamics of economic reforms in transitional countries. Two essays included in this 
thesis – Chapters 3 and 4 – will also explore the implications of credibility problems for 
policy reforms and for the character of political markets in transitional environments.  
While the research on incentive problems in political decision-making is developed and 
well-integrated with the economic profession, the exploration of the effects of beliefs 
and cognitive limitations on policy making or institutional change remains limited. At 
an intuitive level, cultural norms and beliefs may be important since they impose 
constraints on individual behaviour. For example, experimental evidence shows that 
cultural backgrounds are associated with different levels of cooperation in public goods 
games.5 At a microeconomic level, Di Tella et al. (2008) find an association between 
left-wing beliefs and individual experience with crime. But can differences in beliefs be 
associated with systematic differences in aggregate economic outcomes? The idea that 
institutions are underpinned by a set of beliefs held by individuals living in a society is 
explored in North (2007). Tentative pieces of evidence suggest that beliefs – or ‘culture’ 
– might be an important factor shaping institutional and economic outcomes. In a study 
of determinants of security of private property, Williamson and Kerekes (2011) find that 
informal constraints are significant, trumping the importance of formal institutions. 
Furthermore, the variation in informal institutions is linked to differences in output 
across countries.6 Similarly, Tabellini (2010), for example, identifies an empirical link 
between cultural norms and economic outcomes, showing that pro-individualistic and 
egalitarian cultures are associated with higher levels of economic development.  
Unfortunately, very little is known about the formation of beliefs and the specific 
mechanisms through which beliefs affect measurable outcomes. Di Tella and 
MacCulloch (2009) explain the joint incidence of leftist beliefs, heavy regulation and 
corruption. In their setting, leftist beliefs are endogenous to the experience of 
                                                    
5 See, e.g., Gächter and Herrmann (2009) or Esarey et al. (2012). 
6 Williamson (2009). 
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‘unpleasant’ capitalists and serve as a mechanism reinforcing heavy regulation, which 
breeds further corruption. In a different vein, Alesina and Fuchs-Schuendeln (2005) 
study the effects of communism on the policy preferences of East Germans after the 
reunification, providing evidence for systematic differences in beliefs between the East 
and West Germans. Working in the context of transitional economies, Runst (2013) 
explains the formation of new firms by differences in cultural norms and attitudes 
towards entrepreneurship. The last chapter of this thesis focuses on the link between 
market-related beliefs and policy formation, using data from post-communist 
Czechoslovakia. The chapter provides evidence for a divergence of beliefs between the 
Czechs and the Slovaks and provides a narrative that explains how that divergence can 
account for the different transitional trajectories of the two countries – without trying to 
formally solve the underlying identification problems. The work in Chapter 5 thus bears 
connection with the earlier research done by Miller, Hesli and Reisinger (1994) who 
find that nationality mattered for the support of reforms in the early 1990s, and Landier 
et al. (2008) who investigate the sources of ‘capitalism aversion’ in the transitional 
countries, as well as the work by Denisova et al. (2007) who investigate the sources of 
support for revising privatisation in transitional countries.  
1.2 The two sets of constraints 
One of the goals of this thesis – ambitious as it may sound – is to gain a better 
understanding of how changes in policies occur, what explains their durability, and 
provide a plausible account of why similarly designed reforms may lead to different 
outcomes in different places. That context matters and that policy prescriptions do not 
always travel well is an accepted fact. However, systematic theories of what shapes the 
success and failure of policy changes are not always readily available.7 
                                                    
7 The existing literature on policy durability has mostly focused on the United States and has not 
produced a systematic model of accounting for differences in durability of policies. See, e.g., Patashnik 
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The claim of this section is that two factors help explain the observed variation: firstly, 
the differences in incentives facing voters, politicians and bureaucrats and, secondly, the 
differences in the beliefs and mental models used by voters and politicians.  
1.2.1 Incentive constraints 
This thesis follows the classic understanding of public choice as the economic study of 
political decision-making that starts from the same motivational assumptions as 
economic analysis of behaviour on private markets. Incentives constrain economic 
reformers at a variety of levels. Most fundamentally, they affect voters’ choice between 
different policy platforms. A rational voter has little incentive to gather pertinent 
information about different policy platforms, and as a result, voters will, in the 
aggregate, remain rationally ignorant, generating a net negative externality in the form 
of uninformed electoral choices. Caplan (2007) takes this line of reasoning one step 
further, providing evidence for the view that political failure is not driven by rational 
ignorance, but rather by systematically biased beliefs, from which individuals derive 
utility. In other words, the political process becomes an avenue through which 
systematically biased beliefs can be expressed, at a low cost to individuals, yet at a 
significant cost to the society as a whole.  
Another reason why socially desirable policies are not always adopted is related to the 
different levels of organisational costs in different groups.8 Small, well-organised 
interest groups are in a better position to solve coordination problems and prisoner 
dilemma-type situations than the public at large, and are therefore more effective in 
influencing the outcomes of the policy-making process.9 Typical manifestations of this 
phenomenon include policies that are costly to the median voter but beneficial to well-
                                                                                                                                                        
(2000, 2003, 2008), Maltzman and Shipan (2008), and Berry, Burden and Howell (2006), Moe (1989). 
On policy durability in the context of developing or transitional countries, see Campos and Esfahani 
(2000), Frye (2004), and Boettke (1995). 
8 Olson (1971). 
9 See Mitchell and Munger (1991) for an overview. 
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organised interest groups, such as trade barriers, occupational licensing, and other 
barriers to market entry. Extreme examples involve the capture of government and 
regulators by interest groups, resulting not only in rules and policies that benefit the 
interest groups but also in their explicit participation in their design and 
implementation.10  
Incentive-related constraints can act either ex-ante, preventing efficiency-enhancing 
reforms from occurring in the first place, or they can apply ex post, leading to the 
reversal of reforms that have already been undertaken. Time inconsistency and 
credibility problems can therefore be described as ex-post constraints on reforms.11  
Economic policies can be seen as contracts between politicians and a decisive part of 
the population, needed for the politicians to control the government. Such contracts, 
broadly understood, can be either contracts between policymakers and a majority of the 
population or, in the case of a lack of democratic governance, between policymakers 
and oligarchic groups that exercise political control over societies. True, contracts 
between politicians and the population do not allow for a central authority to enforce 
them – as is often assumed in neoclassical economics. Our approach follows Greif’s 
(1997) demonstration that contracts can emerge even without legal enforcement, by 
virtue of design of self-enforcing mechanisms. Similar mechanisms may emerge – or 
fail to emerge – in the political realm. Because this thesis is not seeking to make a 
theoretical contribution but rather to explore how some widely accepted rational choice-
based intuitions can explain significant patterns in the real world, it refrains from 
explicit formal modelling of contracting, which tends to be highly technical.12 However, 
the main idea of the policies-as-contracts approach is that politicians seek to obtain the 
support that enables them to control the government apparatus in exchange for policies 
                                                    
10 Stigler (1971), Laffont and Tirole (1991) . 
11 For examples of the work on policy credibility in the context of development and emerging 
democracies, see Keefer and Vlaicu (2008), Keefer and Knack (2007). 
12 See, e.g. Hart and Holmstrom (1987), Salanié (1997), Macho-Stadler and Perez-Castrillo (2001). 
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that deliver benefits for the part of the population that is needed to control the 
government. As with other contracts, these are vulnerable to situations when politicians 
face incentives to deviate from the announced path. 
The situation is visualised on Figure 1. At the first stage of the game, the politician 
proposes a welfare-enhancing reform. At the second stage, the public decides whether 
or not to support the politician’s platform. If the platform is rejected, both the politician 
and the public receive a default pay-off of 1, corresponding to the status quo. If the 
public supports the platform and the politician is elected, the politician has the option of 
either delivering on their promise, generating a pay-off of 2 to the politician and a pay-
off of 4 to the voter. If the politician chooses to renege – e.g. by seizing the whole 
surplus from the reform – they will end up with a pay-off of 6, leaving with the public 
with a pay-off of 0. This setting assumes that the politician can seize the whole surplus 
of the reform without any loss of economic efficiency; that assumption can easily be 
relaxed to allow for a dissipation of a part of the welfare gains in case the politician 
reneges, as long as the pay-off the politician can seize is larger than the pay-off she 
receives should she deliver on her promise. 
- 17 - 
Figure 1 The problem of commitment 
 
In a one-shot game, the outcome (Supports, Delivers) is not attainable because in the 
final stage of the game the politician is tempted to hijack the surplus created by the 
reform by reneging, creating a classic time inconsistency problem. The only subgame 
perfect equilibrium in the game is the one in which the public rejects reform, leaving 
both the public and the politician with a lower pay-off compared to the Pareto superior 
outcome that the reform would have brought if implemented. A rational public will 
reject the reform proposal unless the structure of the game is changed in a way that 
precludes the politician from reneging in the final stage or makes reneging costly for 
him. In other words, the politician needs to find a way of making a credible 
commitment.  
The significance of credibility problems as constraints on economic policy making in 
transitional environments is a theme explored by Boettke (1995). Historically, 
communist economies were subjected to numerous reforms. In the USSR alone, 
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argues, either failed or were reversed at some later stage. In such circumstances, the 
credibility of reformers, especially if they were connected in any way with the previous 
political elite, was contestable. In such an environment, piecemeal reforms were 
perceived as reversible and lacking credibility. One way that the new political elite 
could signal a durable commitment to the new economic and political order was to use 
the brief window of opportunity for rapid and encompassing reforms. True, in an ideal 
environment, a carefully designed sequence of partial reforms could have worked better, 
if the commitment of the elites to the new economic system was known. However, 
gradual sequencing was unlikely to be a viable reform strategy in a situation in which 
such commitment was in doubt. 
1.2.2 Cognitive constraints to economic reforms 
Cognitive constraints to economic policy have several dimensions. At a fundamental 
level, any decision-making problem entails three different elements: (1) preferences, (2) 
objective constraints, and (3) choice variables. Economists often take these as given and 
try instead to understand the mechanisms through which changes in objective 
constraints modify individual decisions – hence the analysis of comparative statics and 
comparative dynamics. Yet, all three of the factors listed above are embedded in a 
deeper cognitive framework. Preferences, for example, are tied to the perception of 
one’s identity.13 One’s knowledge of choice variables and objective constraints is 
contingent on both the information available to the individual and on the mental models 
that one is using to describing the functioning of the physical and social world. A 
research programme that acknowledges that the formation of beliefs can be an important 
factor in the political realm has to make at least a passing reference to the growing body 
of literature on behavioural economics,14 which seeks to understand the departures of 
individual cognition from the neoclassical rationality assumptions. This thesis has no 
                                                    
13 Akerlof and Kranton (2000). 
14 See, e.g., Camerer, Loewenstein, and Rabin (2011). 
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such overarching ambitions. However, in Chapter 4 it explores the potential effects that 
individual beliefs have on the feasibility of different policies, while being conscious of 
the fact that a more systematic exploration of the drivers of individual belief formation 
would go beyond the current scope of the three essays this thesis encompasses. 
The problem of the role of cognition in policy making is related to the question of the 
knowledge available to policymakers. In his work on the subject, Friedrich von Hayek 
argued that the knowledge that would have been necessary to effectively control social 
and economic processes is never given to anyone in its entirety, cannot be centralised, 
and would not even exist outside of a market-based discovery process.15 Although of 
acute importance for policy making, this issue remains conceptually separate from the 
notion of cognitive constraints. Cognitive constraints go beyond incomplete information 
problems as they capture how institutional and policy outcomes are affected by 
individuals’ beliefs about the functioning of the social world – and not just by the 
information available to them. In other words, in order to feed into decision-making, 
any information that individuals collect needs interpretation. In this sense, this thesis 
has the ambition to go beyond the dominant approach in the field of ‘new political 
economy’, typically limited to the study of how limited information affects choices in 
political processes16 but is mostly silent on the issue of how cognition and belief 
formation affect decision-making in the political sphere.  
One way of approaching this broad issue question is to understand that preferences, 
beliefs and mental models are shared and reflected in cultural norms guiding human 
cooperation, shared understanding of individual behaviour as right or wrong, as well as 
the degree of trust among individuals. Moreover, people have intuitive mental models 
of the functioning of the economy and of the effects that different policies and 
institutions have on the economic and social outcomes. Such intuitive accounts shape 
                                                    
15 Hayek (1945, 1948). 
16 Besley (2007: F580). 
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individual responses to policies and institutions in societies. In other words, institutions 
and policies are nested in a number of rules, practices and shared expectations, called 
mētis by Boettke et al. (2008) Originally, the concept of mētis is attributed to the 
political scientist and anthropologist James Scott (1998) who defined it as follows: 
Mētis represents a useful array of practical skills and acquired intelligence in 
responding to a constantly changing natural and human environment. (Scott 
1998: 313, emphasis added) 
Mētis is thus the set of shared preferences, beliefs, and mental models, reflected in 
formal and informal institutions, and generating practical knowledge about solutions to 
social problems of human interaction.17 The examples would include attitudes towards 
cooperation in repeated prisoner dilemma situations – related to trust levels prevailing 
in the society – but also the approbation that is associated with different forms of 
behaviour, including risk-taking, individual pursuit of material self-interest, rent-
seeking, or attitudes towards unequal distribution of resources. In this understanding, 
mētis also encompasses the positive mental models of the social world that individuals 
in a society use. Do they understand the market process as a zero-sum game? What do 
they believe the origins of economic wealth are? 
A testable corollary of this line of thinking is explored on a case study in Chapter 5. 
Specifically, its main idea is that the likelihood of the success of economic reforms 
depends on the congruence of the policy change and the underlying mētis. Boettke et al. 
(2008) posit that the durability of reforms or changes in formal institutions – their 
‘stickiness’ – is determined by their relationship with the existing informal institutional 
structure. Formal institutions which are compatible with the prevailing set of deeply 
ingrained informal institutions are more likely to ‘stick’ than institutions that are at odds 
                                                    
17 Mantzavinos et al. (2004: 77). 
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with the prevailing cultural practices and local knowledge embodied in the set of 
informal norms.  
The interaction between mētis and formal institutions can lead to different outcomes, 
according to whether the informal and formal institutions diverge, and whether formal 
institutions are effective.18 If the two types of institutions are convergent, no conflicts 
will arise. In cases where the formal institutions are ineffective, mētis can serve as a 
substitute for formal institutions. However, formal norms, which are not congruent with 
the mētis, would enter into conflict with prevailing informal institutions. The outcome 
of this conflict is not clear. In cases when the new formal norms are ineffective, due to 
the lack of proper enforcement, they will not replace the operating informal norms and 
will become irrelevant for private agents. The situation is more complicated in the case 
when the formal norms are effective, e.g., through proper enforcement. One can expect 
that informal structures will accommodate the new formal rules, but the conflict 
between formal and informal norms will generate unintended consequences, as 
individuals are likely to attempt operating outside of formal rules, either by contracting 
around them or by creating black markets.19  
The interaction between the mētis and formal norms occurs also at the level of the 
political process, through which the mētis is reflected in the policy agendas 
commanding popular support. To be sure, in an autocracy or in a totalitarian regime, the 
responsiveness of the political process to the mētis prevailing in the country might be 
limited. In contrast, in a democratic political process, elections will constitute both a 
selection and feedback mechanism that will ensure a certain degree of responsiveness to 
the mētis. Even if we understand that instrumental voting is pointless,20 it is possible to 
understand elections as a device that individuals can use to express their political and 
                                                    
18 Helmke and Levitsky (2004: 728). 
19 Miron and Zwiebel (1995). 
20 Tullock (2006). 
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cultural views and signal attachment to a particular set of informal norms.21 Through 
elections, voters are thus able to select – however imperfectly – political platforms that 
reflect the preferences, values and expectations of a large part of the population. And 
when politicians deviate from the prevailing mētis, either through their policies or 
through their rhetoric, they run the risk of being penalised by an electoral defeat. 
This relates to the earlier distinction between the ex-ante and ex-post constraints facing 
economic and political reformers. Ex-ante constraints prevent policymakers from 
making certain moves from the outset. Ex-post constraints are driven by the expected 
popular and political reaction to certain policy moves. Unpopular policies are likely to 
lead to a popular backlash and to their reversal – and that fact represents an ex-post 
constraint to any reformer. The interaction of economic reforms with the mētis is an ex-
post constraint – furthermore it is one that might not always be foreseen by the 
policymaker. 
1.3 Understanding economic transitions 
This section revisits one of the significant economic debates of the 1990s, surrounding 
post-communist transitions in Central and Eastern Europe. Its purpose is to show that an 
analytical approach that relies on incentive-related and cognitive constraints, 
accompanied by an appreciation of the limited nature of knowledge available to 
policymakers, is a potentially fruitful avenue for exploring the effects of different 
transitional strategies, as well for explaining the factors behind the actual policy choices 
made during post-communist transitions. 
The economics profession has been traditionally divided between those who advocated 
a rapid sequence of wholesale reforms and those who claimed that the transition needed 
to be slow and gradual. Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz (2002) commented: “You had the 
undermining of the basic social fabric of society. You didn't have growth; you had 
                                                    
21 Fiorina (1976), Schuessler (2000). 
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decline. You had increase in poverty rather than the fruits that capitalism was supposed 
to bring.” Both approaches saw the transition as a problem in optimal sequencing and 
timing of policy changes. The differences between the two approaches were related to 
the assessment of effects of rapid versus gradual policy changes, the dislocations that 
the transition would induce, and on other matters; yet the two approaches shared a 
common outlook on policy making as an exercise unconstrained by cognitive 
limitations and incentives facing policymakers and the public. This stands in contrast to 
the approach adopted by this thesis, which sees policy-making and policy reforms as 
largely endogenous. 
The proponents of radical approaches to reform were correct in advocating radical 
reforms on margins that were amenable to discretionary changes in policies and legal 
rules – privatisation, liberalisation, inflation and deficit reduction, as well as the low-
hanging fruit in the form of statutory changes affecting the status of private property, as 
suggested by the proponents of ‘shock therapy’. As ‘gradualists’ pointed out, however, 
these were not sufficient for a successful transition. A market economy needed 
institutional underpinnings. Yet, the rules of market order could not be designed and 
imposed on market participants from above in no time. 
An evolutionary process needed to guide the emergence of new legal rules, and formal 
and informal institutions. It would be mistaken to think that such rules and institutions 
could have been created before the actual markets existed. Furthermore, there are few, if 
any, known ways of creating, through the means of public policy, the informal and 
cultural norms needed to support the market economy. 
One corollary of the argument outlined in section 1.2 is that successful economic 
reforms needed to be perceived as credible and need to be grounded in the knowledge 
and beliefs available to policymakers. As a result, the policy changes that were 
perceived as irreversible – or too costly to undo – and required little in terms of 
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policymakers’ knowledge – e.g. which rely on simple rules of thumb or laundry lists – 
were likely to fare better than reforms that only perform well under favourable 
assumptions about knowledge available to policymakers and their motivations. Because 
the ‘shock therapy’ limited the scope for discretion and provided policymakers with 
simple ‘laundry lists’ of desirable policy prescriptions, it limited the need to collect 
information, interpret it, and exercise judgment. And because it advised to pursue 
reforms quickly and in a wholesale fashion, it was also suited to overcome the problem 
of credible commitment, which plagued gradual and partial reform strategies. 
Ultimately, the success of reforms in post-communist transitions was dependent on 
whether they were congruent with the underlying mētis. This section will therefore 
discuss the available evidence, unsystematic as it is, which links differences in attitudes 
towards various aspects of the market economy and policy outcomes in Central and 
Eastern Europe.  
1.3.1 Transitions from what? 
To what extent does it make sense to classify economies within different “economic 
systems” between which they might transition? Kornai (2000) provides a simple 
dichotomy between two kinds of economic systems: those that fall within the capitalist 
spectrum and those that can be seen as socialist. Similarly, there are numerous historical 
variants of what can be understood as the same socialist system. The dividing lines 
between two systems are as follows: 
-whether the political power is friendly to private property and private markets, 
or not, 
-whether the economy is dominated by private ownership or state and quasi-state 
ownership, 
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-whether the economy is coordinated through market means or through 
bureaucratic decision making, 
-whether economic agents are subjected to hard or soft budget constraints, 
-whether most markets are in equilibria or whether the economy suffers from 
chronic shortages. 
While this list of characteristics provides us with a rough set of metrics, Boettke (1992) 
emphasises that even the former USSR was a case of non-comprehensive economic 
planning with a large market economy – albeit with one that was “politically 
manipulated to yield profits to those in position in power” (Boettke 1992: 139).22 The 
distinctive feature of a Soviet-type economy was, according to Boettke, a vast network 
of interlocking monopoly suppliers who relied on market signals as well as on 
commands from the power centre. Firstly, producers in a Soviet-type economy were 
responsive to price signals coming from the world markets and they were also 
responsive to signals established in the informal economy – very often in the form of 
bribes. As a result, while Kornai is correct to point out the dominant role of 
“bureaucratic coordination” in socialist economies, this is essentially a manifestation of 
a market-based coordination – albeit one with distorted incentives. Moreover, the 
classification of a country as “capitalist” or “socialist” cannot be based solely on 
measures of the size of government alone, as the government plays a significant and 
varying role in most market economies.23  
For decades, prominent neoclassical economists maintained that centrally planned 
economies could perform as well as competitive markets.24 Murrell (1991a) showed that 
                                                    
22 See also Anderson and Boettke (1997).  
23 In fact, most economists, including Besley and Persson (2011), would agree that such a role is essential 
to the proper functioning of markets and to economic growth. 
24 Most prominently, as late as in 1989, Paul Samuelson and William Nordhaus provided probably the 
most telling summary of their views on the workings of a centrally planned economy in their best-selling 
textbook: “[C]ontrary to what many sceptics had earlier believed (…) the Soviet economy is proof that 
(...) a socialist command economy can function and even thrive” (Samuelson and Nordhaus 1989: 837).  
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neoclassical economics played only a limited role in explaining the deficiencies of 
centrally planned economies. The core of his argument was that the distinctions made 
by neoclassical economists between socialist and capitalist economies – distinctions that 
tended to ignore the institutional context – were not relevant in the real world. For 
instance, empirical studies of Soviet industry25 showed similar levels of technical 
efficiency as market economies. Similarly, the foreign trade of planned economies – 
used as a proxy for the overall production structure – did not appear to be vastly 
different from that of capitalist economies. Finally, the estimates of production 
functions in communist economies – by Thornton (1971) or Whalley (1976) – pointed 
to efficiency losses that did not appear to be significantly different from estimates 
obtained from data from market economies. That does not mean that Soviet-type 
economies were not economically inferior to market economies. It means, however, that 
their deficiencies may have lain elsewhere than in the attributes that standard economic 
analysis could identify easily.  
In the socialist calculation debate, advocates of central planning used the tools of 
general equilibrium analysis to derive conditions under which planning could generate 
economic outcomes equivalent to the general equilibrium.26 It was almost exclusively 
the economists working in the Austrian tradition27 who were able to articulate why such 
efforts amounted to a blackboard exercise. In the real world, the knowledge needed for 
economic planning was tacit and decentralised, and would not exist outside of a market-
based discovery process. The price mechanism is a way of generating and 
communicating knowledge and using it to make economic decisions. By eliminating 
this mechanism, socialism placed unreasonable informational demands on the planners 
who were thus supposed to gather the knowledge of the “particular circumstances of 
                                                    
25 E.g., Danilin et al. (1985). 
26 Taylor (1929), Lange (1936, 1937), Lerner (1934). 
27 See Mises (1920) and also Hayek (1935, 1945) for the key contributions. Lavoie (1985) and Boettke 
(2001) provide an overview of the history of the debate. 
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time and place” (Hayek 1948: 80). The reason for the failure of the economic profession 
to appreciate this argument may be related to the weight attributed by economists to the 
use of the general equilibrium model of the economy as the dominant tool of analysis.28  
While the point about the role of markets, prices, and competition seems trivial at first 
sight, it remains underappreciated by the mainstream of the economic profession. 
Zinnes, Eilat and Sachs (2001: 149), for instance, claim that the principal rationale for 
privatisation was the existence of asymmetric information and incomplete contracts 
between planners and enterprise managers.29 While those were valid concerns, they 
hardly constituted the crux of the matter. In fact, the fundamental purpose of 
privatisation in post-communist countries was to restore the institutions – most 
importantly private property – that would enable rational economic calculation within 
the economy by creating genuine markets for factors of production.  
The second, more mundane, reason for the failure of socialism had to do with the 
perverse incentives created by a system where economic decisions were based on a 
process of bargaining over output and resources between factory managers and 
planners. Even if we agree that central planning could, in principle, deliver efficient 
outcomes, it would remain unclear whether the individual conduct needed to attain such 
outcomes was incentive-compatible.30 In planned economies, factory managers were 
incentivised to provide the planners with information that led them to either increase the 
factors of production given to companies and/or decrease the level of output relative to 
what it would otherwise have been.31 Misaligned incentives also led the planners to set 
                                                    
28 See Levy (2011) and also Levy and Peart (2006). Also, Boettke (1997) argues that a broader failure of 
the economic profession has led to ‘a flight from reality’ and to the development of either empirically 
irrelevant or ideologically motivated work. 
29 See also Shleifer (1998). 
30 See, on this matter, Shleifer and Vishny (1994). 
31 Weitzman (1980). 
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prices at artificially low levels, in order to induce shortages on product markets, as these 
created rents for those involved within the political process.32 
1.3.2 Between Washington Consensus and neo-institutionalism 
The central divide of the debate in the 1990s was between those who claimed that rapid, 
systemic changes needed to be undertaken quickly at the beginning of the transition33, 
and those who believed that the institutional and structural change needed to occur in a 
piecemeal way, with careful sequencing that would limit the social losses of the 
transition.34  
The policy of rapid systemic changes, with a strong focus on restoring macroeconomic 
stability was called the Washington Consensus by Williamson (1990)35 because it 
reflected at the time the dominant view of the US Treasury, the IMF and the World 
Bank about policies that either were or should have been adopted by Latin American 
countries in the 1980s.36 Table 1 below summarises ten key prescriptions of this 
approach. 
 
                                                    
32 See Levy (1990). 
33 See, e.g., Lipton and Sachs (1990).  
34 See, e.g., Murrell (1991b) or Hare (2001). 
35 More on Washington Consensus can be found in Williamson (1990), Williamson (1993), Williamson 
(1997) and in Kolodko (2000). 
36 For a review of the thinking and principles behind this approach, see also Balassa et al. (1986). 
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Table 1 Washington Consensus 
Policy Meaning 
Fiscal discipline “Budget deficits … small enough to be financed without recourse to the 
inflation tax.”  
Reorienting public 
expenditure 
“…redirecting [public] expenditure from politically sensitive areas [that] 
…receive more resources than their economic return can justify … 
towards neglected fields with high economic returns and the potential to 
improve income distribution, such as primary health and education, and 
infrastructure.” 
Tax reform “Tax reform [so as to broaden] the tax base and cut … marginal tax 
rates.” 
Financial liberalisation “Financial liberalisation, [involving] an ultimate objective … of market-
determined exchange rates.” 
Unified and competitive 
exchange rates 
“…a unified … exchange rate … at a level sufficiently competitive to 
induce a rapid growth in non-traditional exports.” 
Trade liberalisation “Quantitative trade restrictions should be rapidly replaced by tariffs, and 
these should be progressively reduced until a uniform low rate of 10 [to 
20] per cent is achieved.” 
Openness to foreign 
investment 
“Barriers impeding the entry of foreign [direct investment] should 
abolished.” 
Privatisation “Privatisation of state-owned enterprises.” 
Deregulation “[Abolition of] regulations that impede the entry of new firms or restrict 
competition.” 
Secure property rights “The legal system should provide secure property rights without 
excessive costs and make these available to the informal sector.” 
Source: Williamson (2004).  
Very quickly, partly through the work of Jeffrey Sachs37 and others,38 the idea that rapid 
macroeconomic stabilisation was the key to success in economic transitions was 
translated into policy practice in the transitional world. Apart from its emphasis on 
containing inflation, budget deficits, and external imbalances, rapid privatisation and 
liberalisation – both on the domestic microeconomic front and also with regard to 
external trade and capital flows – were of the essence. The approach emphasised the 
existence of complementarities between various elements of policy reform. Plausibly, 
price liberalisation without prudent monetary policy would result in rampant inflation 
rates. Likewise, without the imposition of hard budget constraints, liberalisation would 
not induce desirable behavioural responses on the part of the firms. 
The emphasis on liberalisation and tackling macroeconomic imbalances was motivated 
by the view that disequilibrium prices were the main problem of the socialist economy. 
                                                    
37 See, e.g., Lipton and Sachs (1990), Sachs (1993) and Sachs (1994). 
38 See Balcerowicz (1994) or Klaus (1990), among many. 
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Once the hindrances to the functioning of markets were lifted, competitive forces would 
restore the equilibrium, resulting in an efficient allocation of resources. Speed was 
another important consideration, since the fall of communism offered a unique and 
limited ‘window of opportunity’39 that could have been closed by the rise of political 
populism and factions that would have been unsympathetic to economic reform. 
Roland (2001) discusses the experience of post-communist transition and concludes that 
policy prescriptions derived from the Washington Consensus were not satisfactory: “If 
anything, the experience of transition shows that the policies of liberalisation, 
stabilisation and privatisation that are not grounded in adequate institutions may not 
deliver successful outcomes.” The alternative to the Washington Consensus or ‘shock 
therapy’ emphasised the primacy of institutions for economic development and 
underscored the political economy dimension of reforms. Peter Murrell (1992) 
emphasises the idea that socio-economic mechanisms are in fact information-processing 
devices and that societies rely on local knowledge (p. 83), very much in the spirit of 
Hayek’s work.  
Whereas the Washington Consensus relied on price theory as its main tool of analysis, 
the neo-institutionalist perspective used the tools of non-cooperative games, stressing 
the potential for multiple equilibria. This perspective stressed the role played by the 
aggregate uncertainty about the outcomes of the transition,40 driven by the multiplicity 
of potential equilibria. Moreover, neo-institutionalism rejected the emphasis on the 
rapid implementation of economic reforms, arguing instead that with the possibility of 
inefficient equilibria, big bang changes could lock countries into irreversible 
institutional outcomes that could be crippling for economic development. 
                                                    
39 Kingdon (1984). 
40 ‘Aggregate uncertainty’ refers to the uncertainty about the global outcome of a policy move, i.e. about 
whether it might bring about an overall welfare improvement or not. In contrast, “individual uncertainty” 
refers to the uncertainty about the effects of a particular policy move on an individual, or a group of 
individuals. In technical terms, a situation of aggregate uncertainty is characterised by a stochastic 
evolution of the distribution of individual outcomes. (Burgin and Bernhardt 1992).  
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Besides the question of timing and sequencing, where they advocated implementing 
more popular reforms first, in order to build political support for further changes, the 
neo-institutionalists also emphasised the importance of creating a sound legal 
framework before privatisation and liberalisation took effect, and a large role for the 
government in the process of control and restructuring of state-owned enterprises. As 
emphasised by Murrell (1991b), the neo-institutionalists were worried by the existence 
of externalities in the creation, design and destruction of large organisations. The 
destruction of pre-existing institutions, guiding the functioning of economic 
organisations existing under socialism could be inimical, in Murrell’s view, to the 
development of the nascent private sector. In other words, this view presumed the 
existence of a trade-off between the creation of new private sector and the speed of 
decentralisation and privatisation of the government-run economy. 
Neo-institutionalists therefore supported the creation of dual-track liberalisation 
programmes, similar to the one employed in China after 1978. The emergent private 
sector should be governed, according to Murrell (2006), by new, market-friendly, 
institutions. At the same time, the old economic mechanisms would remain in place and 
would guide the functioning of the old sector in order to prevent its convulsion. In this 
manner, the output contraction that occurred in the 1990s would have been prevented 
and, in the meantime, the institutions needed for a smooth functioning of the market 
economy would have been introduced gradually. 
The debate among the advocates of the Washington Consensus and those defending the 
evolutionary-institutionalist perspective was heated but not always motivated by deep 
differences in the understanding of institutional change. Roland (2001: 34), for instance, 
claims that the proponents of the Washington Consensus “have faith in societal 
engineering” and “emphasise shrinking the size of government,” without providing 
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specific references.41 In fact, one of the points stressed by Åslund, Boone and Johnson 
(1996) is that rapid reforms encouraged institutional development in Eastern Europe. It 
seems thus that these authors were simply trying to answer a relatively narrow question 
of what economic policy moves were necessary for a successful transition, rather than 
trying to provide an encompassing list of sufficient conditions for such success. Their 
answer to that narrow question – which we may or may not accept – was that 
macroeconomic stabilisation and controlling inflation and government deficits were 
among those prerequisites that government could control.  
What is important from our perspective is that although some important institutions 
were amenable to quick change by modifying the existing legal norms, most of them 
were subject to gradual change over which policymakers have only a limited degree of 
influence. Even those formal institutions that are seen as contingent on government fiat 
are dependent in reality on the presence of effective court systems, judges, and lawyers 
who are able to apply and enforce the new legal norms. Finally, the market economy is 
always embedded in a cultural framework, which depends on the prevailing norms 
sanctioning entrepreneurship, innovation, keeping promises, and so on. Economists and 
policymakers know little about the origin and evolution of these norms, and it would be 
presumptuous to claim that these can be tweaked at will. 
In contrast, the narrower approaches to economic transitions, exemplified by Åslund, 
Boone and Johnson (1996), provided policymakers with a simple list of measures that 
had and could feasibly be adopted by policymakers in transitional economies that 
required immediate macroeconomic stabilisation, whereas the neo-institutionalist 
approach often asked politicians to pursue policies that were beyond their immediate 
control or understanding. A part of the appeal of the ‘shock therapy’ seems to lie in its 
focus on variables that policymakers could control directly – the statutory character of 
                                                    
41 Havrylyshyn (2001: 55), for instance, thus sees the characterisation of the Washington Consensus as 
oblivious to the importance of institutions for economic growth as mistaken. 
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private enterprise, legal restrictions on price formation and freedom of contract, and also 
on inflation, public spending and public deficits.  
By the standards outlined in section 1.2 – and particularly if one appreciates the role 
played by tacit knowledge in society – it can be argued that neo-institutionalist reform 
prescriptions fared worse, notwithstanding their references to the intellectual tradition of 
Friedrich von Hayek.42 Not only does neo-institutionalism require that policymakers are 
to identify the measures that are the most likely to elicit popular support in the 
beginning of the transition, but also that they are able to sequence the reforms in a way 
that would lead to the desired reform outcome. Even the question of identifying winners 
and losers from particular policy moves is a more complex task than first hits the eye. 
Counter-intuitively, Milanovic (1998) demonstrates that, in relative terms, the biggest 
winners of the post-communist transitions were pensioners who, because of their fixed 
pensions, experienced smaller declines in their real earnings than other social groups – a 
finding that is at odds with the popular perception of pensioners as the most vulnerable 
victims of the transition.43  
While the insistence on experimentation and piecemeal change are reasonable, the 
success of a transition guided solely by these principles would require policymakers to 
design the optimal legal and institutional order for a market economy, while the 
economy was still in the shackles of bureaucratic control. Not only would such form of 
transition have problematic second-order effects – such as spontaneous privatisation of 
state-run enterprises44 – but, more importantly, it would be impracticable because many 
of the institutions and norms guiding economic life are not known to anyone prior to the 
existence of the actual markets. Rapaczynski (1996) demonstrates that the progress in 
the creation of functioning and well-enforced property rights in transitional countries 
                                                    
42 Murrell (1993: 123). 
43 Hellman (1998), e.g., speaks of pensioners as of “traditional losers” of post-communist transitions. 
44 Unlike some proponents of gradualism who downplay the role played by spontaneous privatisation, 
Johnson and Kroll (1991) argue that spontaneous privatisation was a very real phenomenon. 
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could not be expected to come from a flawless ex-ante design of legal rules. In the case 
of more complex assets and more intricate market relationships, it is impossible to 
identify the desirable legal mechanisms in advance, without observing the practice that 
emerges on the markets. 
1.3.3 What does evidence tell us? 
Could the disagreement between advocates of shock therapy and those defending a 
more gradualist approach be reconciled by inspecting the economic performance of 
countries that followed different policy advice? The difficulties of such exercise are 
considerable, considering the complex nature of economic and political changes in 
Central and Eastern Europe in the 1990s. Transitions are a perfect illustration of under-
identified problems, in which the number of potential explanatory variables exceeds the 
number of data points available, limiting the usefulness of conventional econometric 
tests. 
This sub-section highlights several stylised facts related to transitions in Central and 
Eastern Europe and discusses the relative merits and demerits of gradual reform 
prescription and its more radical alternatives. In spite of its fall from favour among 
economists, in most places, it is not obvious that the relatively simple strategy of 
macroeconomic stabilisation, privatisation and liberalisation was associated with 
systematically worse outcomes than more gradualist strategies. Figure 2 below reports 
the economic performance of transitional countries since 1990 until 2007, a year before 
a financial crisis hit the Baltic states. By 2007, Poland, Estonia, Slovenia, and Latvia 
had made the most impressive recoveries from the output fall that had occurred in the 
early stages of the transition. It also shows that only a limited number of countries 
recovered their initial levels of economic output in the first decade of the transition; 
these included Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Slovakia, and Slovenia. 
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The chart also reveals a distinctly poor performance of Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan, and 
Russia, but in the initial phases of the transition, as well as in the 2000s. 
Figure 2 Fall in output per capita in transitional economies between 1990 and 2000 













































ource: World Development Indicators, World Bank 
Output in practically all of the post-communist countries followed a J curve, as the 
initial fall was later reversed by an upward trend. The initial slump was much deeper 
and the recovery was slower in the case of the post-Soviet space, with Russia recovering 
its 1989 output levels only as late as in 2006. In Central and Eastern Europe, 1989 GDP 
levels had been reached already at the end of the 1990s, and the upward trajectory was 
sustained until the Great Recession of 2008. As Shleifer and Treisman (2005) and 
Åslund (2002) point out, standard GDP statistics might well overestimate the magnitude 
- 36 - 
of the output fall, especially in a country like Russia where the 1989 output levels were 
likely overstated due to the high share of industry creating little or no consumer surplus, 
such as the military production sector. 
A simple inspection of the data in Figure 2 does not indict shock therapy as the main 
driver of the slump. Countries where the initial slump was the smallest and which 
recovered most rapidly were Poland, Slovenia, Estonia and Hungary – countries that 
followed thorough reform strategies.45 These were countries that had achieved, by 1995, 
the greatest progress in their transition towards a market economy, as measured for 
example by the set of Transition Indicators published by the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development. In contrast, on the graph the worst outcomes are 
recorded for Ukraine, Russia and Kyrgyzstan – countries that refrained from more 
radical reforms to their economies in the immediate aftermath of the fall of communism. 
As Campos and Coricelli (2002) note, the fall in output was accompanied by a 
contraction in the capital stock. Socialist economies were characterised by inefficiently 
large amounts of capital. Furthermore, they had an interlocked structure of capital goods 
which could not be sustained on an open market and which could be reallocated towards 
uses in the emerging private sector at significant cost, if at all. Roland and Verdier 
(1999) provide an almost ‘Austrian’46 account of this argument through a model of 
relations-specific investment, implying that new investments would occur only after 
new business relationships are formed. Interestingly, they blame rapid liberalisation for 
the resulting economic downturn, arguing that a more gradual privatisation, creating a 
two-track economy, with a parallel existence of private markets and a centrally planned 
system, might have avoided this outcome. However, the key point is that production 
                                                    
45 Admittedly, that does not necessarily mean that the countries followed ‘shock therapy’ in the strict 
sense. Hare (1991) and Hare et al. (1992) show there was a degree of continuity of early Hungarian 
reforms in the 1990s with the previous reforms attempted by consecutive communist governments. 
46 See, e.g., Horwitz (2000). See also Bevan et al. (2001) for a similar account, in which specificity of 
inputs led to greater output adjustments in more complex supply chains. 
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structures that did not reflect underlying consumer valuation were unsustainable on 
competitive markets. Therefore, unless the pro-reform governments were in a position 
to subsidise the loss-making state-owned enterprises, it was necessary to close them 
down, even at a sizeable social cost. 
The collapse of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance contributed to the fall in 
output. The ability of economies to reorient their trade towards the West was critical in 
coping with the slump.47 The most agile adjustment occurred in the Visegrad countries 
and in the Baltics. Campos and Coricelli stress the remarkable speed of the reorientation 
of trade in Baltics: a rise of the share of exports to industrial countries as a percentage of 
total exports from five percent in 1991 to more than 50 percent in 1998. This adjustment 
was more difficult for many of the former USSR countries, especially those in Asia, for 
which access to Western European markets was extremely difficult, in part because of a 
lack of financial infrastructure and of foreign reserves, which were needed to support 
export-led growth. 
These considerations suggest that post-communist economies clearly needed to undergo 
substantial structural changes, involving a reduction in the share of industry and growth 
of services. From this perspective, the claim made by Roland (2001: 44) that “standard 
(…) economics (…) at best would predict a low supply response to liberalisation but not 
a negative one,” is accurate only if one considers the simplest, the least sophisticated 
version of neoclassical models.48 However, taking into account the heterogeneity of 
capital and complementarities that exist between different capital goods might go a long 
way in explaining this apparent paradox.49 In any event, economies with worse initial 
conditions underwent deeper recessions.50 But that does not mean that economic 
                                                    
47 Christoffersen and Doyle (1998) provide an early discussion of the importance of trade dynamics in 
transitions. 
48 Similarly, Blanchard (1997) characterises this slump as a puzzle since in his view the removal of 
distortions existing in socialist economies should have caused output to increase, not to decrease. 
49 Boettke (2003: 30). 
50 Heybey and Murrell (1999), Krueger and Ciolko (1998), Åslund, Boone and Johnson (1996). 
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policies were irrelevant for growth performance. A number of studies have found that 
greater liberalisation in the early years of the transition led to higher growth and lower 
inflation in the subsequent period51. One interpretation of that finding can be that fast 
liberalisation works. Obviously, a more cautious view is that countries with more 
favourable initial conditions were able to liberalise more quickly than others and also 
experienced smaller output losses. While adjudicating this dispute is not 
straightforward, it is difficult to find clear evidence that fast liberalisation was 
associated with deeper economic slumps in the 1990s.52 
1.3.4 Privatisation 
Rapid privatisation was among the most contentious aspects of the ‘shock therapy’. 
Some critics of privatisation argued that “rapid mass privatisation […] was a crucial 
determinant of differences in adult mortality trends in post-communist countries.”53 
Although that claim has been shown dubious by further studies,54 advocates of gradual 
reforms have suggested that privatisation was counterproductive because the institutions 
needed to underpin the markets were underdeveloped or absent prior to privatisation.  
However, it is questionable whether those institutions could have emerged without 
privatisation. The idea that a complex legal and judicial framework, as well as a set of 
social norms, could have been imposed on a transitional country before any property 
rights were assigned, is not plausible if one adopts a perspective that stresses the 
emergent nature of institutions and the importance of local knowledge in social 
processes.  
                                                    
51 De Melo et al. (1996), Sachs (1996), and Fischer, Sahay and Vegh (1996), Åslund, Boone and Johnson 
(1996), Havrylyshyn, Izvorski, and van Rooden (1998) and Berg et al. (1999). 
52 This does not prevent Roland (2001: 45) from embarking on a speculation about the possible 
counterfactual to rapid price liberalisation. If the Chinese model of dual-track liberalisation was adopted, 
he claims, the output fall would have been only limited. 
53 Stuckler et al. (2009: 399). 
54 Earle and Gehlbach (2010), Gerry et al. (2010). 
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A large literature maps the effects of privatisation on economic performance. 
Harvylyshyn and McGettigan (2001) and Djankov and Murrell (2002) find that 
privatisation improved the performance of enterprises. Zinnes, Eilat and Sachs (2001) 
find that different countries react differently to privatisation. In itself, the privatisation 
of a company did not guarantee a genuine transfer of ownership. For that to occur, 
specific institutions needed to be in place. When privatisation occurred in good 
institutional environments, it had a positive effect on corporate performance. 
Conversely, however, Zinnes, Eilat and Sachs do not demonstrate a negative effect of 
privatisation on economic performance of enterprises when institutional conditions were 
adverse. However that may be, it is fairly obvious that not all privatisation methods led 
to the same economic outcomes. Hare and Muravyev (2002), for example, show that 
although substantial progress in privatisation had been achieved in the first decade of 
the transition in Russia, it was not followed by equally significant restructuring due the 
incentives facing the insiders who were involved in the privatisation process. 
Megginson and Netter (2001) provide an encompassing literature review focused on the 
economic effects of privatisation, both in the developed world and also in transitional 
countries. The general conclusion is that privatisation “worked,” in the broad sense of 
improving firms’ performance. The paper singles out privatisation by insiders as 
problematic since it precluded value-enhancing exchanges. Looking at Central and 
Eastern Europe, the paper summarises a wide cross-section of empirical studies and 
notes that private ownership, especially foreign ownership, had large positive effects on 
firm-level performance and restructuring. 
Nellis (1999) concludes his overview of privatisation in transitional economies by 
noting that in institutionally weak environments, privatisation has led to stagnation and 
decapitalisation of companies, instead of better financial results and increased 
efficiency. He stresses, however, that renationalisation or postponement of further 
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privatisation, was unlikely to provide any major gain. “Governments that botch 
privatisation are equally likely to botch the management of state-owned firms” (p. ix). 
Although privatisation in Central and Eastern Europe did not always live up to 
expectations, we have yet to see convincing evidence that its alternatives would have 
brought about significantly better outcomes – especially if we hold constant the 
underlying quality of institutions in different transitional countries. 
To make a plan of gradual privatisation work, the managers would have to be 
incentivised to embark on a complex programme of restructuring before being 
accountable to shareholders. Not only is it unclear why they would do that if subjected 
to soft budget constraints, it is also equally unclear how they would gather the 
knowledge needed to restructure the companies in the appropriate way unless subjected 
to the discipline of profit and loss. To be sure, ‘stronger monitoring’ is often advocated 
as a solution to this problem. But unless the government can credibly threaten to close 
down the business in question – which is very unlikely in large parts of the state-run 
economy – such monitoring remains more of a wish than a policy option. Unless one 
makes heroic assumptions about the benevolence and knowledge of the enterprise 
managers and about the effectiveness of state control, it is unclear that a gradual 
privatisation programme would result in anything else but large scale rent-seeking and 
asset-stripping. Åslund, Boone and Johnson (1996) therefore describe this hypothesis to 
gradualist transition strategies as by-products of strong vested interests, which aim at 
capturing the state apparatus in order to keep the inflationary spigot running. Moreover, 
it appears that rapid privatisation– and privatisation with the participation of the general 
public – provided a political guarantee preventing reform reversal. The large scale of the 
newly created private sector and the mass character of the privatisation process, 
involving often the population at large as shareholders, could be seen as a constraint 
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against potential re-nationalisation. It is most likely harder electorally to go against the 
interests of many citizens-shareholders than against those of a few capitalists. 
1.3.5 Did mētis matter? 
So far, this account of economic transitions in Eastern Europe has not employed 
explicitly the notion of cognitive constraints to policy making. However, as Chapter 5 
of the thesis illustrates, differences in cognitive constraints can help explain some part 
of the variation in institutional and economic outcomes during post-communist 
transitions – although estimating their effect formally proves to be a challenge. 
Similarly, little systematic evidence exists that would link actual policy choices made 
by policymakers in transitional economies and prevailing attitudes or informal norms. 
However, the idea that differences in beliefs are associated with differences in aggregate 
economic outcomes underpins much of the recent work by Douglass North,55 who had 
stated that: 
‘[I]t is much easier to describe and be precise about the formal rules that 
societies devise than to describe and be precise about the informal ways by 
which human beings have structured human interaction. But although they defy, 
for the most part, neat specification and it is extremely difficult to develop 
unambiguous tests of their significance, they are important.’ (North 1990: 36) 
A growing body of literature suggests that differences in institutions are associated with 
differences in beliefs and policy preferences displayed by individuals.56 As mentioned 
earlier, Tella and McCulloch (2009) explain the joint incidence of leftist beliefs, heavy 
regulation and corruption. In their setting, leftist beliefs are endogenous to the 
experience of ‘unpleasant’ capitalists and serve as a mechanism that reinforces heavy 
regulation that encourages further corruption. Likewise, Tabellini (2010) identifies an 
                                                    
55 See, specifically, North (2007). 
56 Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2005), Di Tella, Galiani and Schargrodsky (2007), Landier, Thesmar 
and Thoenig (2008). 
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empirical link between cultural norms and economic outcomes and shows that pro-
individualistic and egalitarian cultures are associated with higher levels of economic 
development. 
In the context of transitional countries, the bulk of the existing research has focused on 
the investigation of determinants of support for economic reforms.57 The early evidence 
is aptly summarised by Rodrik (1996). The findings are generally in line with the 
theoretical work on barriers to economic reforms,58 which suggests that uncertainty over 
distributional benefits of reforms generates a status quo bias, whereas the possibility of 
identifying the winners and losers opens door to mutually beneficial bargains. 
Relatedly, Rodrik (1994) develops a simple heuristic, the ‘political cost-benefit ratio’ 
which relates the efficiency gains from reforms to their political ‘costs’ in the form of 
redistribution of income away from groups that benefit from the status quo. In areas 
where the amount of redistribution to the efficiency gains generated is high, reforms 
will be particularly difficult.  
On empirical grounds, some findings suggest that private entrepreneurs, white-collar 
workers and university-educated voters were generally supportive of the transition, 
whereas the unemployed, retirees, blue collar and agricultural workers opposed the 
reforms.59 Similarly, scholars have investigated the sources of support for revising 
privatisation in transitional countries60 or the effects of economic hardship on ideology 
and political attitudes.61 Earle and Gehlbach (2003) find that receiving property through 
                                                    
57 See, e.g., Landier et al. (2008). 
58 Fernandez and Rodrik (1991). 
59 Fidrmuc (2000). 
60 Denisova et al. (2007). 
61 Večerník (1995). 
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restitution was strongly associated with support for economic reform and privatisation 
among those who were on the receiving end.62  
In spite of the seeming importance of the subject, very little of the existing literature is 
focused on tracking systematic differences between countries or nations, or trying to 
explain those differences. Exceptions include the differences between citizens of the 
Soviet Union and the United States documented by Shiller, Boycko and Korobov 
(1991), the differences between former Soviet republics documented by Miller, Hesli 
and Resisinger (1994) or the wider Central and Eastern Europe documented by Rovelli 
(2009), Krkoska and Robeck (2008) or Runst (2012). Finally, Pejovich (2003) provides 
an overview of the mechanisms, illustrated by short case studies, of how cultural norms 
affected outcomes of the economic transition in different countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe. 
The aim of Chapter 5 in this thesis is to argue that a link exists between popular 
attitudes and policy choices. While the perils of demonstrating such a link through 
formal econometric evidence are obvious, there are prima facie reasons to believe that 
in political systems relying on decision-making by popular majorities, the policies 
undertaken will have to reflect, in some broad sense, the attitudes, beliefs, norms and 
mental models prevailing in the society.  
1.4 Conclusion: What have we learned? 
This account of economic transitions in the post-Soviet world can be seen as a source of 
several insights that motivate the themes explored in this thesis. Most importantly, 
while the distinction between the Washington Consensus and the more gradual, neo-
institutionalist approaches animated the debates of the 1990s, it was not particularly 
compelling. After all, very few participants of the debate would argue that the 
                                                    
62 Needless to say, restitution of property remained a contentious and politically sensitive issue 
throughout the transitional economies, and only a handful of countries, such as the Czech Republic, used 
it on a larger – albeit very strictly limited – scale.  
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institutions in which the emerging market economy was embedded did not matter for 
transitional outcomes. It is likewise obvious that different policies required different 
time frames for their implementation – certain measures could be taken immediately, 
whereas others required a long time to come to fruition. In our opinion, the relevant 
distinction was between approaches that appreciated the incentive-related and cognitive 
constraints facing policymakers and approaches that started with a relatively 
unconstrained vision of policy making. By this metric, both gradualism and the 
‘Washington Consensus’ had different strengths, and failed at different margins. 
The general lessons from the economic transitions in Central and Eastern Europe could 
thus be summarised as follows: 
(1) Successful reform strategies should focus on controllable variables, as 
opposed to factors that are out of policymakers’ reach; 
(2) Policymakers should focus on a small number of known and measurable 
variables, as opposed to a large number of complex variables, the interactions of 
which they might not fully understand; 
(3) Credibility matters. Successful reform strategies in transitional environments 
must be able to overcome the problem of a lack of credibility. Speed, 
completeness of changes, and their irreversibility seem to achieve that; and 
(4) Initial conditions matter. Besides differences in levels of economic 
development, institutional, legal and political legacies, transitional economies 
differed in the preferences, beliefs and mental models of the general public. It 
remains an open question to what extent the latter played a role in the 
transitions. 
Each of these points opens a range of research questions. In the case studies that follow, 
we will focus specifically on points (3) and (4) – on how credibility problems affect 
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policy-making and institutional outcomes and how beliefs influence the success or 
failure of different reform strategies. This choice is not guided by deep theoretical 
reasons, but is a rather opportunistic reaction to the availability of interesting empirical 
material that one can study in this area. Some of this material comes, interestingly 
enough, from the economies of the Middle East and North Africa, which are currently 
undergoing significant economic and political changes. Besides studying the importance 
of policy credibility, this thesis will purport to substantiate the links between cognitive 
constraints – or mētis – and policy outcomes by studying the example of transitional 
Czechoslovakia in the 1990s. However, before proceeding with the individual case 
studies, Chapter 2 will lay down the fundamental methodological apparatus that guides 
our work in the remainder of the thesis. 




This chapter provides an overview of the main methodological strategies used in the 
three case studies that form the core of this thesis. The case selection is arguably 
eclectic and, in some sense, opportunistic. We investigate two country-specific 
questions relevant for Egypt and post-communist Czechoslovakia, and one that is 
focused on a broader range of countries in the Middle East and North Africa. Our 
primary ambition was to produce self-contained case studies that can generate valuable 
insights on their own, yet which are connected to the theme of cognitive and incentive-
related constraints affecting policymaking and reform processes. Instead of committing 
upfront to a specific geographical or historical focus and developing it into a long-form 
book project, which tends to be common in some parts of this stream of literature, we 
have opted for three self-contained case studies, directly publishable as articles in peer-
reviewed journals. These case studies attempt to illustrate the substantive points that are 
of interest to us: the effects of credibility problems on policymaking and on the 
structure of the political landscape, as well as the role of mētis in shaping economic 
policy. These studies could be scaled up, with the addition of further research material 
into a book project. The other factor that motivated our choice of specific case studies is 
intellectual product differentiation. It is striking that a dominant part of the literature 
both in economics and political science that discusses durability of reforms, reform 
reversals, and political economy of legal and institutional change focuses on the 
experience of the United States and of the developed world. One reason is related to the 
relative abundance of high quality data. However, transitional countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe, as well as poorer parts of the world, such as the Middle East and North 
Africa, can offer unexpected sources of variation, even though exploring them may 
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involve eschewing some of the traditional statistical tests in favour of more 
unconventional methods, such as analytical narratives. 
The thesis is further distinguished by its use of case studies and analytic narratives as 
the main tools of analysis, as opposed to cross-country quantitative evidence. Analytic 
narratives represent an approach that aims at connecting rational choice-based models 
with traditional narrative explanations of phenomena in the social sciences, revolving 
around the questions of political order and institutional change.63 Chapters 4 and 5 
present also formal, quantitative evidence. However, the identification issues involved, 
as well as the coarse nature of the existing survey-based data, which are relevant to our 
enquiries, would make an exclusive reliance on econometric evidence unduly limiting. 
The analytic narratives used throughout the thesis are therefore offered as complements 
to the more orthodox methods of quantitative enquiry used in economics.  
Simultaneously, this thesis is characterised by a relative absence of formal theory. 
Chapters 3 and 4 present stylised verbal models from which testable claims are derived 
but the thesis offers little in terms of the formal modelling that is common in 
contemporary political economy.64 Given that this collection of papers is not seeking 
primarily to make a theoretical contribution, it is unclear what benefits formal 
modelling would have for our purposes. The toolbox of models and theoretical 
propositions that are used throughout this thesis is not novel – rather, the point of the 
exercise is to see how well it can account for some of the notable patterns in the design 
of economic reforms and their success, as well as in policy-making in transitional 
political environments. It should be stressed that our approach is by no means 
atheoretical. Throughout the thesis, a core assumption of individual rationality is 
maintained, although our core claims are driven not by strict assumptions about 
individual rationality, as is often the norm in orthodox microeconomic modelling, but 
                                                    
63 See Bates et al. (1998). 
64 For an introduction, see, e.g., Persson and Tabellini (2002) or Besley (2007). 
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rather by the interaction of rational, purposeful behaviour with existing institutions. In 
that sense, the thesis displays a commitment to the agenda of classic public choice 
analysis, institutional analysis, and Austrian economics – which could be subsumed, 
following Boettke (2012), into the notion of ‘mainline economics.’ 
With the exception of Chapter 5, which has a more explicitly descriptive character, the 
dominant approach throughout this thesis consists of an articulation of simple rational 
choice-based verbal model, from which various testable implications are derived and 
compared against observed reality. This is done either informally or through the use of 
formal, quantitative evidence. Given the substantive focus of our thesis, surveys, 
including Arab Barometer, Eurobarometer, and Economic Expectations and Attitudes, a 
survey run in the Czech Republic and Slovakia in the 1990s, represent the main sources 
of formal data.  
Surveys are useful for our purposes because they provide the most straightforward 
measures of beliefs – and potentially of mētis. True, cross-country data may not be 
comparable because of the specific wording might carry different meanings in different 
contexts.65 Furthermore, people can lie, if we have reasons to believe that they 
misrepresent their beliefs and preferences in a systematic way. In authoritarian regimes, 
for example, respondents face incentives to misrepresent reality in a way that is 
congruent with the official line of the government or of the ruling party. 
An important limitation in this thesis has to do with the quality and relevance of the 
used survey data. Not all attitudes that are of interest to us have been articulated in 
surveys; and those that have been have often been translated into questions that are 
imperfect for our purposes. Moreover, the finite nature of surveys implies their potential 
incompleteness – one can only get answers to questions they have asked, and there are 
                                                    
65 See also Di Tella and MacCulloch (2006) for a discussion of survey data in the context of well-being 
research. 
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only so many questions that one can ask within a survey.66 Unless individuals are asked 
about specific beliefs and preferences, those may go unnoticed. Conversely, questions 
on subjects about which individuals have not thought or sufficiently cared about might 
elicit opinions that they do not hold strongly. 
The remainder of this chapter presents detailed accounts of methodological strategies 
employed in the three subsequent case studies.  
2.2 Methodology of Chapter 3 
Chapter 3 represents perhaps the most straightforward case study in this collection of 
essays. In order to explain the persistent failure of reforms of Egypt’s system of 
subsidies, we build a verbal model of policy credibility and present a theoretical account 
of mechanisms that facilitate commitment of policymakers to efficiency-enhancing 
reforms. We then discuss whether these are present or absent in Egypt. The chapter has 
also a descriptive part, synthesising information about Egypt’s subsidy system, its 
operation and its history. 
The explanation of the Egyptian reform failure then proceeds by investigating whether 
such mechanisms are present or absent in the Egyptian context, establishing that 
prospective reformers in Egypt are facing deep commitment problems. Furthermore, we 
outline several other plausible explanations of the phenomenon of reform failure and 
demonstrate that these fail to account for important aspects of the Egyptian reality. 
Finally, we derive several immediate lessons that seem of importance for public policy. 
These are discussed in Chapter 3, as well as in the conclusion of this thesis, in Chapter 
6. 
                                                    
66 Or, ‘[t]he fundamental problem is that the dimension of the vector of institutions that we believe 
influences growth is extremely large.’ (Pande and Udry 2005: 5) 
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2.3 Methodology of Chapter 4 
This chapter provides a rational choice-based explanation for the popularity of Islamic 
political groups in countries of Middle East and North Africa – most notably in the 
countries of the Arab Spring. The central argument is built on a simple verbal model of 
credible commitment and patronage, complemented by an account of organisational 
properties of religious groups, referencing the sizeable literature in the field of 
economics of religion. This discussion yields a number of testable implications. Whilst 
some of them can be compared against reality directly, others require a more intricate 
statistical test. 
One question that does require a formal, statistical test is whether political Islam is 
connected with any consistent pattern of policy preferences in the Downsian policy 
space, or an ‘Islamic ideology.’ Using data from the 2006-2007 Arab Barometer,67 
which covered Jordan, Palestinian territories, Morocco, Algeria, Lebanon and Yemen, 
we provide a tentative answer to that question. We put the emphasis on the word 
‘tentative’ because the data which we have at our disposal are far from perfect for a 
answering the query that interests us. For one, the selection of countries offers only a 
very imperfect overlap with the countries of the Arab Spring, leaving out Egypt, 
Tunisia, Libya, and Syria, and including countries that are not currently undergoing 
significant political changes, such as Jordan or the Palestinian territories. The 
justification for our approach is mainly instrumental. Even if the test we can offer is far 
from the ideal test to which we would like to subject our hypothesis, it is still extremely 
informative. Should religiosity be a significant predictor of policy preferences across the 
Arab countries covered by the survey, the central claims made in Chapter 4 would seem 
much weaker and much less convincing. 
                                                    
67 Tessler et al. (2008) also use the Arab Barometer data to test various hypotheses about voting 
behaviour in the Arab world. 
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Our right-hand side variables are twofold. Firstly, we use the individual preferences 
over essential characteristics of democracy expressed in the survey. Respondents were 
asked to choose from the following four attributes: (1) opportunity to change the 
government through elections, (2) freedom to criticise the government/those in power, 
(3) a small income gap between the rich and poor, and (4) basic necessities like food, 
clothing and shelter for everyone. Secondly, we look at individuals' assessment of how 
well or badly is their government doing on a variety of matters, ranging from the 
economy, through to education and health, to addressing deteriorating morality (247q). 
The respondents are also asked whether human rights violations are acceptable if 
justified by security or stability concerns (234q). Finally, respondents are given a choice 
of various issues and are asked to choose the one that they perceive as the most 
important problem facing their respective countries (withoutPalestine248q).68 All of the 
dependent and independent variables are listed in Tables 9 and 10 in the appendix. To 
measure a preference for political Islam, we use the first principal component of four 
variables, related to the role of Islam in politics (Political Islam). These variables are 
described in Table 10. Following the standard practice, we retain only the first principal 
component because it is the only one with an eigenvalue greater than 1. Table 11 in the 
Appendix reports the factor loadings and unique variances for this principal component. 
We have reversed the sign on the Political Islam to ensure that higher values of 
Political Islam can be interpreted as higher degree of political Islamism. Besides this 
composite variable, we include a vector of country fixed effects and standard individual 
characteristics, including the level of civic engagement. 
Following standard practice in this area of research, we estimate the relationship 
between Political Islam and policy preferences – controlling for a vector of potentially 
                                                    
68 The poll asks a modified version of the question, with different options, in Palestine as well, 
(onlyPalestine248q) so in principle a separate regression could be run on Palestinian data alone. We have 
decided to eschew that in this version of the paper because the development in the Palestinian territories is 
not central to our argument and because it would be impossible to compare the results with the regression 
run in other Arab countries. 
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relevant explanatory variables – using ordered logit regressions,69 the results of which 
are reported in Tables 12-14 in the appendix. A detailed discussion of the results can be 
found in section 4.3.2.1. 
2.4 Methodology of Chapter 5 
Chapter 5 relies on econometric evidence establishing the existence and significance of 
differences in beliefs about markets and policy preferences between the people living in 
the Czech part and the Slovak part of Czechoslovakia in the early 1990s. This evidence 
is then complemented by a historical narrative that finds that these differences had their 
counterparts in the realm of actual policy platforms that dominated the political scenes 
in the Czech Republic and Slovakia.  
The data for the first stage of the investigation come from the survey Economic 
Expectations and Attitudes, run by the Institute of Sociology at the Czechoslovak 
Academy of Sciences from 1990 until 1998. The early waves of the survey (until 1994) 
covered both republics; after the split, the survey provided data only for the Czech 
Republic. We use only the data from the first six waves of the survey, in the period 
between 1990-1993. Each wave provides roughly 1,600-1,700 observations, leading to a 
total of over 10 thousand data points in the sample under consideration. The survey uses 
quota sampling to cover a representative sample of the Czechoslovak population. In the 
first stage, stratification by settlement size and region is used, and then, in the second 
stage, respondents are selected by quota sampling by age, gender, and education. 
The survey asked questions about people’s perceptions of the changes that the country 
was undergoing, their views on different economic policies, and broader questions about 
social justice and the role of the government in the economy. While the survey asks a 
large variety of questions about economic and social policies, economics, trade, 
                                                    
69 The choice of logistic regression in this case should not be a matter of great controversy; in any event, 
alternative estimation procedures (OLS, probit) yield results that are qualitatively similar. 
- 53 - 
entrepreneurship and inequality, not all of the questions are covered in all years of the 
survey. Furthermore, many of them are substantively ‘collinear,’ which decreases the 
value of analysing all of them in great detail. 
We have settled on six questions that in our view capture important dimensions of 
economic and social policy in the aftermath of the fall of communism – ranging from 
broad questions about the desirable economic system to specific queries about social 
policy, privatisation and health care – and which have the widest coverage throughout 
the different waves of survey.  
The first question, Money For Competent, asks whether “[i]t is right that capable and 
competent people have a lot of money, even millions.” Answers to this question can be 
potentially informed by the respondents’ beliefs about meritocracy and their preference 
for egalitarian distribution of resources. 
The second question, Unnecessary Job Positions, asks whether respondents agree with 
the statement that “[u]nemployment should be prevented even at the cost of preserving 
many unnecessary jobs.” Answers to this question can reflect individual preference for 
job security. Relatedly, the third question, Transform SOEs, asks whether “[a]ll big state 
enterprises should be transformed into shareholders' companies or private firms.” 
Answers to this question are likely related to the individuals’ views of corporatisation 
and privatisation of the state-run economy. 
Fourthly, Only Capitalism asks whether “[c]apitalism represents the only possible 
course of our future development.” Clearly, this is a broad and somewhat vague 
question, but the answers plausibly reflect the ideological positions of respondents and 
their beliefs about the desirable path for the economic transition. 
The fifth and the sixth question, Private Social Services and Private Health Care, ask 
about the respondents’ attitude toward the privatisation of social services and health 
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care. The exact wording of the questions is as follows: “Would it be right, according to 
your opinion, that a part of social care, e.g. care for the elderly, would be performed by 
private institutions?” and “would you agree with the introduction of private medical 
care? 
Data reported in the Economic Expectations and Attitudes provide us also with control 
variables with individual characteristics including age, educational status, income, self-
reported ideology, and so on. Later in this chapter, we also exploit the variation in 
regional characteristics, such as employment structure by sector, or various historical 
features. A summary of the variables used is reported in Table 16 in the appendix. 
For the questions 1-5, the answers are coded as follows: 1 definitely no, 2 rather no, 3 
rather yes, 4 definitely yes. For question 6, we recoded the answers so that being pro- or 
anti-market results in the same sign as in the case of the other variables. The answers to 
the question of Unnecessary Job Positions is thus coded as follows: 1 definitely yes, 2 
rather yes, 3 rather no, 4 definitely yes 
To investigate whether differences exist between policy preferences of the Czechs and 
the Slovaks, we first run simple univariate ordered logit regressions. These reveal that 
the differences in observed means are statistically significant. Afterwards, we 
investigate whether the observed differences are simply artefacts of the underlying 
differences in socioeconomic status between the Czechs and the Slovaks. The results of 
these regressions are reported in Table 6 in Chapter 5. Our estimation strategy relies on 
a large number of categorical variables. In such circumstances, ordered logit could 
produce inconsistent estimates unless the number of observations in each category is 
large.70 While this concern may not be hugely consequential in this context, as the 
observed differences between logit estimates and its alternatives are not large, we report 
the results that rely on the use of linear probability models (i.e., OLS). In the next stage 
                                                    
70 Greene (2008: 805). 
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of this econometric exercise we attempt to explain whether the differences in opinions 
between the Czech and the Slovak population could be explained by measurable 
differences in various structural and historical characteristics. Obviously, the measures 
that we have been able to use are very coarse and the results need to be taken with a 
grain of salt. Nevertheless, inserting these alternative ‘explanations’ into our regressions 
one by one, and using them to produce a joint test of significance, does little to displace 
the Slovak dummy, although it does reduce its size somewhat.  
To complement the evidence of sizeable and statistically significant differences in self-
reported beliefs between the Czechs and the Slovaks, Chapter 5 also presents a 
historical narrative of the period following the fall of communism in Czechoslovakia to 
the split of 1993. We note that significant differences existed between the composition 
of Czech and Slovak political elites who formulated the initial transition strategy and 
while Klaus’ plan of radical reform resonated in the Czech context, Slovak politicians 
seemed inclined to prefer more cautious, gradualist policies. These differences were 
reaffirmed in the election in 1992, which brought two leaders with incompatible policy 
visions to power in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. 
The evidence that we present in Chapter 5 obviously suffers from a identification issues 
that prevent us from claiming that the differences in beliefs were a cause of the split of 
Czechoslovakia and of the different transitional paths of the two countries. The 
differences in beliefs may have simply reflected differences in the expected cost of the 
rapid transition – after all, the initial output slump was deeper in Slovakia than in the 
Czech Republic, as documented on Figure 1. The differences in beliefs could have also 
been a reflection of Slovak nationalism, of the discontent with the constitutional 
arrangements in the common state, or of the personal appeal of Vladimír Mečiar. If that 
were the case, the observed differences in beliefs could have followed the different 
policy decisions in the two constituent parts of Czechoslovakia, without exercising any 
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causal effect on those decisions. Our hope is that by documenting the existing 
differences in opinions and by showing that they were perfectly aligned with the 
differences in policy decisions, we have provided an impetus for further research into 
this question. 
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3 Policy Credibility and the Political Economy of Reform: the 
Case of Egypt’s Commodity Subsidies71 
3.1 Introduction 
In settings with well-defined property rights and low transaction costs, economists 
expect private actors to eliminate inefficiencies through competition or through 
bargaining. Why doesn’t the same reasoning translate easily into the political realm? 
How can we account for the emergence and persistence of institutions and policies that 
entail large social losses? A sizeable public choice literature explores the failures of the 
political process to generate efficient outcomes, starting with Tullock’s (1967, 1975) 
seminal contributions. However, disagreements exist over the mechanisms through 
which the political process prevents efficiency-enhancing political bargains from 
occurring – including most prominently transaction costs,72 rational ignorance,73 
problems of credible commitment,74 to a failure of individual rationality in the political 
realm.75 The latter class of explanations would include accounts that rely on sources of 
independent variation in beliefs – or in mētis – as the key moving force determining 
social and economic outcomes. 
To elucidate that question, this chapter provides a case study of failed subsidy reforms 
in Egypt. In 2012, close to one third of the country’s public spending – or 13 percent of 
GDP – was directed towards subsidies of consumer goods, ranging from diesel oil to 
tea. Besides the fiscal burden, subsidies disproportionately benefit the wealthier 
segments of the population, which makes them ill-suited as instruments of social 
assistance. They distort the supply of commodities and deter entry, resulting in poor 
quality and unreliable service. Subsidies also invite arbitrage, leading to leakages to 
                                                    
71 A version of this chapter is forthcoming in Journal of Institutional Economics (Roháč 2013a). 
72 Tullock (1975). 
73 Downs (1957). 
74 Rodrik (1988), Keefer and Vlaicu (2008). 
75 Caplan (2007). 
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black markets and to smuggling.76 Yet, subsidies are embedded in Egypt’s political 
landscape as the main tool of redistribution. Attempts to reform the subsidy system in 
the past were met with popular resistance. 
According to this chapter, the lack of credibility can explain why subsidies have 
withstood reform. Therefore, it is not necessary to try to explain the apparent 
inefficiency of the Egyptian subsidy system by an appeal to particular characteristics of 
Egyptian political culture, belief system, or mētis. The costs of reform reversal and the 
costs of opportunistic seizure of the surplus of a reform – typically in the form of 
budgetary savings – by politicians have been low in Egypt. A premise of our 
explanation is that the public expect that any savings from a subsidy reform would end 
up being grabbed by the political elite and its cronies instead of being directed at the 
population, either in the form of a lower tax burden or increased provision of public 
goods. As a result, the government has never been able to commit credibly to a 
permanent reform of subsidies. Instead, only marginal changes have been enacted 
occasionally and then reversed. In the pre-Arab Spring Egypt, the costs of reform 
reversal were low because the one-party system provided very few genuine veto players 
that could block such policy reversals. Even after 2011, Egypt’s politics suffered from 
credibility problems as well because, in general, new politicians in new democracies 
cannot easily make credible pre-electoral promises about policies.77 As a result, 
problems of credible commitment in policy making will likely plague Egypt regardless 
of how oblique is the country’s journey towards an open political system. 
This chapter provides a discussion of how the lack of credibility could be overcome by 
appropriately designed reforms. In order to overcome the credibility problem, a reform 
of subsidies would need to be quick, irreversible and simple to implement. It should 
also involve an explicit mechanism for distributing the gains of the reform and be 
                                                    
76 Pelham (2012). 
77 Keefer and Vlaicu (2008). 
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accompanied by complementary measures that would yield wide benefits to the 
population and improve the functioning of the markets for food and energy. 
This chapter fills gaps in several streams of literature. Firstly, it represents a new 
application of the research on policy credibility78 to a problem that has obvious 
relevance for policy in low- and mid-income countries. Its purpose is to provide an 
answer to the question asked often by public choice theorists – namely, why do 
efficiency-enhancing trades often fail to materialise in the political realm?79 Besides 
commitment and credibility problems, the existing literature cites the impracticability of 
compensation schemes that would accompany changes in policy,80 uncertainty over 
distributional effects of policy changes81 or a status quo bias driven by incentives.82 
Secondly, the paper represents an addition to the literature on the evolution of policy 
and durability of reforms, which has so far focused mostly on the American context83, 
and much less on low- and mid-income countries, or transitional economies.84 Poorer 
parts of the world, however, by offering a greater variation in policies and economic 
outcomes, both over time and across countries, represent a natural testing ground for 
different models of policy persistence. Moreover, as we have seen in Eastern Europe in 
the 1990s, political and economic transitions tend create an environment in which many 
of the problems affecting political decision-making are exacerbated. That applies 
particularly to the problems of credible commitment and to the incentive-compatibility 
of economic reforms.85 As a result, during post-communist transitions, wholesale and 
                                                    
78 Keefer and Knack (2007), Keefer and Vlaicu (2008), Coyne and Boettke (2009), Frye (2004), Talercio 
(2004). 
79 See Acemoglu (2003).  
80 Tullock (1975). 
81 Fernandez and Rodrik (1991). 
82 Coate and Morris (1999). 
83 Patashnik (2000, 2003, 2008), Maltzman and Shipan (2008), Berry, Burden, and Howell (2006), Moe 
(1989).  
84 E.g. Campos and Esfahani (2000), Frye (2004). 
85 Boettke (1995). 
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rapid reforms seemed associated with better outcomes than piecemeal changes 86 – in 
line with the logic of Rodrik’s (1988) idea of overshooting as a signal of credible 
commitment. What is more, gradual reforms were often a by-product of strong vested 
interests that captured the state apparatus in order to keep the inflationary spigot 
running.87  
The existing literature on reform durability has focused heavily on institutional settings 
in which reforms are adopted, as well as the nature of coalitions adopting such policies. 
By adding an explicit emphasis on policy credibility, it is hoped that this approach 
provides a more complete account of reform reversals than the ones commonly used in 
the literature. Finally, this chapter makes a connection between the political economy of 
credible commitment and the sizeable literature on subsidy reforms88, where an explicit 
political economy focus is underplayed and where the problem of subsidies is 
represented as a technical one. Although the technical aspects of subsidy reforms are 
without any doubt important, the goal of the paper is to focus the attention of 
researchers and policy practitioners on the broader issues of political economy of 
reform. 
3.2 Reform reversals, reform paralysis, and lack of credible 
commitment 
Economic policies can be seen as contracts between politicians and a decisive part of 
the population, needed for the politicians to control of the government. Through such 
contracts, politicians obtain the support that enables them to control the government 
apparatus, in exchange for policies that deliver benefits to the part of the population that 
                                                    
86 Roháč (2013d), see particularly Figure 1. 
87 Åslund, Boone, and Johnson (1996) 
88 IMF (2013), Vagliasindi (2012), World Bank (2005), Coady et al. (2010), or Commander (2012).  
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is needed to control the government. As with other contracts, these are vulnerable to 
situations when politicians face incentives to deviate from the announced path.89  
A substantial part of the population derives net benefits from the existing subsidy 
system, even though these come at a deadweight cost. Disturbing the status quo by 
eliminating subsidies would impose cost on that part of the population, even though it 
would enhance economic efficiency. An elimination of subsidies does not necessarily 
imply that ordinary Egyptians will receive the surplus, either in the form of lower taxes 
or directed transfers. Instead, politicians may choose to appropriate the surplus created 
by the reform to themselves. To elicit support for reform, politicians must propose an 
explicit – and credible – mechanism for distributing the benefits of the reform, which 
would leave a decisive part of the population no worse off than in the absence of 
reform. Even if a deal is reached, the public will have only imperfect mechanisms for 
monitoring politicians’ compliance with their proposal and penalising them if they fail 
to deliver. 
However, the negotiations and calculations needed to make sure that the decisive part of 
the population is left no worse off are costly and take time. That, together with 
competing demands on politicians’ time and attention, can create a situation in which 
the surplus that politicians expect to appropriate from the policy change is outweighed 
by the costs of reaching a deal with the population. 
Because the deadweight cost of a subsidy system extends over time, the benefits from 
the reform will not be realised all at once. Those who consent to the reform will have to 
rely on a promise made by the politicians to share with them the benefits from the 
reforms as they accrue over time. Such promises can be broken because, at a later stage 
                                                    
89 For different formulations of this problem, in different contexts, see Coyne and Boettke (2009), Keefer 
and Stasavage (2001), or Weingast (1997).  
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of the game, politicians may decide to redistribute the surplus from the reform 
opportunistically, violating their prior agreement with the population. 
The situation is visualised on Figure 1 in Chapter 1, which mirrors the exposition in 
Coyne and Boettke (2009: 6). In the first stage of the game, the politician proposes a 
welfare-enhancing reform – i.e. an elimination of wasteful subsidies. In the second 
stage, the public decides whether to support the politician’s platform or not. If the 
platform is rejected, both the politician and the public receive a default pay-off of 1, 
corresponding to the status quo. If the public supports the platform and the politician is 
elected, the politician has the option of either delivering on their promise, generating a 
pay-off of 2 to the politician and a pay-off of 4 to the voter. If the politician chooses to 
renege – e.g. by seizing the whole surplus from the reform – they will end up with a 
pay-off of 6, leaving the public with a pay-off of 0. 
In a one-shot game, the outcome (Supports, Delivers) is not attainable because in the 
final stage of the game the politician is tempted to hijack the surplus created by the 
reform by reneging, creating a classic time inconsistency problem. Time inconsistency 
in multi-stage game is a situation where a player’s best plan for some future stage of the 
game will not be optimal when that future stage arrives. A time-inconsistent game is 
subgame imperfect. The importance of time inconsistency in economics and in political 
economy was popularised through the work of Kydland and Prescott (1977), who 
developed an influential model of time-inconsistent monetary policy, and expanded 
through the seminal contribution of Rogoff (1985). 
A rational public will reject the politician’s reform proposal, resulting in an equilibrium 
that leaves room for a Pareto improvement, which is unattainable unless the structure of 
the game is changed in a way that precludes the politician from reneging in the final 
stage or makes reneging costly for him. The politician needs to find a way of making a 
credible commitment. The only subgame perfect equilibrium in the game is the one in 
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which the public rejects reform, leaving both the public and the politician with a lower 
pay-off compared to the Pareto superior outcome that the reform would have brought if 
implemented. 
While the situation depicted on Figure 1 describes a one-shot came, it is possible to 
extend its implications to a dynamic environment. It is possible to imagine that the 
continuation of a subsidy reform over time requires a repetition of the game above in 
each period. Even if the initial problem of reform implementation is overcome and the 
politician delivers, it is not clear that he will continue delivering in subsequent stages of 
the game. The government can be changed in an election and the commitment of new 
politicians to delivering may be in doubt. That would induce the public to play ‘Reject’ 
in the following stage of the reform, leading to a repeal of the reform. 
As Campos and Esfahani (2000) note, different mechanisms exist that can help 
politicians overcome such credibility problems. The general mechanism through which 
these mechanisms work is by decreasing the pay-off to the politician of seizing the 
surplus of the reform in the final stage of the game. The main testable prediction of this 
theoretical framework is that reforms will be more difficult if these commitment 
mechanisms are weak or unavailable.  
3.2.1 Gains sharing 
A large part of the efficiency gains generated by the subsidy reform will in the form of 
budgetary savings. As a result, politicians will have discretion over the distribution of 
that part of the surplus. The main risk of the reform from the public’s perspective is that 
the savings will be appropriated as rents by politicians. One way of overcoming that 
problem is for the politician to accompany the subsidy reform with a reduction of the 
tax burden, which would ensure that the savings are appropriated by the population. 
Alternatively, the government can create an explicit system of cash transfers that would 
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direct a large part of the budgetary savings to the population, conceivably in a way that 
targets poor households rather than wealthy ones.  
Tax cuts and the creation of a system of transfers both have the potential to create 
constituencies who will derive benefits from the new status quo, who will have stakes in 
the reform and who will oppose its reversal, making it more difficult for the government 
to repeal the reform or seize the welfare gains that the reform would generate. It would 
do so by changing the structure of the pay-off in the final stage of the game depicted on 
Figure 1. The politician would no longer have the option of reneging at no cost and 
capturing the surplus of 6, leaving the public with a pay-off of 0. Instead, the politician 
would have to propose a statutory repeal of the tax changes or of the compensatory 
mechanisms accompanying the subsidy reform – which would hardly command popular 
support. 
3.2.2 Governance reforms 
The subsidy reform may also be linked to governance changes that increase the cost of 
reform reversals. Such reforms may increase the number of potential veto players whose 
agreement is needed to revoke the reform, thereby making reneging on reform more 
difficult, enhancing thus the credibility of the reform. That can be achieved, e.g., by 
delegating the decisions over pricing of commodities to an independent regulator, 
instead of keeping them in the hands of the politicians. In other words, such governance 
changes would remove the power of politicians to renege in the final stage of the game 
by placing the node of decision-making into the hands of an independent regulator who 
does not face the same incentive structure and is unable to appropriate the created 
surplus for herself. 
The costs of reversal can be increased by dismantling the administrative capability of 
the government to provide subsidies by closing down the relevant parts of the 
government apparatus. Precedents for such reforms include the abolition of foreign 
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exchange controls in the United Kingdom in 1979, when the relevant bureau of Bank of 
England was closed down, or the shutdown of the planning offices in Central and 
Eastern European countries in the early stages of the transition in the 1990s. In a case 
where subsidy systems have co-existed with heavy regulation of entry, it is plausible 
that the elimination of government-protected monopolies and opening up of markets to 
competition would make reintroduction of subsidies or price controls more difficult or 
perhaps even plain impossible.  
3.2.3 International agreements 
Governments can use international treaties as a way of committing to certain policies. 
International treaties, or arrangement with organisations such as the European Union, 
World Bank or the International Monetary Fund (IMF), can offer substantial benefits to 
the governments. If they are conditional on governments’ pursuit and upholding of 
subsidy reforms, the costs of reneging for the government increase.90 This mechanism 
would change the pay-off structure of the game by imposing costs on politicians for 
reneging in the final stage of the game depicted on Figure 1 and therefore decreasing the 
pay-off from reneging or from seizing the surplus. An obvious limitation of such 
arrangements is that they do not extend indefinitely over time. Once a particular 
structural adjustment programme of the IMF is completed, it will no longer prevent the 
government from reintroducing inefficient price subsidies.  
3.2.4 Reputation 
Politicians may use their reputation and their record of delivering on other policy-
related promises to overcome the time inconsistency problem involved in removing 
subsidies. Politicians who have built a reputation for delivering on their promises will 
find it more costly than others to renege, and will be less likely to do so. Unlike the 
previous commitment mechanisms, this would not change the structure of the game 
                                                    
90 On this point, see Fang and Owen (2011). 
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directly. Instead, this mechanism would give voters an opportunity to punish the 
politician in subsequent rounds of the game.  
This mechanism exists only in competitive political environments where citizens can 
vote politicians out of office and is available only to politicians who have a record of 
delivering on promises. Furthermore, it requires a political environment in which it is 
possible to track politicians’ promises and monitor their performance. In other words, 
reliable channels of communication and feedback between politicians and the public 
must be established and the voters need to be able to gather information about the 
conduct of politicians. Such mechanisms, including free press91 and institutions of civil 
society, may not be available in closed or uncompetitive political systems, and should 
not be taken for granted in new democracies either.  
3.3 Egyptian subsidy system 
The origins of Egypt’s subsidy system can be found in the combination of weak 
institutions characterised by a lack of capacity to direct transfers to vulnerable groups, 
and a demand for redistribution from the general public.92  
This chapter takes a narrow understanding of subsidies as measures “that keep prices for 
consumers below the market level or keep prices for producers above the market level 
or that reduce costs for consumers and producers by giving direct or indirect support,”93 
in contrast with their broader understanding which may also encompass tax subsidies, 
cash subsidies or transfers in kind. The economic effects of subsidies are 
straightforward. By imposing a price below the market clearing one, policymakers 
create shortages.94 In response, governments intervene to increase the total supply of the 
commodity. For example, to keep the subsidised bread available, the Egyptian 
                                                    
91 For a discussion between free media, institutional change and economic development, see Coyne and 
Leeson (2009).  
92 Commander (2012). 
93 De Moor and Calamai (1997:1), cited in Fattouh and El-Katiri (2012: 11). 
94 See Schneider (1988) for a basic framework for the microeconomic study of food subsidies. 
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government provides subsidised wheat flour, which it either buys on the world market 
or is involved in producing.95 Subsidies also create opportunities for arbitrage, 
especially if private markets exist on which the commodities in question are traded at 
unsubsidised prices.  
Given these inefficiencies, why is it that the subsidy system in Egypt has been so 
difficult to reform? The stylised model presented in Section 2.2 predicts that reform will 
be impossible to implement – or reversed later – if politicians do not have access to 
relevant commitment devices or when those devices are weak. All four of the following 
commitment devices have been either absent or weak in the Egyptian context: (1) gains-
sharing schemes accompanying the attempts at reform, (2) independent regulatory 
structures constraining the power of politicians to reintroduce subsidies, (3) 
international treaties or conditional arrangements with international organisations, (4) 
politicians who would use reputation on competitive political markets. 
3.3.1 Background 
After World War I, the Egyptian government started importing large quantities of wheat 
and selling them at subsidised prices in government-owned shops.96 World War II led to 
the introduction of rationing of basic commodities, including wheat and sugar. After 
independence, subsidies of food, transport, housing, energy, water and health – and also 
to soap and cigarettes – became an essential element of the relationship between the 
government and Egypt’s citizens. The agrarian reform of 1952 was a catalyst in that 
process and led to a direct involvement of the government in numerous aspects of food 
production and distribution.97 Rationing was used, then removed, and finally 
reintroduced in 1966.  
                                                    
95 In 2010/2011, 70 percent of the high-extraction flour used in the production of coarse baladi bread was 
produced by the public sector. Also, the public sector purchased roughly 61 percent of the total wheat 
imported to Egypt. (Mansour 2012) 
96 See Ghoneim (2012: 5-7) or Ahmed et al. (2001: 5-12) for a history of Egypt’s food subsidy system. 
97 Gutner (2002: 461). 
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Table 2 provides information about the size of subsidy spending relative to the Egyptian 
public spending. Subsidies to petroleum products account for almost three quarters of 
the total spending on subsidies. The remainder is directed towards spending on food 
subsidies, most notably bread. While the relative size of subsidy spending has fluctuated 
as a result of a growth in other areas of public budgets, spending on subsidies, expressed 
either in Egyptian pounds or US dollars has grown continuously since the fiscal year 
2005/2006. 
 
Table 2 Spending on selected subsidies (% of total spending) 
 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/2013 
Food 
(GASC) 1 
8.14 4.24 5.83 5.99 4.60 8.15 6.43 5.53 
Petroleum 36.16 18.07 21.34 17.84 18.18 16.84 20.28 20.40 
 
Source: Central Bank of Egypt (2014). 
1 General Administration for Supply of Commodities, in charge of food subsidies 
*Budget only 
 
The cost to the public budget underestimates the opportunity costs of subsidies. Fattouh 
and El-Katiri (2012: 38) argue that because of deadweight losses such opportunity costs 
– which encompass the social benefits from the alternative uses of scarce resources that 
are used towards subsidising consumer products – may amount to roughly twice the 
recorded financial costs of subsidies. And that estimate ignores the dynamic effects that 
subsidies have on the broader economy by encouraging overconsumption of certain 
sources of energy and food and deterring competitive entry. Artificially low prices also 
result in overconsumption, leakages, and black markets. Fattouh and El-Katiri (2012: 
25) note that while energy intensity98 has decreased in most industrialised countries 
around the world, it has been increasing in countries that use energy subsidies – 
including Egypt.  
                                                    
98 Energy intensity is understood as a measure of energy efficiency of an economy, expressed in units of 
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The excessive incidence of subsidies on high-income groups is pronounced in the case 
of energy subsidies.99 Abouleinein, El-Laithy and Kheir-El-Din (2009) show that in 
both urban and rural areas the top 20 percent of households (as measured by 
expenditures), receive by far the largest share of the total subsidy spending, and the 
share of the benefits received by other households decreases with their wealth, as 
proxied by household expenditures. This discrepancy is even stronger in urban areas, 
where it is likely driven by multiple car ownership among the wealthiest households. 
Unsurprisingly, the gasoline subsidy is the most regressive.100  
Leakages, measured as differences between the observed supply and demand, are also 
significant. They represented 31 percent in the case of baladi bread in 2008/2009 (down 
from 40.8 percent in 2004/2005), and 20 percent in the case of sugar and cooking oil.101  
Benefits from food subsidies, directed in part to inferior goods, accrue more evenly 
across different segments of the population - particularly after the reforms of the 1980s 
and 1990s, which eliminated subsidies to food items that were consumed mostly by the 
wealthy Egyptians.102 Food subsidies, however, tend to have an urban bias, which is 
driven partly by the fact that households in rural areas are able to supply their own 
food.103  
3.3.2 A history of failed reforms 
An early reform of food subsidies was introduced by president Anwar Sadat in 1977,104 
following almost a decade of growth in subsidy spending during which subsidies 
covered a variety of new foodstuffs, including corn, rice, or frozen fish and meat.105 
                                                    
99 This is in line with the finding by Del Granado et al. (2010) who find, on a sample of different 
developing countries, that the top quintile of the income distribution typically receives six times as much 
in energy subsidies as the bottom quintile. 
100 Vagliasindi (2012). 
101 World Bank (2010: 86). Egyptian Center for Economic Studies (2010) reports even significantly 
higher estimates. 
102 Ali and Adams (1996). 
103 Ahmed et al. (2001). 
104 Alissa (2007: 3). 
105 Ahmed et al. (2001: 6). 
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Though the series of protests that followed were dubbed ‘bread riots,’ the reform 
announced in January 1977 did not involve an increase in the price of coarse baladi 
bread nor a number of other staples such as lentils, beans, cooking oil and sugar. 
Subsidies were to be reduced on the more expensive fino bread, as well as the low-
extraction flour from which it was made, rice, LPG, gasoline, cigarettes, and tea.106 
Riots that occurred led the government to cancel the reforms and instead expand the 
subsidy system. 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, some reforms were put in place – mostly as part of a 
structural adjustment programme administered by the IMF. In 1990, the prices of 
agricultural products – except for sugar – were liberalised. Petroleum prices, set at 36 
percent of international prices in 1989 were raised to 100 percent in 1994. (ADB 1999: 
xi) The specific changes to food subsidies included targeting by introducing two 
categories of ration cards, a reduction of the number of subsidised foodstuffs, a 
reduction of people eligible to receive ration cards,107 phasing out of certain 
commodities and their replacement with less heavily subsidised alternatives, a reduction 
of size of subsidised bread loaves.108 
The real burden of food subsidy spending fell afterwards, but then started growing 
again.109 In the 2000s, the government launched an extensive energy subsidy reform, 
increasing prices of gasoline and diesel oil and putting in place mechanisms for gradual 
electricity price increases, which took effect between 2005 and 2008. In 2008, natural 
gas prices were increased, and plans had been made for a complete elimination of 
energy subsidies by 2014. However, those efforts were abandoned in 2009 as the global 
economic crisis began to unfold, resulting in gradual increases in subsidy spending to 
unsustainable levels. In December 2012, the subsidy on 95-octane gasoline – used by 
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the wealthiest Egyptians – was scrapped. Instead of generating the savings that the 
government had hoped for, however, it induced consumers to shift to 92-octane 
gasoline,110 creating shortages. In March 2013 an increase of the prices of LPG was 
announced, by 60 percent for consumers and by 100 percent for businesses.111 Since 
2012, the country has been suffering from a diesel shortage, 70 percent of which needs 
to be imported. Given the high subsidisation rate on diesel, the government is 
responding to the existing fiscal pressures by purchasing less fuel – a solution that can 
hardly be seen as lasting.112 
While there has been no shortage of partial reforms, before and after the events of the 
Arab Spring, the successive Egyptian governments have failed to end subsidies to food 
and energy or to prevent increases in subsidy spending following cuts to such spending. 
To show how the framework outlined above in Section 3.2 accounts for the failure of 
Egyptian governments to sustain subsidy reforms, one needs to provide evidence for the 
lack – or weakness – of commitment devices available to prospective reformers in the 
country.  
3.3.2.1 Gains sharing 
A subsidy reform accompanied by an explicit gains-sharing mechanism makes it 
difficult for politicians to capture the surplus of the reform since that would require a 
repeal of the gains-sharing mechanism in question – such as a cash transfer programme 
or tax cuts. The attempts to reform the subsidy system in Egypt did not include a 
sizeable increase of the existing social safety nets. In 1977, the announcement of price 
increases of subsidised food triggered riots because they were perceived as unfair. 
“Although the riots are commonly termed ‘food riots’, as noted above, they were in fact 
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‘equity riots’ since the underlying issues had more to do with the perception that the 
policy change was unfair, rather than the actual policy change itself” (Gutner 2002: 18).  
Nor were later attempts to curb subsidy spending accompanied by a sizeable increase in 
cash transfers to the population. As late as 2005, only 0.12 percent of GDP was spent 
annually on cash transfers and the size of the Social Fund for Development (SFD), 
which had been established as part of previous reforms was around 0.18 percent of 
GDP. (World Bank 2005: iv) 
3.3.2.2 Governance reforms 
Governance reforms involving the creation of independent regulatory bodies, rules-
based pricing mechanisms or full liberalisation of markets in question remove the 
discretion over prices from politicians’ hands, making it more difficult for them to 
renege. Since its independence, Egypt was governed as an authoritarian system 
dominated by one political party. Under Nasser, the Arab Socialist Union (ASU) 
effectively controlled the government. After its demise in the mid-1970s, the National 
Democratic Party (NDP) – originally the centrist group in the ASU – became the only 
effective political organisation in the country controlling all levels of government and 
public administration. As such, the number of veto players in the political process was 
limited, placing few formal constraints on the range of policies that could have been 
adopted. A government that is not accountable to a majority of the population faces few 
constraints if it decides to renege on its promises, whether they pertain to the 
distributional or other aspects of a reform. Arguably, that account characterises the 
Egyptian situation well. Policies were introduced and repealed at the sole discretion of 
the ASU or NDP, with very little constitutional checks and balance. Repeated reversals 
of reforms further eroded the public’s trust of the government to tackle the problem. 
Furthermore, the attempts to reduce subsidies in the past have not been accompanied by 
consistent attempts to depoliticise price-setting in the area of food or fuels, or to 
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delegate those to an independent authority. A governance reform that would support the 
phasing out of subsidies could involve closing the relevant government agencies – the 
General Administration of the Supply of Commodities (GASC) or the parts of the 
Ministry of Petroleum in the case of Egypt. Such governance reforms have never been 
proposed. 
In the area of energy, the elimination of subsidies would be aided by a privatisation and 
liberalisation of energy markets, making it more difficult for the government to re-
impose price controls. So far there have been no signs of such liberalising reforms.  
3.3.2.3 International agreements 
International agreements, such as loans from international aid agencies, can increase the 
costs of reneging on the reform or of the seizure of the surplus of the subsidy reform as 
long as these are conditional on the pursuit of the reform. In the Egyptian context, the 
most obvious instance of international agreements that could increase the costs of 
reform reversal were the country’s dealings with the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), which has repeatedly conditioned its assistance to the country on a pursuit of a 
reform of the system of subsidies.  
In Egypt, the IMF conditionality played a limited role as a commitment device. A 
famous early reform of food subsidies was introduced by president Anwar Sadat in 
1977 as part of negotiations with the IMF113 following almost a decade of significant 
growth in subsidy spending. During this period, subsidies came to cover a variety of 
new foodstuffs including corn, rice, frozen fish and meat, and other items.114 The 
reform, which aimed to reduce subsidies on fino bread, low-extraction wheat flour, rice, 
LPG, gasoline, cigarettes, and tea, was aborted following the riots that erupted in 
several Egyptian cities. 
                                                    
113 Alissa (2007: 3). 
114 Ahmed et al. (2001: 6). 
- 74 - 
In 1987, another loan agreement was reached, conditional on the pursuit of reforms 
including cuts to subsidy spending. Because of no progress in reforms, the IMF 
terminated it shortly after the initial disbursement in May 1987. In 1991, however, after 
Egypt had agreed on a broad reform programme for the economy, the IMF approved a 
$372 million stand-by loan to support the reforms. This time around, significant reforms 
were introduced. In 1990, prices of agricultural products – except for sugar – were 
liberalised. Petroleum prices, set at 36 percent of international prices in 1989, were 
raised to 100 percent in 1994.115 Subsidies were reduced and better targeted, and 
declined as a percentage of GDP from 3.8 percent in 1991/1992 to 1.6 percent in 
1997/1998.116  
As a result, the real burden of food subsidy spending fell, but started growing in the 
following years.117 In other words, the effectiveness of IMF conditionality did not seem 
to extend beyond the duration of the structural adjustment programme. By the mid-
2000s subsidy spending had reached high levels again. Furthermore, the structural 
programme agreed on with the IMF did not include an explicit commitment to a specific 
distribution of the surplus from the reform, and hence did not mitigate the problem of 
opportunistic seizure of surplus, which is central to credibility problems.  
3.3.2.4 Reputation 
Reputation is a commitment device that can be used by politicians who want to seek re-
election. Reputation bestows on them an electoral advantage and makes their promises 
credible because of the ability of voters to punish politicians who do not live up to their 
reputation by not re-electing them. In the pre-2011 Egypt, such reputational 
mechanisms were absent because of the restrictions placed on electoral competition – 
namely, the country was under an effective one-party rule. Furthermore, the country 
                                                    
115 African Development Bank (1999: xi). 
116 African Development Bank (2000: 11). 
117 Ibid.: 8. 
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lacked functional mechanisms monitoring politicians’ promises and deliverables – most 
importantly it lacked free media. 
After the events of the Arab Spring, it would have been naïve to expect the quick 
emergence of reputational mechanisms. There is a sizeable literature describing 
commitment problems in emerging democracies.118 Politicians in such settings have not 
yet created reliable channels of communication with their voters, which would allow 
them to make credible commitments on policy. Because they are either tied to the 
previous regime or are new to the political arena, they do not have a valuable reputation 
that could be used for the purpose of making commitments on policy.119 The lack of 
political organisations and candidates who can make credible commitments about 
policy leads to political competition that revolves around patronage and distribution of 
special favours – and not around devising efficiency-improving reforms. 
3.3.3 Alternative explanations 
While it does not seem necessary to leave the narrow area of public choice economics to 
explain the persistence of commodity subsidies, it is very plausible that the subsidies 
have become engrained in the Egyptian culture and mētis as the key element of the 
social contract between the government and the population. Testing such conjecture 
empirically would be extremely difficult and would go beyond the scope of the present 
thesis. In this section we provide examples of other alternative explanations for which 
such empirical test seems easier.  
3.3.3.1 Price volatility 
It is plausible to argue that cash transfers are an inefficient form of redistribution if food 
and energy represent a large fraction of household expenditures and if prices of those 
commodities are volatile. In that case, a transfer of cash, even if indexed by inflation, 
                                                    
118 See, e.g., Keefer and Vlaicu (2008). 
119 Roháč (2013c) points out that it is the religious groups who may potentially have the ability to make 
credible commitments over policy and public goods provision. 
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might not guarantee that poor households will be able to purchase some minimal 
amount of essential goods and services. If that were the reason behind the failure to 
adopt a system of cash transfers in Egypt, then it would be puzzling why the existing 
redistribution occurs dominantly through price controls and subsidies and not through 
rationing. If uncertainty over the availability of essential commodities were the main 
concern, then it would be difficult to explain why the government subsidises the prices 
of any amount of the commodity that gets sold through the official market, instead of 
using the existing system of ration cards or tradable vouchers to guarantee a quantity of 
goods available to each individual or household. 
True, Egypt has imposed rationing on some commodities – including food and liquefied 
petroleum gas – but not on all. A systematic introduction of ration cards for fuels, for 
example, has yet to materialise. Hence if price volatility were the dominant concern, 
price subsidies would still be dominated by other policy tools such as vouchers or 
rationing. 
3.3.3.2 Lack of administrative capacity 
The use of subsidies can be related to the inability of the government to administer a 
system of transfers targeted at vulnerable groups within the population. This can be due 
to a lack of systematic, household-specific data on income, an inability of the 
government administration to perform proxy means-testing and so on. It is very likely 
that in the Egyptian context it would be problematic to set up a well-functioning system 
of social assistance, at least in the short run. In Jordan, which until recently appeared as 
a successful case of subsidy reform, the creation of a system of social assistance took 
years, since the creation of the National Aid Fund 1986, to changes that improved its 
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targeting in the 2000s.120 In Egypt these difficulties are magnified by the sheer size of 
the population. 
A lack of administrative capacity helps explain why subsidies arise as an alternative 
mode of redistribution, and why their transformation into a targeted system of social 
assistance does not occur. Although different methods for identification of poor 
households have long been entertained, including geographical targeting, electricity 
consumption or proxy means-testing121 - they have never been deployed in the country 
on a larger scale. However, the existence of commodity subsidies represent a source of 
unexploited efficiency gains relative to a situation in which the government provided 
untargeted cash transfers to the population – a policy that would require only a very 
limited amount of administrative capacity. In other words, if the lack of administrative 
capacity were the binding constraint on reform, setting up an untargeted cash transfer 
scheme would still be an improvement over the existing system. 
Furthermore, the example of Jordan suggests that the lack of administrative capacity is 
not on its own a binding constraint. Over several years, the Jordanian government 
invested in the expansion of the National Aid Fund, which largely replaced subsidies as 
an instrument of social assistance. The reintroduction of subsidies in 2010 was driven 
by the fears of political instability in the aftermath of the Arab Spring – not by 
administrative dysfunctions of the cash transfer programme. 
3.3.3.3 Alternative public choice mechanisms 
The existence of the subsidy system could be due to the presence of strong and 
organised special interests that have hijacked the political process for their own benefit. 
Although small groups within the Egyptian society derive a disproportionate share of 
benefits of the subsidy spending, an account relying on the presence of special interests 
                                                    
120 Coady et al. (2006: 19-21). 
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needs to explain why the opposition to subsidy reforms has been driven by popular 
unrest. The existence of vested interests is not sufficient to explain the persistence of 
inefficient policies like Egypt’s subsidy system. A causal mechanism needs to be 
outlined, which prevents political bargains from occurring.  
Similarly, the idea of a ‘transitional gains trap’,122 advanced by public choice scholars 
as an obstacle to reform, appears incomplete as an explanation for the persistence of 
inefficient policies.123 According to Tullock’s original interpretation, transitional gains 
are a barrier to reform because there is no feasible way of compensating the losers of the 
reform. But that is a testable claim, and its validity depends on the institutional 
environment and character of the policy reform in question. In the case of Egypt, 
contrary to Coate and Morris (1999), strong incentives seem to exist to deviate from the 
existing status quo – after all, the fiscal savings from removing wasteful subsidies 
would be considerable, not to mention the dynamic effects on the supply of 
commodities that are currently subsidised.  
The distribution of surplus is often seen as a pressure point in reaching efficiency-
enhancing bargains. Given that the incidence of benefits from the existing subsidy 
reform is well-documented, it seems unlikely that uncertainty over the distributional 
effects of the reform124 would be a major factor hampering reform. Similarly, an ex-ante 
disagreement over the distribution of the surplus from the reform125 does not seem to be 
a decisive factor. With the possible exception of the wealthiest households,126 which 
receive the bulk of the energy subsidy spending, most Egyptian households would 
benefit from a switch to universal, non-distortionary, cash transfers.  
                                                    
122 Tullock (1975), Tollison and Wagner (1991). 
123 See, e.g., Thomas (2009) for a case study of an efficiency-enhancing reform that occurred despite 
transitional gains. 
124 Fernandez and Rodrik (1991). 
125 Alesina and Drazen (1991). 
126 Abouleinein, El-Laithy, and Kheir-El-Din (2009). 
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In short, the account presented in this chapter is consistent with the standard public 
choice literature in the sense that it identifies a specific failure of the political process to 
deliver efficient outcomes. As in Acemoglu (2003), the mechanism that enables 
inefficient subsidies to persist relies on the inability of the government to bind its future 
actions. While other factors might have contributed to the failure of Egyptian politics to 
generate a sustained policy reform, this section has shown that the usual commitment 
devices have been weak or absent in the Egyptian context, making the story of repeated 
reform failure consistent with a model that relies on the lack of policy credibility as the 
main factor driving policy failure.  
3.4 Conclusion 
The puzzling existence and persistence of policies that entail large social losses can be 
explained by the inability of prospective reformers to commit to a credible reform path. 
Although the problem of policy credibility can be addressed by appropriate policy 
design, the severity of the subsidy problem in a country like Egypt is related to the 
institutional context in which the political process operates. The corollary is that policy 
problems, such as subsidies, may become easier to solve as Egypt, alongside with other 
Arab Spring countries, moves towards better functioning modes of governance. The 
chances of a sustained reform would be improved in a competitive political 
environment with politicians who are able to make credible pre-electoral promises. 
Similarly, delegating part of the power to veto a reform reversal to players outside of the 
political process – e.g. to independent regulators – would also increase the costs of 
reform reversal, provided that the governance structure is perceived as credible. 
Taking the institutional deficiencies that lead to credibility problems – such as a lack of 
reliable channels of communication between politicians and voters – as given, 
appropriate design of reforms can help overcome the problem.  
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Specifically, a credible reform will need to be (1) complete, quick, and simple to 
implement, (2) accompanied by a compensation scheme directed at those segments of 
the population who are deriving net benefits from existing subsidies, and (3) 
accompanied by reforms that would improve the functioning of markets in commodities 
that are being subsidised. In some respects, these recommendations are consistent with 
the conclusions of different studies that have synthesised the lessons from subsidy 
reforms around the world.127 However, putting credibility at the forefront of the 
discussion leads to a departure from an approach that sees subsidies as a technical 
problem that can be addressed by political fiat, particularly by stressing the need for a 
quick and complete reform. The concluding part of this thesis, Chapter 6, will discuss 
the practical implications of such an approach.  
                                                    
127 See, e.g. Vagliasindi (2012), World Bank (2005), Coady et al. (2010), Commander (2012). The IMF 
(2013) has recently revisited reforms in 22 different countries and summarised the key elements of a 
successful reform as follows: 
“(i) [A] comprehensive energy sector reform plan entailing clear long-term objectives, analysis 
of the impact of reforms, and consultation with stakeholders; (ii) an extensive communications 
strategy, supported by improvements in transparency, such as the dissemination of information 
on the magnitude of subsidies and the recording of subsidies in the budget; (iii) appropriately 
phased price increases, which can be sequenced differently across energy products; (iv) 
improving the efficiency of state owned enterprises to reduce producer subsidies; (v) targeted 
measures to protect the poor; and (vi) institutional reforms that depoliticise energy pricing, such 
as the introduction of automatic pricing mechanisms.” 
Furthermore, Roháč (2013e) provides a discussion of prospects of a subsidy reform in Egypt, drawing on 
the experience of successful energy subsidy reforms in Turkey, Philipines, Brazil, Chile, Kenya and 
Uganda. These reforms tended to be implemented by governments with strong popular mandates. In all of 
these examples above, some mitigation or compensation schemes were used to balance the impact of the 
reforms on the population. Growing fiscal imbalances seemed as a powerful impetus for reform. Finally, 
in all of the cases, subsidy reforms were a part of a larger reform packages that aimed to improve the 
functioning of energy markets. In contrast, Nigeria’s failed subsidy reform is an extreme example of how 
such reforms can be derailed if the population has a low level of trust in the government, which it 
perceives as essentially self-interested, if not predatory (Commander 2012: 25-26). 
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4 Religion as a Commitment Device: The Economics of 
Political Islam128 
4.1 Introduction 
Throughout the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), Islamic political parties, many 
of them part of the Muslim Brotherhood, have gained influence over the recent years. 
Until the military takeover in Egypt in July 2013, the most populous Arab country had 
been governed by the Freedom and Justice Party, a political organization of the 
Brotherhood. In other countries as well, Islamic organisations count among the most 
important political forces in the region. But why have they become so popular among 
the voting public?  
Unlike common accounts for the political patterns in the Middle East, which revolve 
around the religious identities of the Arab peoples,129 the repressive nature of the 
previous regimes,130 poverty and underdevelopment,131 or Arab nationalism and 
grievances against Israel,132 our paper offers a rational choice-based explanation for the 
popularity of Islamic parties in the Arab Spring countries. We explain religious politics 
as a solution to the problem of credible pre-electoral commitment that plagues new and 
emerging democracies. Voters will prefer political groups that can make credible 
promises to supply public goods after the elections, but such political groups are rare. 
Politicians in new and emerging democracies seldom have the opportunity to invest in 
the technology of making credible commitments, which includes establishing reliable 
channels of communication with voters and methods of tracking their promises and 
their deliverables.133 Voters then tend to support politicians who make credible 
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132 Stepan and Robertson (2003). 
133 Jottier et al. (2012) show that the problem of communication between voters and politicians goes in 
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promises about transfers, through a system of patronage. Patronage works because 
although politicians are not credible to voters, they can make credible promises about 
transfers to intermediaries, patrons, who are, in turn, able to make credible 
commitments to their clients. The political process encourages transfers directed at the 
groups that are relevant for re-election and provision of too few public goods. 
Islamic parties have characteristics that enable them to make commitments that are 
credible to voters. Firstly, they are well-known for being involved in the provision of 
collective goods for their members and wider communities for a long time, which adds 
to their credibility in making promises about the supply of public goods in the future. 
Islamic parties are far from being a homogenous group across the countries of the 
Middle East and North Africa. Some of them – namely the parties in Egypt, Libya, 
Algeria, Lebanon, Palestine, and Syria – belong to the Muslim Brotherhood, a network 
that has operated in Arab countries for decades, often in spite of official repression. 
Other groups, such as the Islamic parties in Morocco and Tunisia, are not part of that 
network, although they do share some structural similarities. While secular dictatorships 
in Arab countries repressed political opposition, they usually allowed the existence of 
organisations that provided community services, health care, education and so forth. 
The exceptions were Libya and Syria, where near-totalitarian nature of the regimes did 
not allow for the operation of religious organisations in the area of provision of social 
services and local public goods. However, where allowed to operate within that space, 
the religious organisations have become singularly successful, and their religious nature 
enhanced both their ability to overcome collective action problems and to make 
believable promises.  
We show that a rational choice-based explanation is consistent with reality at various 
margins: we note that religious groups command broad popular support in Arab Spring 
countries, especially in countries where they have had a long-standing presence, we find 
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that support for Islamic political groups is not related to a specific set of policy 
preferences, and finally we document that the religious political organisations were 
previously involved in supplying social services or club goods. This supports the notion 
that religious organisations might possess an advantage at providing such goods,134 and 
also that reputation created by providing such goods can be transferred into the political 
arena and can serve as a basis for making credible pre-electoral commitments.  
Our argument does not rely on specific substantive claims about Islam or any other 
particular religion, but rather on an understanding of religion as a node of social 
organisation. The success of Islamic parties in the Arab Spring countries is not 
predicated on their idiosyncratic Islamic characteristics, but rather on the fact that their 
precursors were allowed by former regimes to operate in the sphere of provision of 
social services and club goods. In contrast, in post-communist Eastern Europe, the fall 
of communism did not lead to a rise of political Catholicism as a major political force in 
countries that had traditionally been Catholic. According to our stylised verbal model, 
this can be explained by the fact that, unlike in Arab countries, Communist regimes 
persecuted churches, and did not allow them to operate large community and social-
service schemes. As a result, Catholic or broadly Christian political parties did not seem 
to enjoy any distinct electoral advantage. That being said, it is obvious that religion 
influences social, economic, and political outcomes in more ways than just one. Islam, 
therefore, is a part of the mētis in many countries of the region under consideration, and 
we do not pretend that its discussion in this chapter is exhaustive by any means. 
While political Islam has been studied by numerous scholars, no existing contribution 
applies both the public choice analysis of credibility problems and the insights from the 
economics of religion to the issue of political Islam. True, some scholars work in the 
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general area – e.g. Kalyvas (2000) who analyses the problem of commitment of 
religious parties to a system of secular democracy, Berman (2003) who sees the rise of 
political Islamism as a consequence of the political failure of Arab governments, or 
Carvalho (2009) who studies the Islamic revival since the 1970s by analysing the role of 
unfulfilled aspirations and income inequality. Following seminal contributions by 
Kuran (2001, 2004), some have explored the link between Islam and 
underdevelopment.135 Others have focused on explaining the electoral advantage of 
Islamic parties – which is indeed the route taken by this chapter as well. For example, 
evidence from Indonesia suggests that the main advantage of Islamic parties stems from 
the uncertainty surrounding the true platform of other parties on matters of economic 
policy,136 whereas other studies stress the importance of their anti-corruption 
platforms.137 It has been also shown that the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, unlike the 
official, government-approved political groups, lacked the funds needed to engage in 
politics of patronage by bribing poor people directly (Massoud 2010). Islamic groups 
have also been successful in providing goods, such as education, to groups that would 
have otherwise been marginalised, such as religious conservatives (Meyersson 2013). 
4.2 Religious politics and policy credibility 
Islamic parties can be seen as a solution to the problem of credibility in new and 
emerging democracies as described by Keefer and Vlaicu (2008). In their model, 
politicians in new and emerging democracies are not able to make credible pre-electoral 
commitments to the supply of public goods. This is because credibility requires costly 
investments from the part of the politicians. Credible promises require the presence of 
reliable channels of communication, so that candidates can communicate their promises 
                                                    
135 See Platteau (2008) and Richards (2005). Relatedly, see also Grier (1997) for a study of the effect of 
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to voters. They also require that voters can observe the actions of politicians and 
compare them against the promises. Alternatively, credibility requires repeated 
interaction, and existence of reputation. These features may not be present in a new 
democracy. 
Typically, non-credible politicians face two options. Firstly, they can invest in building 
a reputation by informing voters about their promises, tracking those promises and 
letting the voters assess the deliverables. That process is costly and takes time to work. 
Alternatively, they can use intermediaries – patrons – who are already able to make 
credible promises about transfers to their clients. Patrons can make credible promises 
because of their role in society and because of their past reputation. If the candidate can 
make credible promises about transfers to a small number of patrons, then the problem 
of credible pre-electoral commitment can be mitigated even though politicians 
themselves are unable to make credible promises to voters. Promises made through 
patrons pertain to targeted transfers, not to the provision of public goods. This is 
because patrons can extract surplus from transfers, but not from public goods.  
The key implication of Keefer and Vlaicu (2008) is that new democracies, which rely 
on patronage, will suffer from an underprovision of public goods and from an 
overprovision of transfers to specific constituencies. The effect on governance 
dissipates over time as politicians build a reputation that enables them to make credible 
commitments to the provision of public goods. It is worth noting that the clientelism, 
which is pervasive throughout new and emerging democracies, is in fact welfare-
enhancing relative to a situation in which politicians would not be able to make any 
binding commitments. However, it is a source of distortions relative to the first-best 
scenario under which politicians would be able to make credible pre-electoral promises 
about public goods provision. Yet, over the long run, as Keefer and Vlaicu argue, 
patronage can create disincentives for politicians' investment in their ability to make 
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credible promises to the electorate, resulting in prolonged periods of bad governance 
and redistributive politics. 
Religious parties in general and Islamic parties in the Middle East in particular, are able 
to eschew patronage and make credible promises about public goods. Most importantly, 
churches, sects and other religious organisations have mechanisms that enable them to 
provide commodities that display public goods characteristics, by screening their 
members for free riding through injunctions on certain kinds of behaviour, or through 
sacrifice and stigma.138  
How does joint production occur in a religious organisation? Firstly, it is worth noting 
that this production occurs during non-market time. Regardless of whether the religious 
organisation maximises the utility of its members – as when religious markets are 
competitive – or whether it maximises the amount of consumption of religious goods – 
as when switching between religions is costly – members who are engaged in market 
production impose a negative externality on other members of the religious group. 
Efficient religious groups would ideally like to discourage involvement in market 
production by taxing market wages. Without the power to tax earned market income 
directly, religious prohibitions are a way of taxing consumption. These methods of 
“taxation” include sacrifices and stigma, which both reduce the returns to market 
activities, and also restrictions on dress or diet, which can either be costly in their own 
right, or make interaction with non-members of more difficult. These help members 
signal commitment to the group and create a barrier against potential lukewarm 
members, who would free ride on goods produced by the religious organisation. 
Creating and sustaining horizontal networks that are successful at providing club goods 
or local public goods requires overcoming collective action problems. Our argument, 
                                                    
138 See Iannaccone (1992) and Iannaccone and Berman (2006). See also Smith et al. (1998) for a model of 
religious participation, accompanied by cross-country evidence. 
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relying on specific features of religious organisations, can be seen as an extension of the 
work by Ostrom (1990) who showed that groups are able to overcome collective action 
problems if their behaviour is governed by certain principles, e.g., having clearly 
defined boundaries, autonomy from external enforcement, presence of a system for 
monitoring members’ behaviour, undertaken by community members, a graduated 
system of sanctions, low-cost resolution mechanisms and so on. As we show in Section 
3.3.1, such mechanisms exist within religious organisations and specifically in groups 
like Muslim Brotherhood. 
Finally, if religious beliefs of Islamic politicians are common knowledge, then their 
promises can be made credible by the existence of post-mortal rewards and 
punishments. How can one determine whether leaders of religious parties are sincere in 
their religious convictions? As before, stigma and sacrifice provide a screening 
mechanism that makes it possible to sort the genuine believers from free riders. Hence, 
some religious parties adhere to more extreme interpretations of the Koran, as it pertains 
to dietary habits or dressing, as a way of signalling credibility. As a result, signalling 
religious beliefs makes political promises more believable, even for people who are not 
religious. 
4.2.1  Implications 
One way of assessing whether this stylised model matches reality in the aspects that we 
care about is to compare its predictions against the reality observed in the Arab world.  
4.2.1.1 Individual religiosity is a poor predictor of voting behaviour and policy 
preferences 
In the model outlined above, individuals do not vote for religious parties because they 
are themselves religious, or because they have a preference for any specific religious 
policy agenda. They vote for religious parties because a platform that can credibly 
promise public goods is preferable to a platform that engages only in transfers and 
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redistributive politics. In this setting, voting for a religious party does not imply any 
preferences over specific public goods that ought to be provided – only a preference for 
some nonnegative supply of them in individual optimum. Religious parties can be 
expected to attract voters if they can credibly promise them a bundle of public goods 
and transfers. 
4.2.1.2 Successful religious political groups will have a reputation – e.g. a track record of 
successful provision of social services 
A track record of provision of services to their communities can be used for making 
credible electoral promises about the supply of public goods at large. This holds 
regardless of whether the initial provision is intended as a means aiming at gaining an 
electoral advantage or whether it is motivated by other ends. Religion provides a natural 
node for the community provision of social services, health, education and other 
commodities that may display the characteristics of public goods. Through sacrifice, 
stigma and costly mechanisms of signalling commitment, religious organisations are 
particularly well-suited to overcome free rider problems and, as a result, to provide club 
goods to their members or local public goods to wider communities. 
4.2.1.3 Religious parties with established mechanisms of making credible commitments 
will possess a distinct electoral advantage 
Political organisations that can make credible pre- electoral commitments about the 
supply of public goods can be expected to do well among the electorate. From the 
perspective of the median voter, a credible politician can do everything that a politician 
relying on patronage can do, plus he can also provide a positive amount of public goods. 
In other words, non-credible candidates face the same maximisation problem as the 
credible ones, but are subjected to the additional constraint of being unable to provide 
public goods in equilibrium. From the perspective of the pivotal voter, credible 
candidates always dominate non-credible ones. 
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4.3 Islamic politics in the Middle East 
This section will first provide a short background description of the Islamic political 
landscape in Arab countries, and then discuss the extent to which the prediction made 
by our stylised model match the observed reality. 
4.3.1 Muslim Brotherhood: Background 
Many Islamic parties in Arab countries are part of an organised network running across 
countries – the Muslim Brotherhood. The Brotherhood was founded in Egypt by Hassan 
al-Banna in 1928 to promote the ideas of a "total self-sufficiency" of Islam.139 Also 
known as the Jamiyyat al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin, it intended to fight the colonial regime 
through religious exaltation.140 Banna considered the Islamic Caliphate as the ideal form 
of government for Arab peoples, and as a means of responding to the failure of liberal 
institutions in the wake of Egyptian independence from the British in 1923.141 
The Brotherhood quickly started to play a major role in Egyptian politics. Under Nasser, 
the tensions between the government and the Brotherhood mounted but the Brotherhood 
remained popular. Started in 1962, Nasser’s initiative to undertake the modernisation of 
Yemen and other Arab states fell flat over time, and, instead, exacerbated Egypt's 
decade-long economic crisis, culminating in its defeat in the Arab-Israeli War in 1967. 
According to the Brotherhood, Egypt's failure, both economic and political, was a direct 
result of its failure to internalise the teaching of the Koran and sharia.142 
Before the military takeover in July 2013, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood had close 
to 300,000 members143 and was based on the principle of da'wa, which calls for every 
Muslim to participate in building the Islamic society.144 In this spirit, the Brotherhood 
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recent developments, see Wickham (2011) and Tadros (2012). 
142 Aly and Wenner (1982: 345). 
143 Council on Foreign Relations (2012). 
144 Paison (2009: 9). 
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in Egypt runs hospitals, schools, banks, businesses, charities and social clubs. The 
Brotherhood has also become a major provider of aid amongst Muslims.145 In 1935, the 
Syrian branch was opened, operating in exile, followed by a branch in Jordan in 1942, 
which later became Jordan's Islamic Action Front. In 1954, Algeria's Movement of 
Society for Peace had gained prominence, followed by the Jamaa Islamiyya in Lebanon 
in 1964. Their example also inspired Tunisia's Ennahda Movement in 1981, Palestine's 
Hamas in 1987, Yemen's Islah in 1990, and Kuwait's Hadas in 1991. More recently, the 
Brotherhood started official political parties in Bahrain (Al Menbar, 2001), Egypt 
(Freedom and Justice Party, 2011) and Libya (Justice and Construction Party, 2012).146 
4.3.2 Islamic political groups and policy credibility 
To assess whether our stylised verbal model can provide a useful perspective on the rise 
of Islamic politics in the Arab Spring countries, we compare its key empirical 
predictions with outcomes observed in reality: 
4.3.2.1 Individual religiosity is a poor predictor of voting behaviour and policy 
preferences 
Our argument predicts that individual voting behaviour and support of religious parties 
should be independent of individual ideology. That is, people vote for Islamists not 
because of a preference for ‘religious’ content in politics and policy making, but 
because they expect them to deliver public goods. Our thesis could be invalidated by 
two classes of results: (a) if religiosity were a strong predictor of actual voting for 
religious parties, or (b) if support for religious politics were associated with a well-
defined set of policy preferences in the Downsian space.  
                                                    
145 Ibid.: 19. 
146 To illustrate how widely the Brotherhood network is spread, Table 8 in the appendix summarises the 
main Islamic political groups in selected countries of the MENA region. In all of the countries under 
consideration, with the exception of Tunisia, the Muslim Brotherhood is represented. And although 
Tunisia's Ennahda Movement is not part of Brotherhood's network, it is modeled after its example and its 
representatives often cite the Brotherhood as a model for their organisation. 
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In Muslim majority countries, the documented links between personal religiosity and 
political and voting behaviour are not very reliable. This is at odds with the evidence 
from Europe where Catholicism is a strong predictor of voting for Christian Democratic 
parties.147 To be sure, the connections between religiosity and voting behaviour are 
underexplored in the context of Muslim-majority countries because of data limitations.  
With the exception of Turkey,148 religious cleavages do not seem to affect voting 
behaviour in Muslim majority countries. Tessler (2002) studies individual-level data 
from the Palestinian territories, Morocco, Algeria, and Egypt and shows that Islam has 
only a small impact on political attitudes, especially on attitudes towards democracy, 
and very little explanatory power in accounting for support for democracy in Arab 
countries. Muslims – just like their non-Islamic counterparts – do favor democracy and 
political liberalisation.149 In Lebanon, religiosity is not a significant predictor of 
political activism.150 Likewise, in the world’s most populous Muslim-majority country, 
Indonesia, religiosity was not significant in explaining voting behaviour in the elections 
of 1999 and 2004,151 and neither does an 'Islamic ideology' explain the support for 
Indonesia's religious parties.152 In Central Asia, religious affiliation does not affect 
preferences for democracy and political Islam.153 In the same vein, Rose (2002) finds 
that “there is little difference between Muslims, the Orthodox, and non-believers in 
Central Asia. Even more strikingly, the most observant Muslims are almost as 
pro-democratic as those who are non-observant.”154 He concludes that “neither nominal 
                                                    
147 Botterman and Hooghe (2012), Van der Brug et al. (2009). 
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religion nor the degree of religious observance has much influence on democratic 
values.” 155 
Is political Islam is connected with any consistent pattern of policy preferences in the 
Downsian policy space, or an ‘Islamic ideology’? To investigate this question, I run a 
series of logit/ordered logit regressions in which I relate a composite variable reflecting 
individual preference for the presence of Islam in politics (Political Islam) to a number 
of variables capturing individual preferences over the key attributes of democracy, 
relative salience of different policy areas, or performance of the government. While not 
encompassing all important policy areas, the survey data provide one with at least an 
impressionistic information about individual policy preferences. Table 3 below 
summarises the findings of our regressions, in which individual socioeconomic status 
was controlled for, as well as country characteristics. 156 
Table 3 reveals a lack of statistical significance of Political Islam in most specifications. 
The only issues that can be linked to Political Islam are the beliefs that elections are the 
most important component of a democracy (Elections), the idea that human rights 
violations are justified by stability and security needs of a country (Human rights 
violations OK), and the belief that corruption is the most pressing problem of the 
respondent’s country (Corruption).  
 
Table 3 Political religiosity and policy preferences. Logit/ordered logit regressions, with 
country fixed effects 
 




standard error 4.4 N 
Elections 0.137*** (0.047) 3162 
Freedom to criticise -0.04 (0.051) 3162 
Small income gap -0.04 (0.052) 3162 
What would you 
choose as the most 
important 
characteristic of 
democracy Necessities for everyone -0.059 (0.049) 3162 
                                                    
155 Ibid.: 110. 
156 For full results, refer to Tables 12, 13 and 14 in the appendix. 
- 93 - 
Managing Economy 0.006 (0.036) 4372 
Creating Jobs -0.03 (0.036) 4427 
Narrowing Gap -0.009 (0.036) 4317 
Improving Health -0.055 (0.035) 4463 
Improving Education -0.008 (0.036) 4469 
How well or badly is 
the government 
managing the 
following matters? (1- 
very well, 2-well, 3-
badly, 4-very badly) 
Improving Morality -0.003 (0.037) 4080 
To what degree would 
you agree that the 
violation of human 
rights in [country] is 
justifiable in the name 
of promoting security 
and stability? 
Human rights violations not 
OK 
0.073** (0.035) 4414 
Economy -0.039 (0.041) 3561 
Corruption 0.143*** (0.045) 3561 
Authoritarianism -0.107 (0.097) 3561 
U.S. occupation of Iraq -0.233 (0.162) 3126 
In your opinion which 




today? Arab-Israeli conflict -0.152 (0.109) 3561 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Description of variables used can be found in Tables 8 
and 9 in the Appendix. Full results are reported in Tables 12, 13, and 14 in the 
Appendix. 
 
Because of the coding of individual questions, it is important to carefully think through 
the exact signs of the observed effects. The coding for the Elections variable is simple: 1 
in case the respondent considers it the most important feature of democracy and 0 in 
case (s)he does not. As a result, those who attach greater value to the presence of Islam 
in politics will be more likely than others to think that elections are the most important 
feature of democracy. The coding for the variable Human rights violations not OK is the 
following: 1 - Completely justified, 2 - Somewhat justified, 3 - Not very justified, 4 - 
Not justified at all. Hence, higher values of Human rights violations not OK indicate a 
lower degree of comfort with human rights violations. The negative sign on Political 
Islam is then an indication that those who attach greater value to the presence of Islam 
in politics will be more likely than others to oppose human rights violations done in the 
name of preserving stability and security of a country. Finally, the coding of Corruption 
is simple: 1 in case the respondent considers it the most pressing issue, 0 otherwise. 
Thus those who attach greater value to the presence of Islam in politics will be more 
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likely than others to think that corruption is the main problem plaguing their respective 
countries.  
Perhaps more interesting than these findings are the remaining non-findings presented in 
Table 3. Apart from Elections, Political Islam has no predictive power over the 
remaining attributes of democracy, no predictive power over whether the government is 
doing a good or a bad job in a variety of areas, and does not predict whether the 
respondents are likely to pick out of the listed issues, with the exception of corruption.  
Although we have not provided a direct test of whether Political Islam is related to any 
specific set of policy preferences in the Downsian space, results presented in Table 3 are 
difficult to square with an understanding of political Islam as a reflection of a specific 
ideological view about policy, informed by religion. If being an ‘Islamist’ affected 
where one stood in the Downsian space, one would expect that Political Islam would 
exercise strong effects across a variety of policy-related beliefs. Our results indicate that 
it does not. 
4.4.1.1 Successful religious political groups will have a reputation – e.g. a track 
 record of successful provision of social services 
The Muslim Brotherhood, as well as other Islamic groups in the MENA region, has 
been involved in the provision of social services, including health services, education, 
welfare assistance and humanitarian aid. Although authoritarian regimes in Arab 
countries suppressed political opposition, they tolerated the existence of organisations 
providing social services. The important exceptions include Libya and Syria, where the 
operations of the Brotherhood were suppressed by the country regimes. In Syria, 
Brotherhood membership was a capital offence between 1980 and 2011, and similarly 
in Libya the regime banned any social work by Islamists. 
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It is worth stressing that these activities of the Islamists were different from standard 
patronage schemes.157 Unlike patronage, which involves vertical relations between a 
patron and multiple clients, religious organisations have created horizontal networks 
that are not based on personal allegiances but rather on joint production by group 
members.158 This is because they are able to overcome the free rider’s problems through 
the mechanisms of stigma and sacrifice, as explained in section 4.2. 
In Algeria, Islamic groups were among the first and most effective organisations to help 
the victims of the Algiers earthquake in 1989.159 The precursor of the Movement of 
Society for Peace (MSP) itself was started by Mahfouh Nahnah as an organisation for 
preaching, religious education and charity. When it was transformed into a political 
party in 1990, it encompassed four major centres, around 40 wilaya (province) sections 
and 916 offices in municipalities, 133 of which were women's offices. Its political 
activities ran alongside social assistance for finding employment, helping families, 
widows and the needy, as well as access to medical care. The MSP plays a socialising 
role for activists and supporters, giving them a network of solidarity within which 
members can find spouses, get help setting up businesses via investment vehicles 
(known as 'tontines’), or find accommodation.160 
In Morocco, the Justice and Development Party (PJD) itself is not active in the 
provision of social services, but its umbrella organisation, the Unity and Reform 
Movement (MUR), is most notably active at the local level.161 Usually, local counselors 
                                                    
157 Clark (2004b). 
158 Interestingly, in Egypt, it was traditionally the governing NDP party that was involved in patronage in 
the traditional sense – offering bribes for votes, or coercing poor and often illiterate voters into voting for 
its candidates (Blaydes 2006: 5). 
159 Esposito (1999: 176). 
160 Boubekeur and Amkar (2006: 12). 
161 Morocco features an influential Islamic group Justice and Charity, founded by Sheikh Yassine, 
providing food, health care, and literacy classes to the urban poor (Howe 2005: 130). It is also involved in 
Islamic teaching - while steering away from participating in formal politics. As one former leftist political 
prisoner put it in an interview, 'political parties of the left have abandoned this strategy of providing social 
services directly. Their strategy is to make changes from the top, by being involved in the political 
process. NGOs that have leftist leanings do that work now.' Another difficulty that they encounter is, as 
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for the MUR are also active in various associations providing services to the citizens, 
and increasing their credibility as local politicians.162 
In Tunisia, Ennahda's precursor, the Movement of the Islamic Tendency, has developed 
a network of social service provision and built a presence at the local level of 
government. Furthermore, it has traditionally operated numerous civic associations 
(Troudi 2011: 172) including sporting clubs, and organised collective weddings, free of 
charge. 
Likewise in Egypt, the involvement of Muslim Brothers in the provision of social 
services has been well documented.163 “Countrywide, the Muslim Brotherhood runs 22 
hospitals and has schools in every governorate in the country. The organisation also 
runs numerous care centres for poor widows and orphans as well as training 
programmes for the unemployed. [...] Of the roughly 5,000 legally registered NGOs and 
associations in Egypt, an estimated 20 percent are brotherhood-run.” 164 
Jordan and Yemen are no exceptions.165 In Jordan, the Brotherhood operates, inter alia, 
the Islamic Hospital in Amman166 and the al-Afaf Charitable Society, providing 
collective weddings and matchmaking services.167 In Yemen, the Islah party has created 
welfare, religious and educational organisations that deliver social services. Most 
notably, the Islah Social Welfare Society engages in health awareness campaigns, 
religious education, illiteracy eradication, and relief donations.168 
                                                                                                                                                        
one militant lamented, 'the lack of financial means,' while Islamists have considerable funds at their 
disposal (Cavatorta 2006: 217). 
162 Catusse and Zaki (2009). 
163 See, e.g., Davis and Robinson (2012) or Clark (2004a). 
164 See IRIN (2006) and also Harrigan and El-Said (2009) and Clark (2004b). 
165 On Jordan, see Wiktorowicz (2001). 
166 Wiktorowicz (2002: 234). 
167 Wiktorowicz and Farouki (2000). 
168 Hamzawy (2009: 6), Brown and Hamzawy (2010: 140). 
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As far as Lebanon's Hezbollah is concerned, the "Social Unit" is one of the eight key 
elements of Hezbollah's structure.169 It provides social welfare services as well as 
technical help and has set up institutions from agricultural cooperatives to cultural 
centres.170 The same goes for Hamas in the Palestinian territories, where its 
opportunities are compounded by the failure of the Palestinian authority to provide 
basic welfare infrastructure. Hamas thus runs relief programmes, funding schools, 
orphanages, mosques, healthcare clinics, soup kitchens, and sports leagues.171 
4.4.1.2 Religious parties with established mechanisms of making credible commitments 
will possess a distinct electoral advantage 
Parties organised within the Muslim Brotherhood command large popular support. 
Table 4 presents the results of recent elections held in Arab Spring countries. With the 
exception of Algeria, Jordan and Libya, Islamic parties or Islamic coalitions – typically 
led by a Brotherhood party – came in first.  
 
Table 4 Performance of Islamic parties in recent legislative elections in countries of the 
Middle East and North Africa 
Country Party/Coalition Elections held % of votes 
Egypt Democratic Alliance for 
Egypt* 
November 2011 – 
January 2012 
37.5 
 Islamist Bloc  27.8 
Tunisia Ennahda Movement October 2011a 37.04 
Morocco Justice and Development 
Party* 
November 2011 22.8 
Libya Justice and Construction 
Party* 
July 2012b 10.27 
Algeria Green Algeria Alliance* May 2012 6.22 
Jordan Islamic Action Front* November 2010 N/A 
 
*Party is part of the Muslim Brotherhood, or the coalition is led by a party that is part of 
the Muslim Brotherhood 
a Election into Tunisia’s constituent assembly 
b Election into Libya's General National Congress. 
                                                    
169 Hamzeh (2004: 49). 
170 Hamzeh (2004), Jawad (2008). 
171 Milton-Edwards (2007: 305), Levitt (2006: 16). 
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The results are mixed, with Islamic parties making significant gains in some countries, 
while performing relatively poorly in others. It therefore is worth disaggregating them 
and inspecting them on a by-country basis. In the Egyptian legislative elections 
concluded in January 2012, the Democratic Alliance, a coalition of six parties led by the 
FJP, won 235 seats in the 508-member legislature. The Ennahda Movement in Tunisia 
won 41 percent of all votes and 89 seats in the 217-seat legislature in the 2011 elections. 
Following the elections in November 2011, in which it gained 107 seats out of 395, 
Justice and Development Party is the ruling party in Morocco. The three remaining 
cases are worth a separate discussion. The three Algerian religious parties formed the 
Green Algeria Alliance, an Islamic electoral bloc that gained 48 seats in the 463-
member Algerian parliament. Unlike in other Arab Spring countries that in recent years 
held free elections, the turnout in the Algerian election was low and the election was 
viewed as rigged by the opposition, although accusations of fraud were not confirmed 
by international observers.172 Likewise, the Islamic Action Front in Jordan boycotted 
the 2013 parliamentary elections as unfair.173 Neither did the Brotherhood party fare 
well in the Libyan election of July 2012, in which the Justice and Construction Party 
received over 10 percent of the votes and 17 places in Libya's General National 
Congress, a key transitional body that is expected to appoint the new cabinet and an 
assembly to draft the new constitution. Libya’s situation is complicated by the fact that 
none of the relevant political groups predate the fall of Gaddafi’s regime and have any 
real grassroots presence. Furthermore, in the election, only one-third of the seats were 
allocated to political parties and two-third to individual candidates. 
                                                    
172 See African Union (2012). 
173 Seven IAF candidates ran as independent and were excluded from the party. Official voter turnout was 
53 percent. See also Dunne (2010). 
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4.5 Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter was to present a parsimonious explanation for the popularity 
of Islamic parties in new and emerging democracies of the Middle East and North 
Africa. In our explanation, the rise of Islamic parties is an answer to the problem of 
credible pre-electoral commitment to the supply of public goods. 
It should be stressed that this model does not purport to be the grand theory of religious 
politics. Notwithstanding the evidence that individual-level religiosity is a poor 
predictor of voting behaviour and also that individual-level religiosity does not map into 
specific policy platforms, we do not deny that some people in the Middle East and 
North Africa may also support religious parties because they attach importance to the 
religious zeal of Islamic candidates. Religion is undeniably an important part of culture 
and of mētis in Muslim-majority countries. But even if it were not, this chapter shows 
that there would be still strong reasons to expect Islamists to perform well in young 
Muslim democracies. 
Our explanation thus makes a ceteris paribus claim. However, in the real world, other 
relevant variables are never constant. For our purposes, it means that the explanatory 
power of our story is weakened when there are other factors that lead to the alignment 
of voters with particular ideological platforms, e.g. when the population is split into 
factions along religious or ethnic lines. In the Middle Eastern context, this problem can 
be expected to be acute in places that suffer from a high degree of religious or ethnic 
polarisation, such as Lebanon, Bahrain or Iraq. In contrast, our explanation ought to fare 
well in more homogenous environments, where such divisions are small or non-existent 
– or where institutional mechanisms for the resolution of disputes between ethnic or 
religious groups exist. 
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The main implication of our stylised verbal model is that the presence of Islamic parties 
is welfare-enhancing relative to a situation in which politicians rely on patronage as the 
only method of making promises to voters. Unlike patronage-based politics, credible 
religious parties provide a bundle of public goods and transfers, maximising the utility 
of the median voter. Our account should not be read as an endorsement of political 
Islam, however. Our explanation is an abstract one and in its parsimony it assumes 
away a host of factors, including the ideological content of politics and goals of political 
leaders. The examples of Hamas and Hezbollah only serve to illustrate that, religious 
organisations, which are distinctly successful at providing club goods and local public 
goods, may also have an advantage in the sphere of organised violence.174 
However that may be, in countries where the incentives for politically or religiously 
motivated violence are low,175 the possibility of credible pre-electoral commitments 
raised by religious parties can improve the quality of the political process. These 
include countries where grievances can be voiced through political channels and 
conflicts can be settled through institutional means, or where such conflicts do not even 
arise – because of the underlying homogeneity of local populations. One can expect that 
the quality of governance is higher than in contexts where there is no one able to make 
credible promises. Comparatively, countries with no credible political groups, such as 
Libya, may face more difficulties than countries that do have religious parties – unless it 
uncovers an alternative way of addressing the problem of credible commitment. This 
also resonates with an earlier argument by Nasr (2005), according to whom a ‘Muslim’ 
democracy will be a necessary component of the transition of Arab countries to 
democracy. 
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175 Wintrobe (2006) provides a theoretical model of politically motivated violence that establishes the 
conditions under which terrorism will be the preferred mode of political action. 
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If one is worried by the rise of political Islam, it is worth stressing that one implication 
of our account is that the electoral advantage enjoyed by Islamic parties can be expected 
to dissipate over time as competing political groups establish channels of 
communication and promise verification for their voters, and build reputation over time. 
Obviously, this corollary of our model cannot yet be tested on data from Arab Spring 
countries. However, it seems to be in line with the pattern seen in other Muslim 
majority countries, which have liberalised their political process earlier on. Most 
notably, in Indonesia, the share of votes by Islamic parties has been falling since the 
elections in 1999 – from 39.2% in 1999, 38.4% in 2004, to 29.2% in 2009. If the 
political environment in the Middle East liberalises further, it will likely open new 
avenues for further research in the area of political Islam and its political economy 
dimensions, as well as new ways of testing more rigorously the explanation presented in 
this chapter. 
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5 Policy Preferences and the Czechoslovak Transition176 
5.1 Introduction 
Why did some post-communist countries embrace radical reform strategies, whereas 
others have followed longer and more roundabout paths towards markets? This chapter 
argues that differences in policy preferences and beliefs about markets – potentially 
reflecting the differences in mētis, a concept defined in Chapter 1 – might have played a 
role in shaping the institutions and policies adopted by governments of different 
transitional economies – of Slovakia and the Czech Republic.  
A growing body of literature suggests that differences in institutions are associated with 
differences in beliefs and policy preferences displayed by individuals.177 Much less is 
known about the drivers of differences in beliefs, in the absence of such prima facie 
variation in institutional characteristics. In this chapter, we study survey data from 
Czechoslovakia in the early 1990s and demonstrate that systematic differences existed 
between the policy preferences of Czechs and Slovaks - in spite of living in a common 
state and being exposed to similar policy shocks, institutional environment, and culture 
over a period of almost 75 years. On various questions in the Economic Expectations 
and Attitudes survey, covering the period of 1990-1993, the Czechs appeared more 
accommodative of the rapid transition towards the market economy, whereas the 
Slovaks retained a strong “anti-market bias.” For example, Slovaks were significantly 
more inclined to oppose the introduction of private health and social care, and were 
sceptical about the idea that capitalism was the only possible option for the future of 
Czechoslovak economy.178 The differences in policy preferences between Czechs and 
Slovaks do not disappear after controlling for socio-economic status and other 
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individual-specific observables, including self-reported ideology. Furthermore, they are 
robust to variation in different regional characteristics, such as past economic 
development or religiosity. 
The existence of a Slovak “anti-market bias” seems puzzling. After all, the two Central 
European countries are alike in their culture, history, and challenges they are facing. A 
look at the current surveys of public opinion does not suggest a marked divergence of 
views on matters related to public policy. In 2009, for example, the average views on 
economic policy-related issues were aligned in the two countries, with Slovaks holding 
slightly more pro-market attitudes than the Czechs on most margins.179 That suggest that 
even if the differences in ideology reported in this chapter reflected differences in the 
underlying mētis, it appears that such differences could be themselves subject to change 
over time.  
This chapter distinguishes itself from the other case studies in this thesis by providing a 
novel emphasis on the role of beliefs in explaining divergent policy outcomes. Whereas 
the other studies in this thesis explore the notion of policy credibility issues emerging in 
transitional environments, the present paper investigates the implications of the 
possibility that beliefs themselves can be independent drivers of economic outcomes. By 
exploiting district-level variation in different characteristics, we assess several 
hypotheses that may explain the systematic differences in policy preferences: extent of 
the market in the pre-communist era, religiosity and also the structural characteristics of 
regions in the early 1990s. It turns out that the economic conditions of the early 1990s 
have a somewhat stronger explanatory power than the deeper historical characteristics of 
the two countries. Religiosity, for instance, does not seem to play a major role in 
explaining the variation in policy preferences across districts, although the share of 
protestant population is significant in some specifications. Inclusion of the 1994 district-
                                                    
179 Table 15 in the appendix provides a summary of data from two waves of the Eurobarometer survey in 
2009, which cannot sustain the claim that an anti-market bias existed on the part of the Slovaks in 2009. 
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level unemployment rate reduces the observed size of the Slovak “anti-market bias” 
somewhat but does not eliminate it altogether. This is consistent with the conjecture that 
the observed differences in opinions between the Czechs and the Slovaks might have 
reflected the expected asymmetry of costs involved in the transition towards a market 
economy, with Slovaks carrying a larger share of the burden of the transition.  
Did policy preferences matter for the outcomes of the Czechoslovak transition? Given 
the identification issues a formal answer to this question would entail, we only provide a 
historical narrative of the political developments in the early phases of the economic 
transition, which were consistent with the underlying differences in ideology. The two 
parts of Czechoslovakia experienced very different political developments. In the Czech 
Republic, Václav Klaus and his radical pro-market platform became a leading political 
force. Simultaneously, in Slovakia, a political movement led by Vladimír Mečiar, who 
quickly ascended to power, displayed a much more cautious attitude towards markets 
and liberalisation. The differences in opinions about the desirable form of federalism 
within Czechoslovakia, together with divergent views of specific policy matters, led to 
the split of 1993. For most the 1990s, the two countries followed very different paths, 
both in terms of economic performance and policy making. The simultaneous 
occurrence of anti-market attitudes and anti-market policies in Slovakia does not 
establish a causal relationship, but it can be indicative of a link between policy 
preferences and policy outcomes. After all, beliefs are seen by an increasing number of 
researchers as the key factor affecting the institutional choices made by different 
societies,180 including countries in transitions.181 
At an intuitive level, cultural norms and beliefs may be important since they impose 
constraints on individual behaviour. Experimental evidence shows that cultural 
backgrounds are associated with different levels of cooperation in public goods 
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games.182 At a microeconomic level, Di Tella et al. (2008) find an association between 
left-wing beliefs and crime victimisation. But can differences in beliefs be associated 
with any differences in aggregate economic outcomes? That seems to be the agenda 
behind the work by Douglass North (2007), who had stated that 
it is much easier to describe and be precise about the formal rules that societies 
devise than to describe and be precise about the informal ways by which human 
beings have structured human interaction. But although they defy, for the most 
part, neat specification and it is extremely difficult to develop unambiguous tests 
of their significance, they are important. (North 1990: 36) 
The idea that institutions are underpinned by a set of beliefs held by individuals living 
in a society is explored in North (2007). That beliefs – or ‘culture’ – might be an 
important factor shaping institutional and economic outcome seems to be confirmed by 
evidence as well. Tabellini (2010), for example, identifies an empirical link between 
cultural norms and economic outcomes, showing that pro-individualistic and egalitarian 
cultures are associated with higher levels of economic development. 
Unfortunately, very little is known about the formation of beliefs and the specific 
mechanisms through which beliefs affect measurable outcomes. Di Tella and 
MacCulloch (2009) provide a partial explanation for the joint incidence of leftist beliefs, 
heavy regulation and corruption. In their setting, leftist beliefs are endogenous to the 
experience of ‘unpleasant’ capitalists and serve as a mechanism that reinforces heavy 
regulation that encourages further corruption. Obviously, there is a plethora of subtle 
explanations for the formation of preferences over policies – and the formation of beliefs 
about the effects of policies on economic outcomes, typically citing phenomena like 
rational ignorance,183 rational irrationality184 as well as the issue of individual identity.185 
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One question is whether departures from Bayesian rationality are observed in the 
political realm and, if so, what is the significance of motivated beliefs, departing from 
the baseline neoclassical assumptions of cognitive rationality.186 This chapter will not 
provide a compelling answer to the question of how beliefs about policies – or 
preferences over policies – are formed – in spite of a basic test of significance of 
individual socioeconomic status and various sources of regional variation. 
Instead, the aim of the chapter is simply to outline a mechanism through which 
differences in beliefs and preferences over policy may have contributed, through 
different voting behaviour, to different policy outcomes in the two countries. This is in 
line with a burgeoning literature on the cognitive nature of institutional change, 
pioneered by North (2007) who claims that the fundamental reason for the adoption of 
institutions by different societies is the prevailing mental models.  
Some authors, such as McCloskey (2013) or Mokyr (2010), go as far as to claim that the 
change in beliefs, and rhetoric about commerce or innovation, account for the economic 
rise of the Western world. Once entrepreneurship and innovation were regarded with 
approbation, more talented people turned towards the private sector, leading to the 
cluster of commercial innovation over the 18th and 19th century. The goal of this chapter 
is much more modest. Instead of presenting a ‘grand theory’ of the Czechoslovak 
transition, we merely try to make the case that differences in beliefs could have 
plausibly accounted for the different transitional trajectories of the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia. 
This chapter is connected to a number of different works that look at the effects of 
institutions on beliefs and policy preferences. Besides scholars who have investigated 
                                                                                                                                                        
185 Akerlof and Kranton (2000). 
186See Cowen (2003) for a discussion of mechanisms through which motivated beliefs can lead to 
political failure. 
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the changing demographic and societal landscape of transitional countries,187 researchers 
have focused on the determinants of support for economic reforms.188 Some of the 
findings suggest that private entrepreneurs, white-collar workers and university educated 
voters were generally supportive of the transition, whereas the unemployed, retirees, 
blue collar and agricultural workers opposed the reforms.189 Similarly, scholars have 
investigated the sources of support for revising privatisation in transitional countries190 
or the effects of economic hardship on ideology and political attitudes.191 In line with 
our own investigation – and using a part of the same dataset – Earle and Gehlbach 
(2003) find that receiving property through restitution was associated with support for 
economic reform and privatisation. Curiously, however, very little of the existing 
literature is focused on tracking systematic differences between countries or nations, or 
trying to explain those differences. Exceptions include the differences between citizens 
of the Soviet Union and the United States documented by Shiller, Boycko and Korobov 
(1991), the differences between former Soviet republics documented by Miller, Hesli 
and Resisinger (1994) or the wider Central and Eastern Europe documented by Rovelli 
(2009), Krkoska and Robeck (2008) or Runst (2012). 
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 provides some historical background to 
our investigation and provides a discussion of our data sources. Section 5.3 presents 
estimation results and assesses alternative hypotheses about the drivers of Slovak anti-
market attitudes in the early stages of transition. Section 5.4 provides a historical 
narrative explaining how differences in attitudes towards markets and economic and 
social policy affected the policy trajectories in the two countries. Section 5.5 concludes. 
                                                    
187 See, in the Czech context, e.g. Večerník (1992, 1997, 2002) or Machonin (1994). 
188 See, e.g. , Landier et al. (2008). 
189 Fidrmuc (2000). 
190 Denisova, Eller, Frye and Zhuravskaya (2007). 
191 Večerník (1995). 
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5.2 Background  
With the exception of the wartime years 1939-1945, Czechoslovakia existed in various 
forms from 1918 until 1993.192 In 1948, the Communist Party took over and the country 
became a part of the Soviet bloc, with a planned economy and a one-party political 
system. In 1989, the regime crumbled over a couple of weeks, as the violent repression 
of a student demonstration on 17 November in Prague triggered mass protests 
throughout the country. A swift change in the political leadership occurred, and a clear 
roadmap for the political and economic transition was drawn up by the new government. 
The cracks in the initial consensus over the direction of the country materialised quickly 
along the national lines. Ultimately, these differences culminated in the decision by the 
leaders of the two nations to divide the country into two. 
The Czech Republic and Slovakia emerged as two sovereign countries on 1 January 
1993, and followed different policy trajectories in the aftermath of the separation. The 
output slump in Slovakia was much deeper than in the Czech Republic, and the two 
countries also differed in the policies and institutions they adopted. For example, in the 
Czech Republic rapid and mass privatisation, including the second wave of voucher 
privatisation, was an important component of the reform process. In Slovakia, this 
second wave was cancelled (though the first wave of voucher privatisation had taken 
place earlier in the common state) and direct sales to domestic investors were the 
dominant privatisation method and they were used as a tool to build political support 
among potential party donors.193 Thus, by 1995, the inward stock of FDI in Slovakia 
was close to just one sixth194 of that in the Czech Republic.195 
Although Slovakia’s governing coalition, displaying anti-market and authoritarian 
tendencies, enjoyed public support, a broad group of opposition forces was able to 
                                                    
192 See, e.g., Heimann (2011) for an excellent, if revisionist, history of the Czechoslovak state. 
193 Haughton (2001: 749). 
194 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2001). 
195 See also Nellis (1999). 
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replace it in the general election of 1998. The new political representation later 
reclaimed Slovakia’s place in the EU accession talks and proceeded with many of the 
overdue economic reforms – bank restructuring and privatisation, bankruptcy law, and 
the daring flat tax plan196 which would turn Slovakia into a premier destination for 
foreign investors.197 
Our data come from the survey Economic Expectations and Attitudes from years 1990-
1993. We study six questions that in our view capture important dimensions of 
economic and social policy in the aftermath of the fall of communism – ranging from 
broad questions about the desirable economic system to specific queries about social 
policy, privatisation and health care – and which have the widest coverage throughout 
the different waves of the survey. The first question, Money For Competent, asks 
whether “[i]t is right that capable and competent people have a lot of money, even 
millions.” The second question, Transform SOEs, asks whether “[a]ll big state 
enterprises should be transformed into shareholders' companies or private firms.” 
Thirdly, Only Capitalism asks whether “[c]apitalism represents the only possible course 
of our future development.” Clearly, this is a broad and somewhat vague question, but 
the answers to it plausibly reflect the ideological positions of respondents and their 
beliefs about the desirable path for the economic transition. The fourth and the fifth 
question, Private Social Services and Private Health Care, ask about the respondents’ 
attitude toward the privatisation of social services and health care. The exact wording of 
the questions is as follows: “Would it be right, according to your opinion, that a part of 
social care, e.g. care for the elderly, would be performed by private institutions?” and 
“would you agree with the introduction of private medical care? The sixth question, 
Unnecessary Job Positions, asks whether respondents agree with the statement that 
                                                    
196 Brook and Leibfritz (2005).  
197 On Slovak economic reforms, see the symposium with contributions from Marcinčin (2004), Chalupka 
(2004), Melicherčík and Ungvarský (2004), Marcinčin, Pažitný and Zajac (2004), Ciaian and Pokrivčák 
(2004), Studená (2004), Javorčík and Kaminsky (2004). 
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“[u]nemployment should be prevented even at the cost of preserving many unnecessary 
jobs.” 
5.3 Policy preferences in the Czechoslovak transition 
In this section, we provide evidence of systematic differences in policy preferences 
between the Czechs and the Slovaks in the early stages of the transition. We provide the 
results of linear regressions demonstrating that even after controlling for socio-economic 
status and ideology, Slovaks were less favourable of a transition towards the market than 
the Czechs. This section then tests various hypotheses about the origins of these 
differences. Unlike other sources of heterogeneity we are assessing, it appears that 
structural characteristics, namely the district-level unemployment rate in 1994, has some 
explanatory power for the evolution of beliefs.  
Table 5 presents summary statistics of the six variables of interest in the Czech Republic 
and Slovakia, suggesting that systematic and significant differences in policy 
preferences existed between the Czechs and the Slovaks. Furthermore, those differences 
appear to be non-random, as they always go in one direction. On all six measures, 
Slovaks appear distinctly less enthusiastic about the market economy, income inequality, 
and market-based provision of healthcare and social services, and more apprehensive of 
the potential job losses involved in the transition.  
 
Table 5 Differences in policy preferences between the Czechs and Slovaks 
Please note: Higher values indicate stronger pro-market attitudes. 
For the questions 1-5 below, the answers are coded as follows: 1 definitely no, 2 rather no, 3 rather yes, 4 
definitely yes. For the question 6 below, the answers are coded as follows: 1 definitely yes, 2 rather yes, 3 
rather no, 4 definitely yes 
   Mean Coefficient 
on Slovak 
Observations 
 Variable name  Czech Slovak   
1. Money For 
Competent 
It is right that capable and 
competent people have a lot of 
money, even millions.  
3.08 2.78 -0.57*** 10,830 
2. Transform SOEs All big state enterprises should 
be transformed into 
shareholders' companies or 
private firms. 
2.67 2.40 -0.52*** 10,760 
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3. Only Capitalism Capitalism represents the only 
possible course of our future 
development. 
2.54 2.20 -0.64*** 9,130 
4. Private Social 
Care 
Would it be right, according to 
your opinion, that a part of 
social care, e.g. care for the 
elderly, would be performed by 
private institutions? 
2.90 2.58 -0.61*** 10,812 
5. Private 
Healthcare 
Would you agree with the 
introduction of private medical 
care? 
3.24 2.84 -0.78*** 10,828 
6. Unnecessary Job 
Positions 
Unemployment should be 
prevented even at the cost of 
preserving many unnecessary 
jobs. 
3.33 3.14 -0.46**** 10,818 
 
Coefficients from univariate ordered logit regressions against a Slovak dummy, * p<0.1, 
** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Slovaks were less willing to accept high earning of capable individuals (Money For 
Competent) and reported a weaker inclination to restructure or privatise state-owned 
enterprises (Transform SOE) and were more doubtful whether capitalism was the only 
possible outcome of the post-communist transition (Only Capitalism). In the same spirit, 
they were inimical about the prospects of private provision of health care and social 
services (Private Social Services and Private Health Care). Finally, they were also 
more inclined to fight unemployment by preserving unproductive jobs (Unnecessary 
Job Positions). Furthermore, as illustrated by the results of the univariate ordered logit 
regressions, these differences are statistically significant.  
To see whether the differences between the Czechs and the Slovaks can be explained 
just by variation in individual characteristics like wealth, education or urbanisation, we 
introduce a selection of control variables into our analysis. To estimate the statistical 
association between policy preferences and various individual characteristics, we run 
six linear regressions, the results of which are reported in Table 6 below. The purpose of 
this exercise is to see whether the apparent differences in opinions reflect a self-serving 
bias, and whether the recorded pattern in responses has nothing to do with the wider 
societal characteristics, culture or expectations idiosyncratic either to the Czechs or the 
Slovaks. Furthermore, our estimation controls for the role of political ideology, as it 
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might have simply been the case that the Slovak part of the country was leaning more 
towards the Left than the Czech Republic. 
Unlike in the univariate case, we use linear regressions instead of ordered logit. 
Provided that a large number of explanatory variables are categorical in nature, ordered 
logit or probit would provide potentially inconsistent estimates unless we have a large 
number of observations per each group.198 To address to possible problem of correlation 
of standard errors, we cluster them by district (Okres). 
Table 6 reveals that age is not a significant predictor of differences in policy preferences. 
Most importantly, the Slovak dummy is highly significant and has a sizeable coefficient. 
Income is weakly significant for some of the left-hand side variables but not for others. 
Higher levels of educational achievement are strongly associated with more pro-market 
attitudes. Unsurprisingly, self-reported political ideology is related to policy preferences 
in all specifications, and with the expected sign. What is somewhat more surprising is 
that the fact of being Slovak has a sizeable effect on policy preferences, both in terms of 
statistical significance and in terms of the size of the coefficient. That is true regardless 
of whether we include a vector of individual-specific dummies, such as variables 
controlling for political ideology, or whether we run a simple univariate regression, as 
reported in Table 5. The regressions reported in Table 6 also contain time-variant effects 





                                                    
198 Greene (2008, p. 805). 
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Table 6 Linear regressions against a vector of individual characteristics, standard errors 
clustered by district 
 
* p<0.1  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01 
 
Why do we observe a consistent anti-market pattern in the attitudes reported by Slovak 
respondents, which cannot be explained by variation in the observed individual-specific 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 















Age 0.006 -0.002 -0.007 -0.001 -0.003 0.012** 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
Age2 -0.000*** -0.000 0.000 -0.000** -0.000 -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Slovak -0.271*** -0.216*** -0.276*** -0.261*** -0.382*** -0.145*** 
 (0.042) (0.033) (0.040) (0.041) (0.041) (0.031) 
LnIncome 0.006 0.018 0.025 0.002 0.042*** 0.023* 
 (0.016) (0.013) (0.016) (0.018) (0.014) (0.013) 
Married -0.005 0.025 -0.067** -0.025 0.049 0.025 
 (0.031) (0.039) (0.033) (0.041) (0.031) (0.035) 
Divorced/W
idow 
0.025 -0.002 -0.024 0.044 0.022 -0.010 
 (0.044) (0.051) (0.050) (0.057) (0.048) (0.048) 
FinSecure 0.299*** 0.150*** 0.240*** 0.188*** 0.246*** 0.175*** 
 (0.026) (0.031) (0.027) (0.032) (0.029) (0.024) 
Left -0.237*** -0.334*** -0.434*** -0.167*** -0.195*** -0.124*** 
 (0.038) (0.034) (0.035) (0.032) (0.033) (0.032) 
Right 0.259*** 0.250*** 0.377*** 0.253*** 0.237*** 0.176*** 
 (0.027) (0.031) (0.028) (0.028) (0.027) (0.024) 
Above100 0.214*** 0.009 0.148*** 0.096*** 0.112*** -0.011 
 (0.044) (0.040) (0.042) (0.035) (0.034) (0.040) 
Above20 0.103** -0.009 0.081* 0.047 0.104*** 0.034 
 (0.041) (0.036) (0.044) (0.043) (0.040) (0.034) 
University 0.374*** 0.086** 0.124*** 0.127*** 0.366*** 0.341*** 
 (0.039) (0.043) (0.042) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) 
HighSchool 0.294*** 0.081*** 0.085*** 0.105*** 0.278*** 0.300*** 
 (0.034) (0.031) (0.028) (0.030) (0.030) (0.029) 
Vocational 0.147*** 0.076*** 0.058** 0.062** 0.127*** 0.124*** 
 (0.027) (0.029) (0.027) (0.029) (0.027) (0.028) 
Male 0.133*** 0.073*** 0.073*** -0.095*** -0.018 0.078*** 
 (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.019) (0.021) (0.020) 
Wave 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes  
N 6959 6920 6933 6951 6958 6954 
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characteristics? Several explanations are available, although discriminating between 
them is problematic. 
First, the differences in attitudes between the Czechs and the Slovaks could be explained 
by deeper differences in legal origins, institutional histories and culture between the two 
countries, which would date back to the era before the foundation of Czechoslovakia. 
Unfortunately, such hypothesis is not testable as it would require a larger sample of 
countries than just the Czech Republic and Slovakia.  
Another option is that the differences in beliefs were not driven by differences between 
the Czech Republic and Slovak but rather by variation at the local level. Specifically, we 
test whether pre-communist levels of economic development and market size affect the 
left-hand side variables. To test that hypothesis we exploit the variation between Czech 
and Slovak districts (Okresy).  
Among the various explanatory variables that were tried in various specifications (not 
reported here) is a Prague dummy. Clearly, Prague had long been a sizeable economic 
and cultural centre, so one may hypothesise that it was driving at least some of the 
differences between the two countries. While significant in some specifications, it has 
little explanatory power. We have also used two measures correlated with the level of 
overall economic development before the communist era - namely geographic distance 
(using available roads) from the former royal capital, which was Prague in the case of 
the territory of the modern Czech Republic, and Budapest in the case of modern 
Slovakia. Distance from the capital is significant in most regressions. However, its 
inclusion does not much change the size of the coefficient on Slovak, suggesting that its 
explanatory power is limited. Likewise, the population of the capital city of the district 
in 1880 has only a very small explanatory power in accounting for the differences in 
beliefs. 
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Finally, regions that had to undergo a deeper and more painful economic adjustment 
during the transition and the individuals living in those regions could have plausibly 
been more opposed to economic reforms, even after controlling for their own socio-
economic status. We proxy for the depth of the transitional economic adjustment by 
district-level unemployment in 1994. We use the year 1994 because in that year the 
cross-district variance in unemployment rates was the highest from all of the periods 
under consideration. While unemployment is not an encompassing measure of the 
transitional costs, it is illustrative. Regional differences in former Czechoslovakia were – 
and still remain – significant. In 1994, many of the Slovak districts found themselves 
with unemployment exceeding 20 percent, whereas unemployment in all of the Czech 
districts was in single digits.  
Table 7 provides the results of a joint test of a variety of different explanations for the 
Slovak “anti-market bias,” including district-level measures of religiosity and 
Protestantism. We have also included these alternative explanations into regressions one 
by one, without producing qualitatively different results. The main finding revealed in 
Table 7 is that the Slovak dummy does not become insignificant in five out of six 
specifications, although its size and significance is reduced somewhat. This suggests that 
the available local sources of variation are not successful in accounting fully for the 
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Table 7 Linear regressions, including a variety of alternative explanations, standard 
errors clustered by district. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 














Age 0.006 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 0.012** 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
Age2 -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000** -0.000 -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Slovak -0.171** -0.066 -0.066 -0.160** -0.207*** -0.073 
 (0.080) (0.065) (0.065) (0.074) (0.065) (0.066) 
LnIncome 0.007 0.020 0.020 0.005 0.043*** 0.025* 
 (0.016) (0.013) (0.013) (0.017) (0.014) (0.013) 
Married 0.001 0.030 0.030 -0.019 0.053* 0.028 
 (0.031) (0.039) (0.039) (0.040) (0.032) (0.035) 
Divorced/ 
Widow 
0.021 -0.004 -0.004 0.040 0.017 -0.013 
 (0.044) (0.050) (0.050) (0.056) (0.047) (0.048) 
FinSecure 0.295*** 0.147*** 0.147*** 0.185*** 0.240*** 0.171*** 
 (0.026) (0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.029) (0.024) 
Left -0.238*** -0.335*** -0.335*** -
0.170*** 
-0.197*** -0.124*** 
 (0.038) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.032) 
Right 0.252*** 0.249*** 0.249*** 0.250*** 0.232*** 0.172*** 
 (0.026) (0.031) (0.031) (0.028) (0.026) (0.023) 
Above100 0.114** -0.050 -0.050 0.030 0.003 -0.022 
 (0.049) (0.044) (0.044) (0.059) (0.045) (0.070) 
Above20 0.116*** -0.004 -0.004 0.058 0.114*** 0.038 
 (0.039) (0.035) (0.035) (0.044) (0.039) (0.034) 
University 0.375*** 0.084** 0.084** 0.124*** 0.367*** 0.343*** 
 (0.039) (0.042) (0.042) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) 
HighSchool 0.291*** 0.081** 0.081** 0.103*** 0.276*** 0.300*** 
 (0.034) (0.031) (0.031) (0.030) (0.030) (0.029) 
Vocational 0.145*** 0.076*** 0.076*** 0.061** 0.126*** 0.123*** 
 (0.027) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.027) (0.028) 
Male 0.134*** 0.073*** 0.073*** -
0.095*** 
-0.017 0.079*** 
 (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.019) (0.021) (0.020) 
Prague 0.033 0.069 0.069 0.077 -0.066 0.275* 
 (0.124) (0.152) (0.152) (0.142) (0.122) (0.151) 
Unemployment
1994 
-0.013** -0.010** -0.010** -0.010** -0.015*** -0.005 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) 
Industry -0.294 -0.030 -0.030 -0.046 -0.388 -0.002 
 (0.233) (0.230) (0.230) (0.280) (0.257) (0.265) 
PopCap1880 0.004 -0.003 -0.003 0.001 0.003 -0.015 
 (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.012) 
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p<0.1  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01 
 
5.4 Popular attitudes and Czechoslovak transition 
We do not formally test the hypothesis that differences in ideology caused different 
policy outcomes in the two countries – that exercise is doomed by the small sample 
size, with the relevant variation occurring between two countries, and no obvious 
instrumental variables available. Instead, we provide a historical narrative of the 
political developments of the early 1990s, which is consistent with that conjecture. 
Clearly, that does not allow us to rule out alternative explanations by a sleigh of hand, 
partly because the two countries differed in a number of characteristics that may have 
affected both the prevailing ideology and the policy outcomes. One thinks particularly 
of the initial economic conditions, as well as the structure of the two economies. 
However, while it has been demonstrated that initial economic conditions can go a long 
way in explaining the length and severity of economic recessions during the early 
phases of transitions,199 it is not clear that they can explain the different policy choices 
made in the two countries. First, our results show that they do not account for the 
differences in market attitudes between the Czechs and the Slovaks. And, second, our 
narrative presents prima facie evidence for the popular appeal of different policy 
platforms selected in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Indirectly, therefore, our 
                                                    
199 Heybey and Murrell (1999), Krueger and Ciolko (1998), Åslund, Boone and Johnson (1996). 
DistCap -0.304 0.030 0.030 -0.173 -0.293 -0.379 
 (0.290) (0.238) (0.238) (0.336) (0.293) (0.271) 
Religiosity 0.253 -0.149 -0.149 0.049 0.058 0.079 
 (0.198) (0.200) (0.200) (0.212) (0.181) (0.169) 
Protestant 
Share 
-0.170 0.097 0.097 0.725 -0.645 -0.519 
 (0.370) (0.419) (0.419) (0.465) (0.530) (0.416) 
Wave effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes  
N 6959 6920 6920 6951 6958 6954 
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account is incompatible with a perspective that stresses economic differences as the 
prime mover of ideology and/or policy choices. 
True, the structural and economic differences could have affected the policy-making 
process in Czechoslovakia by routes other than through popular attitudes. Most 
importantly, the different economic structures could have given rise to different 
coalitions of interest groups, which either supported or opposed the transition, and 
which clashed in the years following 1989. But such an approach would have to explain 
the unequivocal popular appeal of the radically different policy platforms in the two 
parts of Czechoslovakia. 
5.4.1 A brief history of economic reforms in Czechoslovakia in the 1990s 
At the time when communist regimes fell in Eastern Europe, Czechoslovakia was 
among the most rigid and sclerotic regimes in the region. The era following the Soviet 
invasion of 1968 was marked by a high degree of homogeneity in the party leadership 
and by a remarkable fear of change and reform. 200 As a result, in 1989 the 
Czechoslovak economy resembled most closely to the original Soviet planned system. 
Whereas, for instance, Hungary’s economy – dubbed also the ‘Goulash Communism’ – 
did include features of market based allocation of resources and private enterprise, 
Czechoslovakia possessed the smallest private sector outside of the Soviet Union, with 
only 0.7 percent of the GDP contributed by private non-farm enterprises.201  
At a political level, the transition was swift, complete and credible. Following the 
regime’s repression of a student demonstration, a popular mobilisation ensued, which 
brought formerly isolated dissident leaders into leadership positions. Through a series of 
talks between the communist nomenklatura and opposition activists led by Václav 
Havel, a quick transfer of power was negotiated, and a new “government of national 
                                                    
200 See Linz and Stepan (1996). 
201 Mejstřík and Burger (1994: 136). 
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understanding” was formed under the premiership of Marián Čalfa, a lawyer and a 
former communist official. Within a month, the former official power structures were 
made irrelevant for any decision-making, and were replaced by newly emergent party 
structures in the form of the Civic Forum (OF) and its Slovak counterpart, the Public 
Against Violence (VPN).202  
Although the nature of the political change was universally accepted, there was less 
agreement over the nature of the economic reform. As a result of the power structure 
emerging in the country, the key transitional debates took place not between the old 
party leadership and the opposition, but between various intellectual groups within the 
opposition, which had acceded to power. Hardoš (2009) provides a discussion of these 
particular groups. Most prominently, they included the radical reformers led by the 
federal finance minister Václav Klaus. That group comprised of Karel Dyba, Tomáš 
Ježek, Dušan Tříska and the young Vladimír Dlouhý. Their main opponents were a 
small group of former communist reformers who had fallen out of favour with the 
regime after the Soviet invasion in 1968. This latter group was led by Valtr Komárek, 
former head of the Prognostics Institute at the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences and 
deputy prime minister for economy in Čalfa’s government. In actual political dealings, 
Komárek was sidelined by the more apt Klaus, who proposed his own conception of 
economic reform in April 1990. Klaus’ conception had no politically viable alternative, 
as Komárek was unable to formulate his own reform agenda in the meanwhile. The 
relevant alternative was a proposal for a sequenced reform, put forward by František 
Vlasák, former Czechoslovak minister of planning in the Prague Spring year of 1968. 
This alternative proposal differed mainly in its views on privatisation, which was to be 
done only gradually – in sharp contrast to Klaus’ programme which stipulated that 
privatisation needed to proceed quickly. In May 1990, Klaus’ programme was adopted 
                                                    
202 Hardoš (2009) provides an excellent account of the power struggle surrounding the decisions over the 
economic reform, from which we are drawing in this section. 
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by the Federal government, while incorporating a small number of ideas from Vlasák’s 
plan. 
The election in June 1990 gave a strong mandate to OF – and to VPN – to proceed with 
their reform agenda, which they did. Price liberalisation was started on 1st January, 
1991, resulting in a temporary spike in inflation, counteracted by the central bank’s anti-
inflationary measures, coupled with fiscal austerity that was seen as an important 
component of inflation-taming policies. At the same time, foreign trade was liberalised, 
and currency convertibility was restored. Throughout 1991, the programme of ‘small 
privatisation’ was being implemented through a large number of small auctions aiming 
at transferring ownership of small businesses into private hands. At the same time, the 
preparations for the large-scale voucher privatisation were on their way. Much in the 
spirit of Rodrik’s (1988) idea of overshooting, Klaus’ reform agenda avoided the 
problem of policy credibility, which plagued some of the reform initiatives elsewhere in 
the post-communist space. By adhering to an ambitious reform programme early on, the 
government signalled to the population – both in the Czech and in the Slovak part of the 
country – that there was a determination to fundamentally change the institutions 
governing economic life in the country.  
It is worth stressing that in spite of a clear policy direction imposed by Klaus and its 
credibility, this was an era of heated discussions and disagreements, especially on the 
Slovak side. As a matter of fact, Klaus’ reform team was composed primarily of Czech 
economists, who had belonged to the same Prague circles. Their ideas never found 
much traction in Slovakia, where a different mode of thinking about the markets and the 
economy was more common. While the OF and the VPN shared some structural 
similarities as political entities emerged in the turmoil of the Velvet Revolution, the 
Slovak mutation was more ideologically diverse than the OF. By its name alone, VPN 
implied a limited political agenda – namely an end to the ‘violence’ exercised by the 
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regime – whereas OF was more open-ended about its ambitions in forming policy. 
Krapfl (2009) shows that the VPN emerged as a distinctly Slovak counterpart to the OF, 
leading to the demise of many locally formed bureaus of the OF, which emerged in the 
immediate aftermath of November 17. 
Many reform communists, including economists such as Hvezdoň Kočtúch or Augustín 
Marián Húska were co-opted into the new political movement, alongside the living 
symbol of the Prague Spring, Alexander Dubček. Unlike their counterparts in the Czech 
part of the country, Slovak intellectuals were taking seriously the idea of a “third way” 
between communism and capitalism. Hardoš (2009) reports that even before the 
formulation of Klaus’ reform proposal, a small group of Slovak economists published 
their own conception of the reform. Entitled “The suggested conception of a Czecho-
Slovak federation under the conditions of the market mechanism,” and published in the 
Slovak Literary Weekly.203 The essay is characteristic for its commitment to seeking a 
third way between capitalism and socialism, which would be suited to Slovak economic 
interests. The question of constitutional arrangement for the two republics was seen as 
critical for the “synergy of economic mechanisms,” which could be achieved only in an 
“authentic federation.” Although the paper is short on specific proposals, it is obvious 
that it does not see the transition towards market economy as desirable. Instead of being 
privatised, state-owned companies were to become “emancipated” and “socially 
owned.” The resulting pluralism of ownership forms would bring about a “symphony of 
effectiveness” by connecting “the individual, the enterprise, the communal, the national, 
the private and the mixed forms of ownership by the criteria of resulting synergy.” 
(Kočtúch et al., 1990: 13)204 
                                                    
203 Kočtúch et al. (1990). 
204 See also Hardoš (2009: 48-49). 
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5.4.2 The Velvet Split and the Czechoslovak divergence 
While it would be easy to dismiss the ramblings by Kočtúch et al. as inconsequential, 
they reflected a broader collective mood in the country, as indicated by the survey 
results reported in the previous section.  
That mood did have consequences. In early 1991, the VPN began to disintegrate. In 
May, a new Movement for Democratic Slovakia, led by former Slovak prime minister, 
Vladimír Mečiar, and his former colleagues from VPN, was registered as a political 
party in the country. Within months, it would become the dominant political force, 
perceptive of the nationalist undertones in Slovak debates, as well as to the existing 
anti-market bias. HZDS would not be a party that could be pinned down easily in 
ideological terms – rather, it represented a catch-all organisation, with a mix of policies 
and platforms to garner every available constituency, without any regard for 
consistency. We can see it as a rally party, unified by a fuzzy self-identification as the 
defender of “Slovakia’s interests.”205 Thus the HZDS and its electoral manifesto were 
representative of the market attitudes prevailing in the country. What is more, it also 
reflected the turn taken by effective policy making in the country, as can be manifested 
by programme declarations of Mečiar’s 1992 and 1994 governments.206 
In its 67-page electoral manifesto,207 Mečiar’s party did not oppose a transition from a 
centrally planned economy. However, in line with the popular views in the country, it 
developed a programme of slow, cautious transition, which succeeded in attracting wide 
popular support. Indeed, the document, with its series of rambling decalogues for policy 
areas ranging from macroeconomic stability, workers’ living conditions, energy, to 
culture and IT, tries to be everything to everyone. Furthermore, it spite of its clearer 
language, it is not difficult to detect the intellectual influence of Kočtúch and his co-
                                                    
205 Innes (1997), Haughton (2001). 
206 Government of the Slovak Republic (1992, 1994). 
207 Movement for Democratic Slovakia (1992). 
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authors, some of whom pursued political careers within the structure of the HZDS and 
who provided significant input into the document.  
The basic premise of the manifesto is that a satisfactory functioning of the free market 
could not be attained in the short run,208 hence government regulation of the economic 
process was necessary throughout the transition period. The manifesto, alongside with 
later programme declarations of the 1992 and 1994 governments, emphasise sector- and 
region-specific industrial policies. Liberalisation of prices and wages was to be gradual 
and, more importantly, the prices – which were liberalised in 1991 by the Klaus 
government – were to be re-regulated by adopting a set of “overall regulatory rules in 
the area of prices.” (p. 23). In sharp contrast to Klaus’s emphasis on prudent fiscal and 
monetary policy, the manifesto promised to restore the aggregate demand in the 
economy, damaged by the output contraction of the early 1990s.209 Mečiar’s party also 
planned to “reconsider the process of voucher privatisation, because of the risk of a 
cheap sale of national wealth abroad, and the risk of concentrating wealth in the hands 
of a small number of owners.”210 (p. 23) 
The manifesto had a strong welfare dimension, with promises of state-guaranteed 
minimal conditions of living for workers’ families (p. 57), an explicit reference to the 
papal encyclic “Centesimus Annus,” (p. 5) – although HZDS was never an explicitly 
religious party – and promises of indexation of various entitlements to inflation. 
                                                    
208 Ibid.: 22). 
209 This is reflected in the 1992 and 1994 Programme Manifestos of the Slovak Government: 
“Development policies will form the basis of macroeconomic strategy, instead of the broadly applied 
restriction, which led to the decline in otherwise promising sectors of the economy.” (Government of the 
Slovak Republic, 1992: 8). “Reviving the economy necessitates transitioning away from a restrictive 
policy towards an expansionary one.” (Government of the Slovak Republic, 1994: 12) 
210 One finds similar wording in 1992 Programme Declaration of the Slovak Government, which stresses 
“ the specificities of sectoral economies, emerging characteristics of individual regions and situation on 
individual markets” which warrant “government participation in strategic sectors [of the economy].” 
(Government of the Slovak Republic, 1992: 13) Moreover, “[The government] will minimise the risk of 
cheap sales of national wealth abroad and an undesirable concentration of ownership.” (Government of 
the Slovak Republic, 1992: 14) 
- 124 - 
While other political forces – most notably the Slovak National Party (SNS) – were 
catering to the fringe nationalist electorate, Mečiar was astute in garnering popular 
support for his platform revolving around some idea of Slovak exceptionalism and his 
personal charisma. In the 1992 elections to the Slovak Parliament, Mečiar’s party 
received more than 37 percent of all votes, and entered into coalition with the nationalist 
SNS. HZDS was also the front runner in the elections to the federal chambers, which 
were held simultaneously. 
In early 1991, the OF started to disintegrate as well. In April 1991, Klaus founded the 
Civic Democratic Party (ODS), which then grew into the leading political group in the 
Czech Republic. The ODS was running on a platform of market liberalism and a radical 
departure from the practices of the communist era. ODS’ electoral manifesto thus stated 
that “it is the individual – and not the government – that is the foundation of economic 
prosperity, as he is the embodiment of economic activity and initiative.”211  
The manifesto articulated private property, freedom of contract and free markets as the 
essential principles of its economic policy, which revolves around the idea of complete 
privatisation of “all state-owned enterprises and state institutions, with the exception of 
those that provide public goods.” The ODS pledged to continue with rapid privatisation, 
price and wage liberalisation, balancing the budget and an opening up to foreign 
investment. Klaus’ message resonated among the Czechs, and in the 1992 elections, the 
ODS would become the leading political party in the country, entering into a right-wing 
coalition with a number of small conservative and Christian parties. Unlike its Slovak 
counterpart, the 1992 Czech government had the nominal ambition to accelerate, and 
not to decelerate, the process of transition towards the market economy: “The 
government considers the current momentum and speed of economic reforms to be the 
                                                    
211 Civic Democratic Party (1992). 
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lower bound of what is necessary for its continuation and effectiveness.” (Government 
of the Czech Republic, 1992: 5)212 
Unsurprisingly, the differences between the two leading political parties were congruent 
with the observed differences in attitudes towards markets and economic and social 
policy, documented in this chapter. HZDS’s electoral manifesto, just like the Slovak 
public at large, was more inclined to display the following features: 
 A lack of appreciation for economic logic. The manifesto implies that 
wage increases can be by themselves drivers of inflation.213 It also implies that modern 
economies need to be focused on manufacturing final, rather than intermediate goods, 
and that they should use domestic resources as opposed to resources that need to be 
imported.214 
 A sense of entitlement and egalitarianism. “The right of a person to work 
is an essential human right.”215 The manifesto is against any increases in the retirement 
age216 and stipulates that the government will remain involved in the area of social 
policy even after the transition.217 According to the manifesto, economic policy needs to 
take into consideration the social dimension of the transition and “accept the limits of 
what is socially tolerable. It is impossible to rely solely on self-regulating capacity of 
markets and expect the public to bring major sacrifices.”218  
 Economic nationalism. The manifesto suggests temporary use of trade 
barriers, until Slovak companies become competitive.219 Its case against voucher 
                                                    
212 The 1992 programme declaration of Klaus’ government also commits to fiscal restraint (Government 
of the Czech Republic, 1992: 6), and privatisation and fostering of markets as the main instruments 
promoting structural change. (ibid.: 8) 
213 Movement for Democratic Slovakia (1992:8). 
214 Ibid.: 22. 
215 Ibid.: 2. 
216 Ibid.: 3. 
217 Ibid.: 2. 
218 Ibid.: 5. 
219 Ibid.: 8. 
- 126 - 
privatisation is partly built on the concern over selling Slovak national assets cheaply to 
foreigners.220 
Let us recall that although HZDS was the leading political force ahead of the 
1992 election, Slovaks had a choice between a number of different policy platforms, 
including ODS’ Slovak franchise, the DS. That one, however, earned only a miniscule 
number of votes in the 1992 elections. At the time of the elections, it was becoming 
increasingly obvious that a simple continuation of the common state with the Czechs 
was impossible. This was due mainly to the divergence in the political platforms of the 
two leading parties in the Czech and Slovak parts of the country. After weeks of 
negotiations, a split of the country was agreed upon between Mečiar and Klaus.  
To a large extent, the rest is history. The Czech Republic and Slovakia emerged as two 
sovereign countries on 1 January 1993, and they followed different trajectories in the 
immediate aftermath of the separation. Firstly, the output slump in Slovakia was deeper 
than in the Czech Republic. This might have owed more to the poorer initial conditions 
and structure of the Slovak economy than to specific policy moves. However that may 
be, the period between 1992 and 1994 was marked by a halt of the privatisation process 
in the country, and then, after 1994, by a lack of restructuring even among the privatised 
companies.221 In contrast, throughout most of the 1990s, the Czech Republic was 
perceived as the economic success story of the post-communist world, in spite of the 
recession and a banking crisis that hit in late 1996. Secondly, Slovakia’s commitment to 
democracy and limited constitutional government was in question for a large part of the 
1990s, as Mečiar’s government was implicated in a variety of scandals, ranging from 
corrupt privatisation practices to a case of abduction of the President’s son.  
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Mečiar’s attitude towards privatisation was peculiar. It was used as a tool to build 
political support among potential party donors; hence around 80 percent of the total 
number of SOEs were privatised during Mečiar’s era (Haughton, 2001: 749), although 
the government kept the commanding heights of the economy, including the gas and 
electricity companies, utilities and the banking sector. As illustrated in the 1992 
manifesto, HZDS had a reserved attitude towards privatisation by foreign investors – a 
factor that arguably contributed to less-than-ideal outcomes in the area of corporate 
governance and enterprise performance.222 
Although Mečiar enjoyed public support, the collective mood in Slovakia began to 
change in the second half of the 1990s. In the general election of 1998, conducted in an 
almost revolutionary atmosphere, Mečiar lost office to a wide coalition of pro-EU 
parties who would later reclaim Slovakia’s place in the accession talks and who would 
also proceed with numerous economic reforms – bank restructuring and privatisation, 
bankruptcy law, and eventually with the daring flat tax plan, which would turn Slovakia 
into a premier destination for foreign investors. 
Interestingly, while in the early 1990s Slovaks displayed a significant degree of 
scepticism about rapid pro-market reforms, in the 2000s the Slovaks earned themselves 
the reputation of being among the most zealous reformers in Central and Eastern Europe 
– pioneering the flat tax, for instance,223 or moving towards a privatisation of social 
security.224  
5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter demonstrates that Czech and Slovak policy preferences differed widely in 
the aftermath of the fall of communism. On a variety of survey measures, Slovaks had a 
strong and consistent aversion against the market and private enterprise.  
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Why was that the case? Explanations that rely on variation in historical features of the 
two societies, such as the religiosity or extent of the market or degree of remoteness or 
proximity to major urban centres, seem to bear only a weak relationship to the observed 
differences in beliefs. Similarly, explanations that use variation in collective memory of 
the pre-communist era do not appear to be consistent with the data, although our proxies 
for something as effusive and delicate as “collective memory” are imperfect. Economic 
structure, measured by 1994 district-level unemployment, seems to be related to the 
observed measures of market-related beliefs but does not account for the observed 
Slovak anti-market bias. The Czech part of the country and Slovakia were subjected to 
the same initial policy shock in the early 1990s – the ambitious economic reform 
programme devised by the federal government. For that reason, it would be difficult to 
explain the differences in subsequent policy trajectories of the two countries by, say, 
different degrees of credibility of the reform programme. However, it is conceivable that 
people in the two parts of the country had different perceptions of the possible effects of 
reforms – and that there was an asymmetry in the expectations of costs and benefits that 
a radical reform process would generate. 
The historical narrative provided in this chapter is consistent with the conjecture that 
differences in attitudes towards markets and economic and social policy were driving the 
events that led to different policy outcomes in the two parts of the country. An important 
avenue for future research would consist of showing formally that policy preferences 
and beliefs about markets matter for institutional and economic outcomes or for public 
policy. That is a difficult exercise, given the nature of identification problems involved. 
While we do not offer such identification strategy, we are tempted to argue that the 
causal link between beliefs and policy preferences on the one hand and economic, 
institutional and policy outcomes on the other hand, is plausible, and perhaps necessary 
if we are to advance our understanding of institutional change or policy reforms. 
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6 Conclusion 
This thesis attempts to establish that two, largely understudied, factors affect the 
outcomes of policy changes and transitions. Firstly, efficiency-enhancing policy 
changes may not occur if policymakers pursue self-interest instead of public interest, 
and if mechanisms aligning self-seeking behaviour and public interest are weak. 
Incentive problems in politics can take many different forms, and may affect voters, 
policymakers, or bureaucrats charged with implementing a policy change. This thesis 
has focused on a particular category of incentive problems – namely on problems of 
credibility. Policies can be understood as contracts between the population and 
policymakers. And just like private contracts, they are based on promises that can be 
broken. How the risk of reneging on promises affects the set of possible policy 
outcomes or the characteristics of the political arena constituted one basic set of 
questions that this thesis purports to address. 
Secondly, measurable differences in policy preferences – or in the prevailing beliefs 
about effects of economic policies – affect outcomes of changes in policies, as does the 
knowledge available to voters and policymakers. This issue is part of a broader set of 
questions of how much ‘cognitive’ and ‘behavioural’ limitations, and the set of 
underlying cultural norms, practices and expectations – mētis  – affect the outcomes of 
changes in policies and formal institutions. One of the chapters in this thesis attempted 
to study, on the example of the economic transition in Czechoslovakia, the role that 
collective beliefs play in economic and political transitions. 
Before discussing the specific implications of the three case studies, it is worth recalling 
that in the review of literature on post-communist transitions in Chapter 1 we 
established the following four regularities: 
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 (1) Successful reform strategies focus on controllable variables, as opposed to 
factors that are out of policymakers’ reach; 
(2) Policymakers should focus on a small number of known and measurable 
variables, as opposed to a large number of complex variables, the interactions of 
which they might not fully understand; 
(3) Credibility matters. Successful reform strategies in transitional environments 
must be able to overcome the problem of the lack of credibility. Speed, 
completeness of changes, and their irreversibility seem to achieve that; and 
(4) Initial conditions matter. Besides differences in levels of economic 
development, institutional, legal and political legacies, transitional economies 
differed in the preferences, beliefs and mental models of the general public. 
The findings of the three case studies presented in this thesis are consistent with those 
initial findings, particularly with points (3) and (4). In Chapters 3 and 4 we identify 
credibility as being not only a factor affecting the outcomes of economic policies but 
also shape the political landscapes in countries of the Middle East and North Africa, in a 
way that is consistent with the public choice literature on policy credibility. Chapter 5, 
in turn, documents that differences in beliefs about economic policy and differences in 
policy preferences between the Czechs and the Slovaks in the early 1990s were 
associated with the differences in public policy outcomes that prevailed in the countries. 
Without pretending to solve the problem of identifying the direction of causality, it is 
our hope that this finding will serve as an impetus for future research seeking to 
establish causal links between beliefs on the one hand and policy outcomes on the other, 
particularly in the context of transitional economies. In the remainder of this concluding 
chapter, we provide some practical implications of our three case studies.  
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6.1 Credibility and subsidy reform 
Chapter 3, discussing the political economy of subsidy reform in Egypt has the largest 
potential for generating specific, practical policy implications. It is probably also the 
chapter with the greatest practical relevance for the immediate economic and fiscal 
problems plaguing Egypt. This is because excessive subsidy spending is arguably a 
contributing factor towards the country’s chronic fiscal deficit problem, which will need 
to be tackled quickly in order to return Egypt’s public finances on a sustainable path. As 
an International Monetary Fund brief put it, “[a] priority will be to implement upfront 
measures to begin reducing the fiscal deficit and ensure a credible, sustainable medium-
term fiscal trajectory.” (IMF 2012, p. 7)  
As stated in the conclusion of Chapter 3, a credible reform of subsidies will need to be 
(1) complete, quick, and simple to implement, (2) accompanied by a compensation 
scheme directed at those segments of the population who are deriving net benefits from 
existing subsidies, and (3) accompanied by reforms that would improve the functioning 
of markets in commodities that are being subsidised. In some respects, these 
recommendations are consistent with the conclusions of different studies that have 
synthesised the lessons from subsidy reforms around the world.225 However, putting 
                                                    
225 See, e.g. Vagliasindi (2012), World Bank (2005), Coady et al. (2010), Commander (2012). The IMF 
(2013) has recently revisited reforms in 22 different countries and summarised the key elements of a 
successful reform as follows: 
“(i) [A] comprehensive energy sector reform plan entailing clear long-term objectives, analysis 
of the impact of reforms, and consultation with stakeholders; (ii) an extensive communications 
strategy, supported by improvements in transparency, such as the dissemination of information 
on the magnitude of subsidies and the recording of subsidies in the budget; (iii) appropriately 
phased price increases, which can be sequenced differently across energy products; (iv) 
improving the efficiency of state owned enterprises to reduce producer subsidies; (v) targeted 
measures to protect the poor; and (vi) institutional reforms that depoliticise energy pricing, such 
as the introduction of automatic pricing mechanisms.” 
Furthermore, Roháč (2013e) provides a discussion of prospects of a subsidy reform in Egypt, drawing on 
the experience of successful energy subsidy reforms in Turkey, Philipines, Brazil, Chile, Kenya and 
Uganda. These reforms tended to be implemented by governments with strong popular mandates. In all of 
these examples above, some mitigation or compensation schemes were used to balance the impact of the 
reforms on the population. Growing fiscal imbalances seemed as a powerful impetus for reform. Finally, 
in all of the cases, subsidy reforms were a part of a larger reform packages that aimed to improve the 
functioning of energy markets. In contrast, Nigeria’s failed subsidy reform is an extreme example of how 
such reforms can be derailed if the population has a low level of trust in the government, which it 
perceives as essentially self-interested, if not predatory (Commander 2012: 25-26). 
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credibility at the forefront of the discussion leads to a departure from an approach that 
sees subsidies as a technical problem that can be addressed by political fiat, particularly 
because our approach stresses the need for a quick and complete reform. 
6.1.1 Completeness, speed, and simplicity 
In the absence of credibility, incomplete and gradual reforms are vulnerable.226 To 
signal its determination to reform, the government should opt for the costlier route of 
quick and complete reform, even though it can induce larger dislocations in the 
economy. 
Besides signalling, a complete reform helps the government to tie its own hands. The 
quicker the reform, the earlier constituencies emerge that will find it in their interest to 
defend the new status quo. It is true that there are few examples of successful wholesale 
reforms of subsidies, but gradual reforms, as implemented in the Middle East and North 
Africa, tend to be reversed later. Although, in theory, a gradual reform may be the 
correct prescription for governments that can credibly commit to a reform path, over a 
number of years, it is unlikely to be an advisable path to follow in Egypt, precisely 
because of the difficulty of making a credible commitment. 
Furthermore, a reformer would raise the costs of reversal by limiting the capacity of the 
Egyptian government to provide commodity subsidies, by closing down of government 
offices such as the General Authority for the Supply of Commodities or the sections of 
the Ministry of Petroleum in charge of price regulation of oil products. 
6.1.2 Compensation 
A successful subsidy reform will need to command the support of a large part of the 
population. This is difficult if the reform imposes economic costs on a large part of the 
                                                    
226 Rodrik (1988) demonstrates that the speed of reforms – as well as “going overboard” and pursuing 
more radical reforms than would be normally justified on welfare grounds – can be used as a signal of 
commitment to the reform process. Boettke (1995) provides a discussion of how a lack of credibility 
derailed economic reforms in post-communist Russia.  
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population. One manifestation of those costs is the increase in poverty levels that would 
follow the elimination of subsidies without any accompanying compensation scheme.227 
However, it would not be only the poor households that would be affected by a removal 
of subsidies, but rather much broader segments of the population – something that needs 
to be taken into account in redesigning the existing social safety net228 and introducing 
compensatory payments.229 Besides extending aid to vulnerable groups, policymakers 
will also need to compensate a large part of the affected individuals in order for the 
reform to command popular support. The key to solving the subsidy problem in a way 
that is politically feasible and sustainable is therefore to exploit the savings involved in 
eliminating the subsidy system.  
6.1.3 Complementary reforms 
From the perspective of the Egyptian population, the subsidies for food and energy 
shield ordinary Egyptians from fluctuations in their prices that would otherwise 
adversely affect their welfare. Provided that spending on food and fuels represents a 
significant portion of consumer spending in the country, any changes to subsidies will 
need to be accompanied by credible anti-inflationary measures on the part of the central 
bank. Post-communist transitions can provide instructive examples, because large price 
liberalisations there created inflationary pressures, with which some of the countries 
coped better than others. In the months following the quasi-complete price liberalisation 
in Czechoslovakia in 1991, the country managed to contain inflationary pressures by 
restrained monetary and fiscal policies.230 To the extent to which monetary inflation 
                                                    
227 Aboulenein et al. (2009) provide a CGE estimation of the welfare effects of a subsidy reform in Egypt 
under different compensation schemes. While the richest households would be affected the most by an 
elimination of energy subsidies, rural households would be affected as well, since they rely on LPG and 
diesel oil as the main sources of energy. The paper concludes that gradual price increases, accompanied 
by cash transfers targeted at poorer segments of the population would induce the smallest economic 
distortions and would be favourable for the income distribution. 
228 Egypt’s main vehicle of social assistance is the Social Relief Programme, directed at extremely poor 
families outside of the labour force. 
229 E.g. Vagliasindi (2012). 
230 See Drábek, Janáček and Tůma (1993). 
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creates uncertainty about price hikes of food and energy, a successful subsidy reform 
will likely require that the monetary pressures on prices be contained. 
Although food prices in the country are driven by the international prices, substantial 
downward rigidity exists, which means that falls in the international prices of certain 
commodities are not translated into decreases in prices for Egyptian consumers.231 Such 
downward rigidity reflects a lack of competition on food markets. The policies that 
accompany the administration of the subsidies, such as licensing laws, damage 
competition and contribute to food insecurity in the country. Although the country faces 
severe resource constraints when it comes to land and water, the government is 
encouraging the production of cereal crops, with per-hectare yields that are a fraction of 
the developing countries average.232  
Fully integrated markets in food and energy do not exist in the Middle East and North 
Africa. The Egyptian government could facilitate trade integration particularly by 
removing the most egregious barriers. The country ranks very poorly on World Bank’s 
Logistics Performance Index (92nd in the world),233 mainly because of complicated 
border clearance procedures, poor quality of road freight and railroads, and a lack of 
ability to reliably trace and track shipments. It remains an open question to what extent 
the poor state logistics and transport is a result of public underinvestment in 
infrastructure and to what it simply reflects the vested interests, which may be 
extracting rents in the form of bribes. 
The energy sector too has been marked by heavy-handed government involvement. The 
combination of subsidised prices and government-controlled refining and distribution of 
petroleum products deters entry and leads to persistent shortages. The government-
operated Egyptian General Petroleum Corporation controls a large part of oil production 
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and upstream activities, including imports of crude oil and refining. Similarly, Egyptian 
Natural Gas Holding Company, run by the government, manages not only the 
exploration of natural gas, but also controls other aspects of the natural gas industry, 
including the use of liquefied natural gas. The government is involved in downstream 
activities as well. In terms of sales of gasoline, 33.5 percent of the Egyptian market is 
captured by the government-run Misr Petroleum and another 30 percent is controlled by 
Petroleum Cooperative Society, Co., an arm of the Egyptian General Petroleum 
Corporation.234 
As a result, a subsidy reform in the area of energy ought to be accompanied by a 
systematic restructuring and privatisation of this sector. Different activities conducted 
by the Egyptian General Petroleum Corporation and other state-owned companies can 
be unbundled and privatised, and a liberalisation of prices needs to take place. In this 
sense, Egyptians can learn from the successful subsidy reforms in countries where the 
removal of subsidies was accompanied by a thorough restructuring of the sector, 
improving access, quality and reliability of supply, and bringing in competition. 
Furthermore, seemingly unrelated economic reforms could generate further support for 
the changes, especially among the urban poor. Currently, up to 17 million Egyptian live 
in informal areas around cities.235 The informal nature of the dwellings reduces their 
value relative to situation where there are regularised property titles. So far, the attempts 
to regularise informal ownership in those areas have been isolated236 – yet evidence 
suggests that legalised property titles would empower the poor and enable them to use 
their dwellings in market exchanges, as collateral and so on.237 Reformers could 
therefore accompany the necessarily difficult subsidy reform with a titling reform, 
which would likely prove popular among poorer segments of the Egyptian society – 
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although arguably this raises the question of whether such a reform could be 
implemented in a sufficiently short time frame . 
6.2 Political economy of Islam 
Our second case study, Chapter 4, investigates the surprising effects that credibility 
problems can engender within the political landscape of transitional countries, with a 
focus on the new and emerging democracies of the Middle East and North Africa. The 
chapter outlines a rational choice-based explanation for the rise of political Islam, in 
which religious political parties are able to address the problem of credible commitment 
ubiquitous in new democracies. Instead of having to rely on patronage as the only 
mechanism of making pre-electoral commitments, Islamic parties are able to directly 
make credible promises about the supply of public goods. This is because they already 
have a history and a reputation, which serve as mechanisms for making credible pre-
electoral commitments. Their reputation relies on a track record of providing social 
services in environments where governments have failed to do so. Furthermore, we 
argue that their religious nature makes them well equipped to overcome collective 
action problems. 
While this chapter is not susceptible to yield immediate and detailed practical lessons 
for policymakers – like the chapter on Egypt’s commodity subsidies does – it can be a 
source of a important insights that can inform Western foreign policy towards the 
countries of the Middle East and North Africa. If our account of Islamic politics is 
correct, then the efforts to eradicate religious political groups from the political 
landscape may easily backfire. Organisations that possess a distinct advantage at 
producing club goods and local public goods are also particularly well-positioned to 
engage in political violence. And, as Krueger (2007) argued, the exclusion of such 
parties from the democratic political process can be a source of grievances that will 
serve as an incentive for those organisations to continue the political struggle through 
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violent means. As a result, the direct implication of this study of political Islam is that 
competitive political process is essential. Competitive politics and democratic 
accountability will incentivise other political groups to invest in channels of 
communication and promise verification that will enable them to make credible pre-
electoral commitments, leading to an erosion of the electoral advantage that Islamic 
parties may enjoy in some transitional countries. 
6.3 Market-related beliefs and policy preferences in Czechoslovakia 
Our final paper, Chapter 5 in this collection, studies the role of cognitive constraints in 
shaping the transitional outcomes, with a focus on post-communist Czechoslovakia. It 
shows that systematic differences in policy preferences existed between Czechs and 
Slovaks in the early 1990s. In spite of having lived in the same institutional 
environment for almost 75 years and in spite of being subjected to the same policy 
shocks in that period, the Czechs displayed significantly stronger pro-market attitudes 
than the Slovaks. Those differences were not explained by a variation in ‘collective 
memory’ of the pre-communist era, differences in the levels of economic development 
before communism, differences in religiosity, legal origins or past institutions. To a 
limited extent, the differences in policy preferences can be accounted for by the 
expected costs of transition in different areas of Czechoslovakia, as measured by the 
unemployment rate in 1994, after the core of the initial economic reforms had been 
adopted. The paper also provides a historical narrative that explains how the observed 
differences in market attitudes affected policy outcomes in both countries in the initial 
phases of the transition. 
The conclusions of this chapter are perhaps the most uncertain and tentative. It appears, 
however, that processes of economic reform and of institutional change cannot be 
dissociated from the underlying structure of popular beliefs – or mētis. Although our 
work presented in Chapter 5 did not establish that mētis exercised a causal effect on the 
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creation of policies, the existence of such causal link appears to be a tempting 
possibility, which needs to be verified by future research that can convincingly address 
the identification problems involved. 
Finally, let us recall that the goal of this thesis was not to provide an all-encompassing 
model of policy change and transitions. It merely purported to show that an approach 
that takes into consideration the role played by cognitive constraints (mētis) and policy 
in shaping policy making and institutional change can provide a lot of mileage in 
explaining otherwise perplexing aspects of political economy of reforms. The case 
studies chosen in this thesis have been chosen to illustrate this claim and hopefully they 
will encourage other scholars to focus their attention on issues of credible commitment 
and beliefs – or on incentive-related and cognitive constraints to policymaking – which 
we believe still present important and largely unexploited opportunities for future 
research. 
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Appendix to Chapter 4 
Table 8 Islamic parties in the Middle East and North Africa 
Country Party  Year Founded 
Islamic Renaissance Movement (Harakat An-Nahda Al-Islāmiyya) 1992 
Movement of Society for Peace* (Harakat mujtama' as-silm) 1990 
Algeria 
Movement for National Reform (Harakat Al-Islah Al-Wataniy) 1999 
Freedom and Justice Party* (Hizb Al-Hurriya wa Al-’Adala) 2011 Egypt 
Al Nour 2011 
Jordan Islamic Action Front* (Jabhat al-'Amal al-Islami) 1992 
Tunisia Ennahda Movement (Harakat an-Nahdah) 1981 
Morocco Justice and Development Party* (Hizb Al-Adālah Wal-Tanmiyah) 1967 
Libya Justice and Construction Party* (Hizb Al-Adala Wal-Bina) 2012 
Islamic Group* (El Gama'a El-Islamiyya) 1964 Lebanon 
Party of God (Hezbollah) 1982 
Syria Muslim Brotherhood* (Al-Ikhwan Al-Muslimun fi Suriya) 1935 
Palestinian 
territories 
Islamic Resistance Movement* (Harakat al-Muqāwamah al-
Islāmiyyah) 
1987 
Yemen Yemeni Congregation for Reform* (Al-Tajammu'u Al-Yamani Lil-
Islah) 
1990 
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Table 9 Arab Barometer - Variable Description (1). Dependent variables 
 
Dependent variables  
People often differ in their views on the characteristics that are essential to democracy. If you have to 
choose only one thing, what would you choose as the most important characteristic? (231q) 
Elections Opportunity to change the government through 
elections 
Freedom to criticize Freedom to criticize the government/those in power 
Small income gap A small income gao between rich and poor 
Necessities for everyone Basic necessities like food, clothing, shelter for 
everyone 
How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? (232q) (Answers: 1 - Strongly agree, 
2 - Agree, 3 - Disagree, 4 - Strongly disagree) 
Bad economy in democracies In a democracy, the economy runs badly 
Democracies indecisive Democracies are indecisive and too much quibbling 
Disorder in democracies Democracies are not good at maintaining order 
Democracies best Democracy may have its problems but is better than 
any other form of government 
To what degree would you agree that the violation of human rights in [country] is justifiable in the name 
of promoting security and stability? (234q) (Answers: 1 - Completely justified, 2 - Somewhat justified, 3 - 
Not very justified, 4 - Not justified at all) 
Human rights violations OK  
In your opinion which of the following is the most important problem facing [respondent’s country] 
today? (withoutPalestine248q) 




U.S. occupation of Iraq Ending the US occupation of Iraq 
Arab-Israeli conflict The Arab-Israeli conflict 
- 159 - 
Table 10 Arab Barometer - Variable Description (2). Explanatory variables 
 
Table 11 Factor loadings and unique variances 
Variable Factor 1 (PoliticalIslam) Uniqueness  
q4011 0.4651 0.7837  
q4012 -0.8389 0.2963  
q4013 -0.8515 0.2749  
q4014 0.6173 0.6189  
 
 
Explanatory variables  
Age Age, in years (701q) 
Age2 Age squared 
lnIncome Log of family monthly Income in 2006 
international dollars (716q) 
Male Sex: male (q702) 
Uni Education: college diploma or higher (q703) 
Secondary Education: secondary (q703) 
Primary Education: elementary or primary (q703) 
Muslim Religion: Muslim (q711) 
Christian Religion: Christian (q711) 
Druze Religion: Druze (q711) 
Married Marital status: Married (q709) 
Involved Citizen Are you a member of any organizations or formal 
groups? (202q) 
Political Islam First principal component of variables q4011, 
q4012, q4013, q4014 (below) 
How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements? (1 – Strongly agree, 2 – Agree, 
3 – Disagree, 4 – Strongly disagree)  
q4011 Men of religion should not influence how people 
vote in elections 
q4012 It would be better for [respondent’s country] if 
people with strong religious beliefs held public 
office 
q4013 Men of religion should have influence over the 
decisions of government 
q4014 Religious practice is a private matter and should be 
separated from socio-political life 
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Table 12 Political religiosity and policy preferences. Logit regressions (1-4). Country 
fixed effects 
  
What would you choose as the most important characteristic of democracy? 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Elections Freedom to criticize Small income gap Necessities for everyone 
Age -0.010 0.024 -0.023 0.007 
 (0.018) (0.021) (0.018) (0.018) 
Age2 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
lnIncome 0.061 0.196*** -0.122** -0.151*** 
 (0.055) (0.064) (0.058) (0.056) 
Male 0.483*** -0.005 -0.236*** -0.307*** 
 (0.085) (0.093) (0.091) (0.086) 
Uni 0.218 0.234 0.115 -0.484** 
 (0.214) (0.241) (0.225) (0.209) 
Secondary 0.128 0.070 0.037 -0.059 
 (0.214) (0.240) (0.228) (0.205) 
Primary -0.182 -0.021 0.129 0.217 
 (0.209) (0.235) (0.219) (0.197) 
Muslim 0.358 -0.848*** -0.404* 0.682*** 
 (0.221) (0.258) (0.234) (0.227) 
Christian 0.345 -1.066*** -0.119 0.401* 
 (0.229) (0.265) (0.231) (0.233) 
Druze -0.633 -0.202 0.671** -0.037 
 (0.410) (0.368) (0.329) (0.386) 
Married -0.243** -0.019 0.088 0.178 
 (0.109) (0.116) (0.117) (0.108) 
Involved 
Citizen 
0.220** -0.041 0.115 -0.369*** 
 (0.104) (0.122) (0.122) (0.123) 
Political 
Islam 
0.137*** -0.040 -0.040 -0.059 
 (0.047) (0.051) (0.052) (0.049) 
N 3162 3162 3162 3162 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Full description of variables used 
can be found in Tables 9 and 10 in the appendix. 
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Table 13 Political religiosity and policy preferences. Ordered logits (5-10). Country 
fixed effects 
 How well or badly is the government managing the following matters? (1- very well, 2-well, 3-
badly, 4-very badly)  













Age 0.016 0.001 0.019 0.028** 0.036*** 0.030** 
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) 
Age2 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000** -0.000** -0.000* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
lnIncome -0.181*** -0.147*** -0.120*** -0.109** -0.177*** -0.042 
 (0.041) (0.042) (0.043) (0.042) (0.042) (0.045) 
Male 0.070 0.111* 0.224*** 0.224*** 0.203*** 0.360*** 
 (0.058) (0.058) (0.060) (0.057) (0.059) (0.060) 
Uni 0.157 0.219* 0.210* 0.152 0.282** 0.250** 
 (0.117) (0.118) (0.119) (0.116) (0.122) (0.123) 
Secondary 0.022 0.153 0.125 -0.002 0.128 0.217* 
 (0.118) (0.118) (0.118) (0.119) (0.126) (0.122) 
Primary 0.059 0.169 0.138 0.016 0.166 0.185* 
 (0.106) (0.105) (0.106) (0.104) (0.113) (0.108) 
Muslim 1.306*** 0.628** -0.350 -0.608* 0.326 -0.917*** 
 (0.297) (0.317) (0.313) (0.316) (0.314) (0.330) 
Christian 1.580*** 0.858** 0.007 -0.310 0.474 -0.551 
 (0.338) (0.353) (0.352) (0.351) (0.347) (0.370) 
Druze 0.117 1.265*** 0.549 -1.801*** -0.828** -0.210 
 (0.361) (0.419) (0.424) (0.375) (0.364) (0.434) 
Married 0.069 -0.061 -0.035 -0.080 0.019 -0.009 
 (0.071) (0.073) (0.072) (0.070) (0.071) (0.074) 
Involved 
Citizen 
-0.127* -0.199*** -0.155* -0.135* -0.102 -0.341*** 
 (0.077) (0.076) (0.079) (0.075) (0.078) (0.081) 
Political 
Islam 
0.006 -0.030 -0.009 -0.055 -0.008 -0.003 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.035) (0.036) (0.037) 
N 4372 4427 4317 4463 4469 4080 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Full description of variables used 
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Table 14 Political religiosity and policy preferences. Ordered logits with country fixed 
effects 
 Violation of 
human rights 
justifiable? 
What is the most important problem facing your country today? 
 (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
 Human rights 
violations OK 





Age 0.009 -0.014 0.040** -0.029 0.037 -0.042 
 (0.014) (0.018) (0.020) (0.035) (0.080) (0.040) 
Age2 -0.000 0.000 -0.000** 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
lnIncom
e 
-0.055 -0.084 0.089 0.096 0.416* -0.108 
 (0.044) (0.059) (0.063) (0.132) (0.231) (0.163) 
Male 0.042 -0.304*** 0.346*** -0.024 -0.361 0.224 
 (0.060) (0.071) (0.080) (0.164) (0.314) (0.179) 
Uni 0.248** -0.070 0.142 0.548 -1.087* -0.407 
 (0.112) (0.133) (0.146) (0.343) (0.613) (0.337) 
Seconda
ry 
0.066 -0.136 0.090 0.844** -0.938 -0.504 
 (0.114) (0.139) (0.154) (0.344) (0.604) (0.340) 
Primary -0.005 0.015 -0.071 0.451 -1.199** -0.170 
 (0.099) (0.117) (0.131) (0.321) (0.469) (0.292) 
Muslim 1.344*** 0.826** -0.870* -2.099* -3.105* 1.155 
 (0.320) (0.410) (0.444) (1.107) (1.884) (1.065) 
Christia
n 
1.885*** 0.243 -0.556 -1.683 dropped 2.043* 
 (0.362) (0.447) (0.486) (1.139)  (1.154) 
Druze 2.214*** 0.696 -0.484 -2.397** dropped 1.079 
 (0.461) (0.487) (0.527) (1.196)  (1.245) 
Married 0.074 -0.050 -0.067 0.216 -0.075 0.411* 




-0.146* -0.099 0.134 0.200 -0.519 -0.260 
 (0.078) (0.095) (0.103) (0.192) (0.538) (0.276) 
Politica
l Islam 
0.073** -0.039 0.143*** -0.107 -0.233 -0.152 
 (0.035) (0.041) (0.045) (0.097) (0.162) (0.109) 
N 4414 3561 3561 3561 3126 3561 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Full description of variables used 
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Appendix to Chapter 5 
Table 15 Policy preferences of Czechs and Slovaks, 2009 
(To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements? 1 Totally agree 
2 Tend to agree, 3 Tend to disagree, 4 Totally disagree) 
 Mean 
 Czech Slovak 
The State intervenes too much in our lives 2.30 2.25 
 Economic growth must be a priority for (OUR COUNTRY), even if it affects the 
environment 
2.59 2.29 
Free competition is the best guarantee for economic prosperity 2.17 2.02 
From the following items, which two should our society emphasise in order to face major global challenges? (1 if 
mentioned, 0 otherwise) 
 Mean 
 Czech Slovak 
Social equality and solidarity .44 .51 
Free trade /market economy .36 .34 
And in 2030, in the European Union, would you prefer a society where more importance is 
given to solidarity, or to individualism? (1 Solidarity, 2 Equal importance, 3 Individualism)  
1.43 1.43 
Could you please tell me for each of the following, whether the term brings to mind something very positive, fairly 
positive, fairly negative or very negative. (1 Very positive, 2 Fairly positive, 3 Fairly negative, 4 Very negative) 
Mean  
Czech Slovak 
Solidarity 1.89 1.80 
Competition 2.07 2.11 
Welfare State 2.22 2.13 
Source: Eurobarometer surveys ZA4973 and ZA4994, 2009 
 
Table 16 Variable definition and description 
Data for 1990-1993 ( Economic Expectations and attitudes, Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences) 
(For the questions below, answers are coded as follows: 1 certainly no, 2 no, 3 yes, 4 certainly yes) 
Money For Competent It is right that capable and competent people have a lot of money, 
even millions.  
Transform SOEs All big state enterprises should be transformed into shareholders' 
companies or private firms. 
Only Capitalism Capitalism represents the only possible course of our future 
development. 
Private Social Care Would it be right, according to your opinion, that a part of social care, 
e.g. care for the elderly, would be performed by private institutions? 
Private Healthcare Would you agree with the introduction of private medical care? 
(For the question below, answers are coded as follows: 1 certainly yes, 2 yes, 3 no, 4 certainly no) 
Unnecessary Job Positions Unemployment should be prevented even at the cost of preserving 
many unnecessary jobs. 
Controls 
Age Age in years 
Slovak 1 if Slovak, 0 otherwise 
Ln Income 
Ln of net personal or household income. (The wording was slightly 
different in different waves of the survey.) 
Married 1 if married, 0 otherwise 
Divorced/Widow 1 if divorced or widowed, 0 otherwise 
Financially Secure 
Reports that getting along with one’s income is very easy, easy or 
rather easy. 
Left 
Identifies as being ‘clearly on the left’ or ‘on the left’ in a self-
reported ideology question. 
Right 
Identifies as being ‘clearly on the right’ or ‘on the right’ in a self-
reported ideology question. 
Above 100 Lives in a city of more than 100 thousand people. 
Above 20 
Lives in a town of more than 20 thousand people but less than 100 
thousand. 
University Highest educational attainment: university education 
High School Highest educational attainment: high school 
Vocational Highest educational attainment: vocational training 
Male 1 if male, 0 otherwise 
  
Prague 1 if from Prague, 0 otherwise 
Distance from capital Distance from former royal capital (Prague or Budapest) 
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Population1880 Population of the capital city of the district in 1880 
Unemployment 1994 Unemployment rate in the district in 1994 
Industry District-level share of employment in the industry 
Religiosity District-level share of religious population 
Protestants District-level share of self-reported protestants 
Data for 1990-1993 ( Economic Expectations and attitudes, Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences) 
(For the questions below, answers are coded as follows: 1 certainly no, 2 no, 3 yes, 4 certainly yes) 
Money For Competent It is right that capable and competent people have a lot of money, even 
millions.  
Transform SOEs All big state enterprises should be transformed into shareholders' 
companies or private firms. 
Only Capitalism Capitalism represents the only possible course of our future 
development. 
Private Social Care Would it be right, according to your opinion, that a part of social care, 
e.g. care for the elderly, would be performed by private institutions? 
Private Healthcare Would you agree with the introduction of private medical care? 
(For the question below, answers are coded as follows: 1 certainly yes, 2 yes, 3 no, 4 certainly no) 
Unnecessary Job Positions Unemployment should be prevented even at the cost of preserving many 
unnecessary jobs. 
Controls 
Age Age in years 
Slovak 1 if Slovak, 0 otherwise 
Ln Income Ln of net personal or household income. (The wording was slightly 
different in different waves of the survey.) 
Married 1 if married, 0 otherwise 
Divorced/Widow 1 if divorced or widowed, 0 otherwise 
Financially Secure Reports that getting along with one’s income is very easy, easy or 
rather easy. 
Left Identifies as being ‘clearly on the left’ or ‘on the left’ in a self-reported 
ideology question. 
Right Identifies as being ‘clearly on the right’ or ‘on the right’ in a self-
reported ideology question. 
Above 100 Lives in a city of more than 100 thousand people. 
Above 20 Lives in a town of more than 20 thousand people but less than 100 
thousand. 
University Highest educational attainment: university education 
High School Highest educational attainment: high school 
Vocational Highest educational attainment: vocational training 
Male 1 if male, 0 otherwise 
Prague 1 if from Prague, 0 otherwise 
Distance from capital Distance from former royal capital (Prague or Budapest) 
Population1880 Population of the capital city of the district in 1880 
Unemployment 1994 Unemployment rate in the district in 1994 
Industry District-level share of employment in the industry 
Religiosity District-level share of religious population 
Protestants District-level share of self-reported protestants 
 
